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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examined the concept of administrative ‘capacity’, which has been employed 
to critique the ability of public administrations to implement development programmes in 
South Africa. References to administrative capacity in South African academic discourse 
have generally treated the term as a concrete item, often translated as public sector 
organisations lacking the ability/capacity to respond to the increasing scale of 
development needs which accompanied the country’s recent political transition. This 
emphasis has in turn raised questions about whether these bodies possess the requisite 
or sufficient capacity to carry out development activities, and where this is judged not to 
be the case, that efforts should be directed at acquiring this capacity, i.e. capacity 
building or strengthening. This thesis argued that this prevailing twofold interpretation of 
capacity was too narrow, because it did not adequately capture how the organisational 
and operational circumstances under which public sector bodies functioned, might 
influence their ability (in other words, capacity) to implement development programmes. 
The research question then focussed on identifying nd explaining those factors found to 
have influenced the capacity of public sector organisations to implement development 
programmes. 
 
This study adapted and applied a systematic framework of variables employed by 
Samuel Paul, to examine the organisational and operational conditions through which 
public sector bodies implemented development programmes. The application of this 
framework was influenced by the conceptual and theoretical development of this study’s 
interpretation of administrative capacity, informed by literature in comparative and 
development public administration. At a theoretical level, a key adjunct to the research 
question became: to what extent are bureaucratic characteristics of public organisations 
representative of those factors found to have influenced the capacity of these entities to 
implement development programmes? Employing a case study approach, this thesis 
examined two large-scale development programmes being implemented by South 
African government departments. Data comprised a mixture of primary and secondary 
sources, including 45 qualitative interviews mainly with government officials, and the 
analysis of government documents. Interview data was collected and subsequently 
coded against the framework of variables used. 
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This thesis identified four overarching factors found to have influenced the capacity of 
public sector organisations to implement development programmes: 1) the adaptability of 
programme objectives, 2) the flexibility of programme operating rules, 3) the functional 
accommodation of demands introduced by a programme, and 4) inter-organisational 
authority relations. The significance of these factors was also expressed in the finding 
that bureaucratic characteristics associated with the organisational and operational 
conditions through which programmes functioned featured strongly in this study. This 
primarily took the form of inflexible, inconsistent and conflicting operating as well as 
objective rules to which implementing departments were bound, which resulted in limited 
departmental flexibility and discretion to respond to the objective and operational 
demands introduced by the programmes. This also saw inter-organisational conflicts of 
hierarchy expressed through decentralised and horizontally-configured programme 
structures. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The capacity of the public service to deliver and expand basic services 
will be the hinge between a stable political economy driving development … 
[and] a volatile country beset with massive inadequacies in service delivery. 
 
 McLennan, Wooldridge (1995: 91) 
 
 
1.1 Overview of research problem 
 
This thesis concerns the subject of administrative ‘capacity’ and how it specifically 
relates to the ability of public administrations to carry out development programmes in 
South Africa. The relationship between administrative capacity and the implementation 
of programmes defined by development has, since 1994, become commonplace in 
assessments of the South African government’s performance. It was in this year that the 
country held its first non-racial democratic elections, which initiated a process of 
significant political and administrative restructuring.1 More specifically, the relationship 
between the capacity of South African public sector bodies and their implementation of 
development programmes has been premised on an expectation that these entities, 
functioning in a reformed system of public administration and guided by a new 
constitutional2 principle of equal access to services, would have to significantly scale up 
their activities in response to severe under-development that had become endemic 
among large sections of the country’s population. 
 
This premise, and the central role administrative capacity plays in it, was in fact evident 
before South Africa began its political transition in 1994. FitzGerald (1992: 63), for 
example, referred to capacity by alluding to the consequences of a future South African 
system of public administration scaling up its activities, by anticipating that ‘[e]ven 
assuming a comparatively non-violent transition and the adoption of an enlightened and 
                                                 
1Prior to 1994 the policy of apartheid, or separation between designed race groups (i.e. white, 
coloured, African, Asian/Indian), dictated government policy and administration in South Africa. 
This included public administration being divided into several public services attached to a white-
minority controlled Republic of South Africa, and various public services attached to ‘homeland’ 
and ‘self-governing territories’, created to house the country’s African population.  
2See Statutes of the Republic of South Africa-Constitutional Law. 1996.  
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coherent development policy, a future post-apartheid state will face severe constraints 
regarding its direct development capacity’. Also commenting prior to the country’s 
political transition, Koster (1993: 5) suggested that the capacity for strategic 
policymaking and planning should be the starting point for broader public sector 
transformation, where changes in the development circumstances of South Africa (and 
hence being able to respond to these conditions) were considered paramount. These 
changes and their implications for capacity were also evident in a post-apartheid 
government White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (1994). Pointing to a 
historical neglect of service delivery in parts of the country, the White Paper argued that 
‘[t]he capacity to implement development programmed [sic] in rural areas is a serious 
bottleneck, which will be addressed as a priority’ (Government Gazette 1994: 41). 
 
Three years into a new political and administrative dispensation, Wallis (1997: 89) also 
used the term capacity when describing the challenges facing public administration in 
South Africa. He stated that ‘[t]he difficulty facing the [South African] public services 
might well be summed up by depicting them as overloaded … The issue of institutional 
capacity is clearly linked to overloading.’ This remark resurrected a decades-old 
observation from the academic research on ‘development administration’, where Koteen 
(1972: 47) cited a United Nations official who commented that ‘planned development is 
necessarily a disequilibrium system where the ”administrative load” is continuously 
outpacing administrative capability’. Fehnel (1997: 374) offered another perspective on 
Wallis’s concern about overloading affecting capacity, by arguing that the ‘new [South 
African] government has the legitimacy which the prior government lacked, but it lacks 
the management capacity to plan and implement reconstruction and development 
activities on the massive scale it has promised.’ Finally, Luiz’s (2002: 594, 596, 601) 
more recent assessment of South African ‘state capacity’ was prefaced by the argument 
that ‘[s]tate-led development will have disastrous consequences where the state does 
not possess the capacity to formulate and execute a developmental vision’. 
 
Perhaps attesting to the enduring profile of administrative capacity in South Africa, the 
country’s Public Service Commission (PSC), a constitutional body charged with 
monitoring and evaluating the activities of the public service, has also linked the 
implementation of development activities with administrative capacity in its State of the 
Public Service reports. The PSC (2006: 30) specifically referred to findings from an audit 
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3 
of poverty reduction activities undertaken by government departments, describing the 
situation as follows: 
 
In itself, the immensity and diversity of the range of interventions that 
government has initiated to address poverty is strong [sic] indication of its 
commitment to a comprehensive and systematic approach to meeting the 
development challenges faced by the country. What needs to be done now 
is to ensure the availability of appropriate capacity in the Public Service to 
ensure their success.   
 
It is evident from the concerns and observations of researchers and government entities 
that references to the South African state’s administrative capacity tend to pivot on the 
question of whether its public administrations possess the ability to carry out an 
expanded agenda of development activities. The link between the need for expanded 
development and the explicit implications for capacity also arose in a series of interviews 
which were conducted with a group of South African public administration academics. 
These interviews were intended to supplement references to administrative capacity in 
the secondary literature. A number of interviewees noted that the 1994 political transition 
was accompanied by an increase in the demand for services from segments of the 
population that were not previously catered for. This arose in a political context that 
emphasised a more negotiated or participatory approach to implementing development 
activities. One respondent described this as follows: 
 
The state in essence was in a position where it provided services to less 
than eight or nine per cent of the total population, so immediately then you 
have a raise in demand for services from 10 per cent of the population to 
100 per cent of the population, you suffer from a serious lack of capacity in 
terms of the basic competencies, so that’s, that is an issue. 
  
Another interviewee also characterised the state as having a limited capacity to respond 
to an increased demand for services after 1994, but this time referred to the additional 
effect on public administrations of having to adjust to a more consultative approach 
when working with beneficiaries: 
 
[B]ut I think it did in fact greatly heighten the awareness in bureaucracies of 
the need for communities, and although that will result in tensions, I mean 
I’m a great believer in the idea that tension is not necessarily a bad thing, 
and that would be an example I think of the kind of creative tension that 
was produced as a result of the growth of expectations and the limited 
capacity of bureaucracy to respond to them. 
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The characterisation given to administrative capacity, in view of an increased demand for 
socio-economic services generated in a context of growing political openness was 
succinctly captured by Walker (1998), who remarked that government’s ‘lack of capacity’ 
had become a South African ‘catch phrase of the 1990s’ (see also SAIIA not dated). 
Furthermore, what can so far be described as a focus on the South African state’s 
possession of capacity has also been partnered by its logical conclusion: if concerns 
were expressed about public administrations not having the capacity to implement new 
development priorities, their capacity would have to be improved or strengthened. 
 
Other critical analyses of South Africa’s public administration have also observed this 
twofold interpretation of capacity. One example was a 10 year review study 
commissioned by the government to evaluate the implementation of programmes across 
all service delivery sectors since 1994 (The Presidency 2003). A content analysis of the 
document revealed that there were at least 30 references to capacity. Of these, 28 
references, or 93 per cent, related to either the possession of capacity or the 
strengthening and building of capacity. Making up this 93 per cent, 53 per cent of the 
references pertained to the possession of capacity, whilst 40 per cent dealt with 
strengthening capacity. References to the possession of capacity were characterised by 
terms such as capacity ‘constraints’, ‘sufficiency’, ‘shortages’, ‘adequacy’, ‘poor’ and 
‘limited’. Strengthening capacity was usually defined as ‘building’, ‘improving’ and 
‘enhancing’ capacity. 
 
Another example illustrating the dominance of the possession-improvement view of 
administrative capacity is the application of the ‘developmental state’ concept to South 
Africa, which was originally modelled on rapidly industrialising East Asian countries. 
Southall (2006) has given a particularly thorough overview of this debate, by outlining 
three ideological positions (economic liberals, Jacobins, developmentalists) taken on 
South Africa as a potential developmental state. What is most interesting in his analysis 
of these positions is the prominence of the state’s possession of capacity, as embodied 
in the bureaucracy, to drive development, although these positions critically diverge 
around broader policy questions of economic ideology, which transcend a narrower 
administrative focus on capacity. Southall (2006: xlii) interestingly observed that despite 
the ideological differences between the economic liberals and Jacobins around the 
state’s role in the economy: 
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5 
[T]hey converge around the issue of the seriously limited capacity of the 
South African state as it is today and raise important questions about the 
simultaneous short-term pursuit of “demographic representivity” and 
“efficiency” … Beyond this, furthermore, their concerns overlap with those 
of the developmentalists about how “state capacity” can be both analysed 
and improved, … 
 
To summarise: the issue of administrative capacity in assessments of South Africa’s 
post-apartheid public administration has revealed concerns that public sector bodies 
have lacked the ability to respond to the expanded and varied development needs 
arising from a major political transition. These concerns have been voiced in critiques 
questioning whether the country’s public administrations possess the requisite or 
sufficient capacity to carry out development activities formulated in response to these 
needs; and, where this has been judged not to be the case, that efforts should be 
directed at increasing or strengthening the capacity of these entities. Such a twofold 
interpretation of the term assumes the existence of a particular standard of capacity. In 
other words, employing the term to characterise public administrations has tended to be 
translated into some measure of sufficient human, as well as material and financial 
resources (suggested by the phrase ‘lack of’). Capacity is therefore treated as an item 
which is judged to be either adequately present in an administrative setting or not, and if 
not, requires remedy. 
 
Indications of this also appeared in interviews with South African academics, many of 
whom referred to human resource deficiencies when describing capacity: 
 
I say that they are well trained, we have enough well trained people in this 
country … we also have enough motivated people, that really want to make 
a difference … but the level of experience lacks and that is the problem with 
their capacity, on the job, the shifting things around on the job level, the 
level of experience is a problem. 
 
 
Other academic contributors also mentioned ‘experience’. One noted the ‘loss of 
institutional memory over the past 15 years, through the whole political process 
there were people with a memory of how things happened who were replaced with 
new officials’, adding that ‘loss of experience, which I think affects to some extent 
some of the development programmes’. Another mentioned that ‘the process of 
transition is still ongoing; we have new elites in government at the moment, they 
don’t have the experience that the old apartheid bureaucrats had, they are to a 
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large extent inexperienced, they’ve come from the outside, they must build up 
experience, they must build up knowledge where the knowledge base does not 
exist’. 
 
Finally, another academic contributor conveyed a broader and more mixed description: 
 
So, there are issues around competencies and commitment that impact 
upon capacity, some of these things are technical, some of it has to do with 
attitudes, and some has to do with basic, basic lack of just … the 
knowledge and skills of financial management, of public management, of 
the hard core administrative things. 
 
The latter contributor expressed concerns about more than just insufficiently experienced 
officials, by questioning the commitment of officials as well as their technical and 
managerial abilities. Concerns about a lack of management abilities affecting capacity 
were extended by other academic contributors, who added that that this could transcend 
a lack of experience and technical expertise to incorporate other features: 
 
[T]hat means internal reasons, and those internal reasons you can in most 
cases relay back to managerial problems, which means basically, coming 
back to what I’ve said initially, either ignorance of management 
requirements, lack of knowledge of good management practices, 
incompetency, and a whole range of different managerial problems. It could 
be a lack of commitment, it could be a lack of vision, lack of leadership, lack 
of strategic co-ordination, lack of operational project management skills. 
 
Relating capacity with management or managerial problems in public administration has 
a lengthy history in the academic literature. Heady (2001: 300) referred to weaknesses in 
trained administrators with management capacity, development skills and technical 
competence related to the execution of development interventions. Iversen (1979: 90) 
observed that ‘it is widely assumed that the failure of development projects largely 
results from a lack of managerial capability’. Finally, in ‘Key Problems in Development 
Administration’, Koteen (1972: 47) remarked that two decades of assistance to 
developing countries had produced significant improvements in administrative systems 
relative to sustained deficiencies in managerial capacity. He went on to observe that 
‘[n]ational development programs … have too often fallen short of expectations for 
reasons of managerial weakness’. References to management or managerial capacity 
suggest a distinction between managerial and administrative capacity, which can in fact 
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be traced to disciplinary debates distinguishing public administration and public 
management. Though recognising this debate, this study will elect to employ the terms 
administrative and managerial interchangeably in pursuing its primary objective of 
examining factors influencing the capacity of public administrations to function, where 
Lynn (2003: 15-16) identified references which either equated or closely related the two 
terms to scholarship as early as the mid-1920s. 
 
To summarise, observations from interviews coupled with references from the literature 
tend to foreground and emphasise a human resource dimension to 
administrative/managerial capacity. A problem with this interpretation of the term is now 
suggested. Although references from the secondary literature and interviews have 
indicated that a number of qualities have been associated mainly with this human 
resource dimension of capacity in the South African case, it was otherwise evident that 
the ‘lack of’ descriptor has remained generally constant. This has tended to be translated 
into some standard or measure of capacity being present, which, if not present, should 
be built or strengthened. This thesis generally accepts the notion that the lack of human, 
material as well as financial resources can have an effect on the ability of public 
administrations to function, where such deficiencies ought to be rectified where they are 
observed to be present. This study will argue however that relying solely on such a 
twofold interpretation of the term capacity limits the contextual scope for identifying 
underlying factors that could potentially affect these conditions. 
 
The research problem being proposed is that the prevailing twofold interpretation of 
capacity does not adequately explain how the organisational and operational 
circumstances under which public administrations function in South Africa, might 
influence their ability to deliver services and implement programmes. Interpreting 
capacity in this third way widens the limitation attached to a focus on the extent to which 
public administrations possess some standard of capacity in order to function, and if they 
do not that they should. This third perspective shifts analytical focus towards identifying 
the underlying features, embedded in the organisational and operational environments in 
which public administrations function, which can be observed as influencing their ability 
(in other words, capacity) to carry out their interventions. The distinction between the 
three interpretations of administrative capacity being advanced by this thesis may be 
summarised as follows: 
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1. The possession of capacity, usually based on assessments of whether public 
administrations have a requisite or sufficient supply of capacity to be able to 
function; where this is found not to be the case they are judged to be lacking 
capacity. This has mainly been linked to human resources, but may also include 
material or financial resources. 
 
2. The acquisition of capacity, which focuses on capacity being built or 
strengthened where public administrations are judged to be lacking it. 
 
3. The influence on capacity, which focuses the analysis on the organisational and 
operational conditions under which public administrations function, and to 
determine what impact these have on their ability to implement development 
activities in particular. 
 
The emphasis being placed on the third interpretation of capacity in this thesis is 
reflected in Painter’s (2002: 210) observation that ‘[t]erms like “loss of capacity” carry an 
evaluative and normative load, but they are principally about effectiveness, a means-end 
criterion concerning the attributes of a process that contribute to objectives’. This thesis 
submits that an analysis of the organisati nal and operational conditions through which 
public administrations implement development activities, which appears to speak to 
Painter’s emphasis on uncovering the ‘attributes of a process’, needs to be factored into 
and inform evaluative statements which conclude that these entities lack capacity. In 
accordance with this perspective, capacity per se, or what constitutes it, is not at issue 
here; the interpretation being pursued by this thesis does not assume that capacity 
represents an item that can be measured on the basis of a particular standard. Rather, 
the perspective of capacity adopted by this study emphasises the identification of factors 
which can be observed as influencing the ability of public administrations to implement 
development programmes. This perspective of capacity is generally lacking in the South 
African public administration literature, and it is hoped that this research can make a 
useful contribution to enhancing knowledge of this subject. 
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1.2 Research question and aims 
 
On the basis of the background just introduced, this thesis proposed the following 
research question: 
 
What are the factors that influence the capacity of public administrations in South 
Africa to carry out development programmes? 
 
The primary aim of the study was to systematically isolate, define and examine the 
effects of factors that can be observed as influencing the capacity of South African public 
sector bodies to carry out development programmes. The benefit of adopting this 
perspective was that isolating and examining the characteristics of such factors would 
enable additional explanatory and theoretical insights to be drawn about the 
administrative circumstances (the organisational and operational conditions) that 
underlie more common applications of the term capacity, that is, ‘lack of’ in South Africa. 
 
Before giving a description of the research methodology employed by this thesis, a 
definition of a development programme, which represented the object of this research, is 
given below. Agreeing on a consistent definition of a development programme was 
required in order for this thesis to select an object for empirical analysis. Before arriving 
at such a definition, though, it is necessary to briefly discuss the concept of development 
and consider its relationship with administrative capacity. 
 
1.3 Administrative capacity and development activities 
 
The term ‘development’, as discussed broadly in Political Science and Development 
Studies literature, has usually been presented as an umbrella concept, generally 
referring to a mixture of depressed social, economic and political conditions existing 
within particular societies. In this context, the term has also been employed to refer to 
Official Development Assistance, characterised by the transfer of various forms of 
financial and technical assistance from economically developed to relatively less-
developed or poorer countries, in support of activities designed to ameliorate these 
conditions. The use of the term development has therefore acknowledged that particular 
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conditions exist within societies which have required the intervention and aid in support 
of government bureaucracies and non-governmental actors. 
 
Without wanting to belabour a discussion on such a complex concept such as 
development, it is necessary to acknowledge that it possesses a multi-dimensional 
character, which makes it a difficult concept against which to attach administrative 
responsibility. For example, on what basis does one proceed to analyse the concept of 
development in relation to Wunsch and Olowu’s (2000: 71) description of the term, as 
incorporating a mixture of economic, social and political decision-making, involving 
complex and co-ordinated behaviour by diverse peoples across large areas of time and 
space? Having said this, the literature going back many decades did recognise, from the 
vantage point of administrative transformation in post-colonial societies in particular, that 
development diverged from other public policy matters around the idea of ‘change’, 
where this differed from the maintenance of law and order (Gant 1979: 20; Stone 1965: 
52). The qualities of change were concisely set out by Gant (ibid), who stated that 
change be directed at ‘stimul[ing] and facilitate[ing] defined programs of social and 
economic progress’. Attir (1965: 79) similarly described development as a concerted 
effort in various interrelated fields leading toward higher forms of social and economic 
life. The point that this study of administrative capacity ought to bear in mind is the notion 
that development seems to centre around decision-making and actions taken by 
government bureaucracies that are centred on changing (by seeking to improve) social 
and economic conditions in their wider societies. 
 
It is from this understanding of development that an association can begin to be drawn 
between the concept and the administrative interventions designed to respond to it. In 
this regard, this thesis elected to follow White’s (1987: 13) description of what a public 
sector-administered development programme should be designed to address, as it was 
felt that her threefold criteria coincided with how development has been described in the 
literature as well as the prevailing circumstances in South Africa. White has suggested 
that a development programme should be designed to: 
 
1. Carry out a nation’s development goals. 
2. Introduce change in a society or community to increase its productive or 
organisational capacity. 
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3. Improve the quality of people’s lives, including improvements in the well-being of 
the poor. 
 
A development programme should then speak to the articulation of a country’s broad 
development goals; promote the improvement and self-sufficiency of its targeted 
beneficiaries; and seek to enhance the socio-economic welfare of these individuals or 
communities. White’s description proved particularly useful for this thesis because it 
corresponded closely with the emphasis directed after 1994 on instituting far-reaching 
government-wide development programmes to redress backlogs in socio-economic 
services that had accumulated among large sections of South Africa’s population. 
 
This emphasis has perhaps best been illustrated in the South African government’s 1994 
White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, the heart of which consisted of a 
proposed ‘Reconstruction and Development Programme’ (RDP). The RDP was explicitly 
defined as a ‘policy framework’ as compared to a distinct development programme, 
consisting of five broadly defined and non-sector-specific programme areas,3 which were 
collectively designed to contribute to the post-apartheid transformation of the South 
African economy and government (Government Gazette 1994: 6-7). The five 
programming areas identified as part of the RDP generally corresponded with the criteria 
that White suggested a development programme ought to address: meeting basic needs 
(concern for qualify of life); developing human resources (i.e. enhancing the 
organisational capacity of communities); and building the economy together with 
democratising the state and society (which were major developmental goals in 
transforming the structure of a society which had engrained economic inequality and 
political repression). 
 
Chapter 9 of the RDP White Paper showed just how influential the framework, at least in 
its intentions, was designed to be, by making broad recommendations covering policy 
objectives, programmes, targets, lead ministries, institutional reforms, legislative 
programmes and financial arrangements for nearly all national ministries and 
accompanying departments, which in any event were in the early stages of 
organisational restructuring following South Africa’s first non-racial democratic elections. 
                                                 
3These were: meeting basic needs, developing our human resources, building the economy, 
democratising the state and society, and implementing the RDP.  
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The influence of the RDP for this particular study stems from its early attempt to 
programmatise, however broadly conceived, a collection of various activities across all 
government departments which were designed to contribute towards the comprehensive 
transformation of South African society. In this regard, the RDP can essentially be 
considered the progenitor of the many sector-specific development programmes 
sponsored by the government, which were elsewhere described in its framework and 
emerged subsequently in its wake. 4 Acknowledging the RDP was significant in that it 
directly informed this study’s selection of relevant development programme cases for 
empirical examination. 
 
The next section of this chapter gives an overview of the research methodology used in 
this thesis to empirically identify factors influencing the capacity of public administrations 
to carry out development programmes. 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
 
1.4.1  Research approach 
 
Gathering empirical data to inform the interpretation of administrative capacity being put 
forward by this thesis required a research methodology capable of identifying and 
delineating the organisational and operational conditions under which public 
administrations have carried out development programmes. This was a prerequisite that 
enabled the task of identifying factors observed as influencing the capacity of these 
entities to carry out these activities. It is instructive to keep in mind that the interpretation 
of capacity being advanced in this thesis was more exploratory in nature, seeking to 
isolate and systematically define factors, without presuming or hypothesising what they 
were. It became evident that a methodology designed to obtain clarity from potentially 
complex operational circumstances associated with the carrying out of development 
programmes would be preferred. It was consequently decided that a case study 
approach would be favourable for organising and analysing empirical data. 
 
                                                 
4Chapter Nine: Summary of Departmental Programmed [sic] to Advance the RDP, outlined 
department-specific activities, including programmes, in accordance with the broader objectives 
of the White Paper. 
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A number of methodological descriptions of the case study appeared to lend weight to its 
suitability and possible benefit to this study. In her book, Research Methods for Public 
Administrators, Johnson (2002: 51; see also Behn 1993: 44) observed, for example, that 
case studies have frequently been used to gain an in-depth understanding of a process, 
event, or situation, where its usefulness can be linked to questions concerning how 
something works, understanding a process, or examining people’s perspectives about 
an experience. Paul (1982: 12), who employed case studies to research public sector-
implemented development programmes, also commented on these methodological 
instruments as being a ‘fruitful means of capturing the complexity of public management 
and generating hypotheses to be tested through large-scale studies in future’. Of note in 
these examples is an emphasis on undertaking in-depth examinations, directed at 
understanding complex administrative processes, among other things, which lends itself 
to the interpretation of administrative capacity being advanced in this thesis. This 
focuses on analysing the organisational and operational conditions under which public 
administrations carry out development programmes. 
 
Extending the points made by Johnson and Paul, Jreisat (2002: 68), writing with specific 
reference to research in comparative public administration, defined the case study as a 
systematic research method concerned with context as well as variables, which primarily 
seeks to discover rather than confirm or test hypotheses. It was mentioned earlier that 
the research question introduced by this thesis did not presume or hypothesise what 
factors actually influenced the capacity of South African public administrations to carry 
out development programmes, given that the interpretation of administrative capacity on 
which it was based was largely absent in South African scholarship. Jreisat’s reference 
to context was also worth noting where, in its search for factors influencing the capacity 
of public administrations, this thesis focused on the operational conditions under which 
these organisations carried out development programmes. 
 
Another factor which favoured the adoption of a case study approach corresponded 
even more directly with the rationale behind this study’s research question. It was earlier 
mentioned that using the term capacity to critique the ability of public administrations to 
carry out development programmes lacked a sufficient explanatory grounding, and in 
particular an understanding of the underlying administrative circumstances that could 
affect how judgements about the possession of capacity were made. In a chapter on 
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case analysis research in Public Management: The State of the Art, Behn (1993: 44) 
observed that the objective of this method is to do more than tell an interesting story, but 
‘to identify the underlying principles that explain why a combination of specific activities 
interacting with particular circumstances produced the observed outcomes, and to 
describe those principles so that they can be applied to other situations’. Behn’s 
characterisation of case analysis corresponded with the explanatory course plotted by 
this study’s research question. In this regard, specific administrative activities were being 
directed at the execution of a development programme, where these were taking place 
within a particular set of operational circumstances, which need to be taken into account 
in so far as these could be observed as affecting the capacity of a public sector 
organisation to carry out these activities. 
 
1.4.2  Methodology 
 
This study selected two development programmes being implemented by South African 
public sector organisations as case studies. The programmes in question were the 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) and the Expanded Public 
Works Programme (EPWP). Both programmes corresponded with White’s threefold 
description of what a development programme should be designed to address, and 
could be traced directly to the RDP White Paper. The aim of the research was to 
systematically isolate and describe those factors that could be observed as influencing 
the capacity of the public organisations involved in executing the programmes, to carry 
these out. 
 
Another methodological feature of this study is that it deliberately selected case 
programmes that were in the midst of their implementation, and so had not yet been 
completed or concluded. This study was therefore not fully retrospective, where the 
rationale for selecting currently implemented development programmes was driven by 
the increased likelihood that more secondary documents and key informants would be 
available for analysis and interviews respectively. The research covered by this thesis 
spanned the period 2004-2007 since both programme cases began implementation in 
2004 and were still operating by the end of 2007. It should be added that the research 
conducted by this thesis was not intended to evaluate the two programmes in terms of 
their end of term outputs, outcomes, and impacts, which a fully retrospective study would 
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require, but was intended to extract scholarly insights into the organisational and 
operational conditions under which the programmes functioned in practice, in order to 
make observations about factors influencing the capacity of their implementing public 
bodies. 
 
The process of systematically examining the implementation of two case study 
development programmes relied on an analytical framework that was selected because 
it was judged to be relevant for isolating factors observed as influencing the capacity of 
government departments to carry out these programmes. This thesis adapted a 
framework employed by Paul (1982, 1983) to analyse public sector-implemented 
development programmes, where Paul also researched and presented his analysis in 
the form of case studies. The advantage of Paul’s framework was that it could be 
translated for systematically examining the public organisational and operational 
circumstances under which development programmes were carried out, based on four 
variables: a programme’s environment, strategy, structure, and processes. Paul’s 
description of these variables was deemed especially relevant for this thesis because 
these acted as a lens through which the activities engaged in by public administrations 
to carry out the programmes could be discerned, and correspondingly for factors 
influencing their capacity to do so to be identified and examined. 
 
A mixture of secondary and primary data analysis was critical for this study in attempting 
to maximise the analytical breadth of the case study approach, and to establish as wide 
an understanding as possible of the organisational and operational conditions under 
which public administrations carried out development programmes. The secondary data 
consisted largely of official government documents outlining the planning and 
implementation of the two development programmes under study. This mostly comprised 
programme-related documents produced by their implementing government 
departments, and available in the public domain, as well as materials procured directly 
from departments by the researcher. 
 
The primary data accumulated by this thesis consisted of 45 qualitative interviews. 
These interviews were held with a broad spectrum of senior government officials, non-
governmental actors directly involved in programme implementation, and the academics 
referred to earlier. The findings from these interviews, together with the secondary data, 
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were combined in the final analysis to reveal factors that could be observed as 
influencing the capacity of implementing departments to carry out the development 
programmes under study. 
 
The next section will give a general overview of the structure of this thesis, together with 
a summary of its contents. 
 
1.5 Structure of thesis and summary of contents 
 
This thesis consists of nine chapters and three appendices. The introductory chapter has 
identified administrative capacity as the subject of its enquiry. It has given a brief 
overview of the research problem associated with the treatment of capacity, which 
exposed how the issue was interpreted in relation to the carrying out of development 
programmes by public administrations in South Africa. The problem identified was that 
interpretations of the South African government’s capacity had tended to be more 
narrowly confined to whether public bodies possessed some standard of capacity, 
usually expressed in human resource terms, which did not sufficiently take into account 
underlying administrative circumstances which influenced the ability of these bodies to 
carry out development activities. A research question was then proposed based on this 
perspective. The introductory chapter has also described the methodology employed by 
this thesis to generate empirical data to inform its research question. 
 
Chapter 2 will present a review of the academic literature that has specifically dealt with 
the issue of administrative capacity in developing countries. This review will help to 
establish a working definition of administrative capacity, which corresponds to the 
interpretation of capacity introduced in this chapter. The literature review will then locate 
this working definition of administrative capacity in a wider conceptual discussion of the 
issue, which has for instance been extensively dealt with in literature associated with 
comparative and development administration. Reviewing this scholarship will also enable 
this thesis to make theoretical and methodological observations on how best to apply its 
working definition of administrative capacity. 
 
Building on the literature review carried out in chapter 2, chapter 3 will present a 
framework of analysis for collecting empirical data to inform the research question. In 
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presenting this framework, the chapter will survey literature that has employed 
systematic sets of variables for studying the circumstances associated with the carrying 
out of development programmes by public administrations. As indicated earlier, a 
framework adapted from Paul’s work on public sector-implemented development 
programmes will be used. Chapter 3 will also explain how this thesis intends to translate 
Paul’s analytical framework for the purposes of enquiring into administrative capacity. 
 
Chapter 4 will give a more detailed explanation of the research methodology and data 
collection methods employed by this thesis to gather empirical data to inform its research 
question. This will include a description of the sampling process used to select the two 
case study development programmes from a larger list of candidate programmes; a 
description of how secondary materials and qualitative interviews were employed to 
generate observations about the functioning of case programmes; a profile of all 
qualitative interviews conducted by this thesis; and finally how the data generated by this 
thesis was recorded and analysed. 
 
Chapters 5 through 8 detail the findings of this thesis based on the analysis of the two 
development programme cases. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on CASP, whilst chapters 7 and 
8 concern the EPWP. Two chapters are allocated to each programme: the first is a 
background chapter and the second a more detailed findings chapter. The opening 
chapter will give a brief historical background on each programme, constructed mainly 
from an analysis of secondary materials. The purpose of the background chapter is to 
give essential contextual foundation to the subsequent analysis of findings on each 
case. The findings chapters will provide a combined analyses of all secondary and 
primary (interview) data sourced by this thesis on each programme, where the aim is to 
isolate and discuss those factors found to have affected the capacity of the programme’s 
implementing bodies. 
 
Chapter 9 will give a general conclusion to this study. It will outline what this research 
found to be the key factors influencing the capacity of public administrations to carry out 
development programmes. In specifying these factors, this chapter will also say 
something about their scholarly significance, or in other words, what these revealed 
about the characteristics of public organisations implementing development programmes 
based on theoretical assumptions identified in chapter 2. The chapter will end by 
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commenting on the scope for employing similar approaches to the study of 
administrative capacity in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY: CONCEPT AND THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of chapter 2 is to give a more detailed conceptual outline of administrative 
capacity by reviewing relevant academic literature on the subject. This will also help to 
further develop the working definition of administrative capacity identified in chapter 1. 
Examining literature which has, in particular, framed thinking about administrative 
capacity and the implementation of development activities will also allow this chapter to 
situate the issue in a broader theoretical arena, which will further inform the process of 
empirically applying this study’s working definition. 
 
2.2 Administrative capacity: building on a working definition 
 
Taking its cue from the introductory chapter, this first section of the literature review will 
briefly consider the argument for distinguishing amongst three interpretations of 
administrative capacity as outlined earlier, and through this process develop the working 
definition of the third interpretation that will guide this thesis. This will allow the 
remainder of the chapter to examine relevant literature associated with the third 
interpretation. 
 
The first interpretation of administrative capacity focuses mainly on concerns that state 
institutions lack the requisite ability to carry out an expanded slate of development 
activities. This interpretation is oriented towards public bodies possessing capacity. The 
introductory chapter provided examples which illustrated this perspective. The second 
interpretation of capacity usually follows as a function of the first, where, if a public body 
is judged to be lacking the requisite or sufficient ability to meet service delivery 
expectations, it is said that it does not possess enough capacity, where capacity will then 
have to be built or strengthened. It is then acknowledged that public administrations 
would have to acquire capacity, which usually takes the form of human, as well as 
material or financial resources. 
 
This second interpretation of capacity is probably best associated with the ‘capacity-
building’ or ‘capacity-strengthening’ literature which has been extensively promoted by 
the international development community. Examples of how this perspective of capacity 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
20 
has been applied to South Africa include McLennan and Wooldridge’s (1995: 102, 111) 
submission that the country lacked the capacity and skills (focus on human resources) to 
shift from a public administration oriented to performing regulatory and law enforcement 
functions, to one performing development functions. The researchers then identified a 
range of skills areas deemed more appropriate to this new focus, which public 
administration would presumably then need to acquire in order to operate effectively in a 
changed environment. This included a range of general and specific skills pertaining to 
administrative functioning, including policy, finance, planning, project management, 
information technology, change management, interpersonal skills, decision-making and 
communication. Picard’s (2005) publication The State of the State: Institutional 
Transformation, Capacity and Political Change in South Africa also discussed the 
acquisition of capacity at length by focusing on human resource development and 
training in particular. Finally, Barichievy, Piper and Parker (2005: 381) have observed 
that the term capacity has assumed a ‘particular nuance in South Africa in recent times’ 
where actions by the government in particular have indicated a strong emphasis on 
education and training, which corresponds with a focus on the acquisition of capacity. 
 
In relation to the two interpretations of capacity referred to above, this thesis submitted 
that a third interpretation of capacity was possible, necessary and empirically viable in 
the South African case. This interpretation broadened the prevailing twofold view of 
administrative capacity by seeking to identify and explain the underlying factors, 
embedded in the organisational and operational environments through which public 
administrations function, which could influence their capacity to carry out development 
activities. This perspective of capacity appeared generally evident in VanDeveer and 
Dabelko’s (2001: 25) treatment of the term, where they remarked that ‘[c]apacity, like 
incapacity, is contingent on contextual factors associated with the public sector functions 
under examination’. Nelissen (2002: 13) similarly referred to ‘effective administrative 
capacity’ as the capability of governing bodies to act, and the context within which that 
action occurs. It is argued that the context in which public administrations carry out 
development activities ought to be factored into interpretations of their capacity to act, 
which would serve to augment more common yet limiting perspectives of capacity 
described earlier. 
 
An explicit link between the context within which public administrations function and their 
capacity was drawn by one South African academic interviewed for this study. When the 
topic of administrative capacity was introduced into the discussion, the respondent 
offered the following description: 
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So capacity then is ... the individual, individuals who have skills, and ... 
attitudes, who have to be in a framework, which is itself complex, because it 
involves policy, regulatory, and then the actual systems and structures that 
allow that to be used to impact on the world, and then that whole thing has 
to be enclosed in some sort of useful culture. 
 
The key word in the respondent’s description of administrative capacity is ‘framework’, or 
in other words, situating the functioning of the more concrete and commonly mentioned 
element of capacity – human resources – into a framework consisting of policies, 
regulations, systems and structures, which have all been recognised as affecting the 
ability of public administrators to carry out their activities. In adopting the third 
perspective of capacity as this study’s working definition, this thesis is choosing not to 
treat capacity as a measurable item based on the existence, or lack thereof, of a 
particular standard, typified by statements such as ‘lack of capacity’, ‘capacity shortages’, 
or ‘poor capacity’. This study recognises rather that there may be factors associated with 
the organisational and operational circumstances through which public administrations 
attempt to carry out development activities, which might then affect their ability to 
execute these initiatives. Section 2.3 will examine how these circumstances may be 
defined and understood in more detail. 
 
2.3 Administrative capacity and the organisational and operational 
circumstances of public administrations 
 
The aim of section 2.3 is to review academic research that speaks to and builds on the 
working definition of administrative capacity employed by this thesis. This begins with 
Grindle and Hilderbrand’s (1995: 445-447) work on public sector capacity in developing 
countries, where the researchers explicitly discussed the subject of capacity in relation to 
a network of organisational, inter-organisational and extra-organisational relationships 
and environments. Grindle and Hilderbrand attributed the following characteristics to this 
context: 
 
• Action environment referring to economic, political and social surroundings within 
which government administrations carry out their activities. 
 
• Institutional context of public administration, comprising the rules and procedures 
regulating government operations and the activities of public officials, and the 
responsibilities that government assumes for development initiatives. Building on 
Grindle and Hilderbrand’s description of the ‘institutional’ context, the public 
‘institution’ is distinguished from the public ‘organisation’ where the institution 
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represents the underlying legal, policy and strategic framework that governs the 
work of government organisations. This follows from Lusthaus, Adrien and 
Perstinger (1999: 6), citing North’s employment of the term. 
 
• Task network referring to the inter-relationship between organisations in the 
public, as well as private and non-governmental sectors, towards the 
accomplishment of specific tasks. 
 
• Public organisations, viewed as the ‘building blocks of the task network’, where 
the focus is on understanding how the structures, processes, resources and 
management styles of organisations, which can be said to represent a particular 
set of dynamics within an organisation, affect the establishment of goals, 
structure work, define authority relations, and influence performance. 
 
In their treatment of administrative capacity, Grindle and Hilderbrand adopted an 
orientation that encompassed a wider web of intra-, inter- and extra-organisational 
relationships and institutional settings. With reference to the latter, they submitted that 
the institutional context could either constrain or facilitate the accomplishment of 
particular tasks (Grindle, Hildebrand 1995: 447). Where it can be argued that these tasks 
could contribute directly to a development intervention, it is suggested that this 
statement speaks to the perspective of administrative capacity adopted in this thesis. 
 
Other researchers have also remarked on the organisational context within which public 
administrations function, when discussing capacity. Writing on development and public 
administration in Africa, Umeh and Andranovich (2005: 47) for instance indicated that 
the process of capacity requires an assessment of an organisation’s capabilities at more 
than one level: managing intra-organisational relationships, managing inter-
organisational relationships, and an organisation’s management of wider political, 
economic and social relationships. Although Umeh and Adranovichs’ description implies 
an assessment of whether public administrations possess the capacity to manage these 
relationships, it is the features that make up the relationships themselves that are of 
relevance to this study’s interpretation of capacity. 
 
Writing from the perspective of public sector development planning in South Africa, 
Wallis (2000: 135) has also suggested that assessing capacity should move beyond the 
‘competence of staff members’, which in the context of this thesis emphasises the 
possession of capacity, to capture wider organisational and operational factors. These 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
23 
were said to include the structure of and co-ordination between public organisations. 
Another South African commentator, Mokgoro (2000: 3-5) has added that an emphasis 
on training initiatives alone, emphasising the acquisition of capacity, was an inadequate 
response to understanding the issue of administrative capacity in the country. Drawing 
on Grindle and Hilderbrand’s work, he suggested that an interpretation of capacity be 
linked to the ability of public administrators to navigate their organisational and 
institutional environments, where the public service was described as a complex system 
composed of many interdependent and interrelated subsystems. The corollary of 
Mokgoro’s description would tend to suggest that capacity cannot be adequately 
understood without taking into account the effect of the organisational and institutional 
environments of the public service. 
 
The makeup of public service intra-, inter- and extra-organisational and institutional 
environments and their influence on capacity was also widely mentioned and given 
greater definition by South African academics interviewed for this thesis. Indicative 
segments of these interviews are included below, which begin with a slightly confusing 
(in terms of distinguishing an institution from an organisation) but no less pointed remark 
about the link between capacity, institutional and organisational context: 
 
[P]art of the capacity problem is around institutionalisation, and it’s not only 
institutionalisation it is organisational format, it’s also institutionalisation in 
terms of the norms and the values, and the particular institutions that create 
the dynamics within institutions. 
 
Another academic respondent was more specific in his characterisation of an apparent 
constraint resulting from inter-organisational arrangements:  
 
For me … that is the level of lack of capacity, it is not higher up in the 
system, it also lies there in terms of poor decentralisation, because the 
theory tells us … that decentralisation means decision-making power being 
dislodged from the top and diversed [sic] down to the bottom giving people 
power, but they don’t really have power. 
 
The same respondent made a further point concerning intra-organisational 
communication: 
 
[W]hilst I say that they [officials] are well trained and they don’t have the 
capacity, it also seems to me that they are not asserting themselves, in 
terms of, in those silos where they work, and where they so poorly 
communicate with one and other on a horizontal level, there’s not integrative 
thinking, there’s not multi-disciplinary planning taking place. 
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Two other academic contributors broadened the observation made about communication 
to include potential capacity constraints resulting from the conduct of inter-organisational 
co-operation. The first offered the following observation: 
 
[T]here are certain features of bureaucracy that we have to deal with, I 
mean I think there’s still a very rigid bureaucratic style in this country, it 
comes out in things like the silo mentality … departments working in their 
individual silos, a lack of co-operation between governmental structures 
whether it be on the basis of horizontal links or vertical links, whether it be 
between provinces and the centre [national level], whether it be between 
different departments working at the centre or indeed different departments 
working in the province, that kind of rigidity … compartmentalism, which are 
features of bureaucracy, which I think are widely regarded as being 
dysfunctional … these new development strategies can only be successful if 
you can find ways of sort of … across some of these departmental 
constraints, these bureaucratic constraints 
 
The second interviewee added: 
 
[H]ow do you integrate services, how do you integrate ... things like the RDP, 
things like the extended public works programme ... and the cluster 
system ... that [South African President] Mbeki introduced in the late ‘90s ... 
assuming a capacity to work transversally, as well as in your silos, and ... 
there were a lot of debates about that as well, because you have to run 
programmes that threaded transversally through government. Just, just 
organising functions like, a lot of functions that we had in Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, the policy was us, national, but the implementation was 
provincial, and that was a huge problem. The Western Cape government ... 
at the time didn’t have an environmental unit ... they had a conservation unit, 
but there were a lot of people who were obsessed about conserving plants 
and animals and looking after the national parks, which is all very well, but 
they had no capacity to administer things like environmental impact 
assessments ... we tried to persuade them ... so even in a silo, there’s 
problems of joining things up. 
 
Finally, another academic contributor, commenting on the organisational structure of the 
state, conveyed a more nuanced observation which this time involved inter-
organisational co-ordination and its effect on capacity: 
 
[A]nd then the question of the lack of or the insufficient co-ordination 
between the stakeholders in implementing the [development] programme ... 
and as you mentioned there is an attempt to integrate ... but who co-
ordinates, and whoever co-ordinates, do they have the political power to 
make decisions, sometimes a co-ordinator is the junior partner, and simply 
because someone needs to do the job, but the rest wouldn’t really listen or 
participate, and that’s a tricky one. [respondent then made a general 
example] 
 
These commentaries from interviews provide useful impressions and characteristics of 
the organisational and operational circumstances through which public bodies have 
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implemented development activities in South Africa. This yielded a description of issues 
which appear to have adversely affected the capacity to function: decentralisation, 
communication, co-operation, and co-ordination. Moreover, these observations are 
generally consistent with the references drawn from the academic literature, whilst 
pointing to more specific contextual features of the experience of public bodies 
implementing development activities in South Africa. 
 
So far this chapter has settled on a working definition of administrative capacity that 
emphasises the search for factors associated with the organisational and operational 
conditions under which public administrations carry out development activities. It has 
defended this approach by citing references from international as well as South Africa-
specific research. The next section will take the discussion further by situating this 
approach to administrative capacity in the wider academic literature on comparative and 
development administration. 
 
2.4 Comparative and development administration and interpretations of 
capacity 
 
The literature on comparative and development administration has been a fruitful source 
of knowledge on the capacity of public administrations to carry out development 
activities. Research associated with this literature goes back many decades, and was 
initially spurred by a wave of post-colonial state reconstructions following the Second 
World War. Key features of this reconstruction included an examination of how post-
colonial administrations could re-orient and reform their structures and processes to 
respond to the considerable development challenges that they inherited. 
 
The relationship between ‘comparative’ and ‘development’ administration was initially 
defined in relation to the interest taken by Western governments and academics in the 
post-colonial reconstruction of non-Western states and state bodies. The research 
generated by this early comparative perspective was driven largely by development 
administration, which as a term had its roots in efforts to reconstruct and reform 
administrative systems in relatively poor countries, which in many cases were 
undergoing political decolonisation (Jreisat 2002: 13). Dwivedi (1994: 1) recalled that the 
conceptual genealogy of development administration was distinctively Western, 
representing a convergence of two interconnected Euro-American traditions. The 
application of this conceptual worldview to non-Western societies in Asia, the Middle 
East and Africa represented the early basis on which a comparative perspective on 
administration functioned. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
26 
An overview of the development administration literature also revealed that the subject 
of capacity was central to its purpose, and which emphasised the interplay between the 
possession and acquisition of capacity by developing country public administrations. 
This was especially acute in those countries seeking to re-orient and restructure 
administrations from the colonial period, where a key objective was to assist a new corps 
of indigenous public administrators engage in activities to improve the development 
circumstances of their populations. Sapru (1994: 9, 42) for example, recalling the early 
development administration literature, essentially linked the problem of executing 
development strategies in poor countries to the need to strengthen the capabilities of 
administrative actors. Riggs (1998: 23), regarded as one of the pioneers of research in 
development administration, observed that the substantial funding provided to the 
Comparative Administration Group (CAG), of which he was a part, was directed at 
researching how developing countries could improve their practical implementation of 
development projects. 
 
Studies in development administration yielded rich observations about the 
transformation of public bodies in developing countries, and more specifically, retained a 
fundamental interest in the capacity of these bodies to carry out development activities 
(Diamant 1966, Riggs 1966 quoted in Zafarullah, Huque 2006: 26). The primary interest 
of these studies appeared, however, to reflect the first two interpretations of capacity 
mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, which questioned whether public 
administrations possessed the requisite or sufficient capacity to carry out development 
activities, and where this was judged not to be the case, that efforts were needed to 
increase or strengthen their capacity. For example, Bryant and White (1982: 27) have 
pointed out that the history of the development administration field was essentially one of 
various efforts to address the needs of Third World bureaucracies and to find ways to 
increase their capacity. Another notable contributor to the field of development 
administration, Heady (1998: 35), also commented that ‘[t]he bulk of research 
undertaken in both comparative and international organisation/administration5 has been 
directed at analysis of the operating problems and identification of steps toward 
improvement in capabilities of the administrative entities most crucially important in each 
field’.  
 
Having observed that generally the emphasis in development administration was on the 
first two interpretations of capacity, it was also apparent that these understandings of the 
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term were not necessarily ignorant of contextual circumstances that could affect capacity. 
For example, the United Nations (1975: 32, 136) submitted that the term ‘development 
administration’ could, on the one hand, be viewed as the development of administration, 
highlighting the objective of improving administrative capability in developing countries 
(which speaks to acquired ability). On the other hand, the term could be read as the 
administration of development, which referred to the organisation of various 
development tasks, or the objective of establishing and managing the organisations 
necessary to execute these tasks. The latter reading of the term, although when read in 
context held an interest in whether public administrations possessed the requisite 
capacity to organise tasks, or that the capacity was available to manage organisations 
for this purpose, could not reasonably ignore the organisational and operational 
conditions through which development tasks and the public organisations mandated to 
implement these activities functioned. 
 
Farazmand (2001: 16) also referred to two broad subsets of development administration, 
the first of which was labelled ‘administrative development’ and the second ‘development 
administration’. The former referred to enhancing administrative capacity and skills in 
areas such as personnel, finance, accounting, management, and organisational 
development. The latter was geared to the administration of national development plans. 
Jreisat (2002: 118-119) made a similar contribution by pointing out that administration 
development was not contextually rooted to poor countries, observing that it could 
involve any administration in any setting seeking to reform, change or improve its 
capacity, which again favoured an interpretation of acquired ability. He then defined 
‘development administration’ as policies, organisations and processes particularly 
adapted to the initiation and implementation of development objectives. Esman (1991: 
19) also picked up on what he referred to as two competing perspectives in the subject 
matter of development administration, or management, by contrasting ‘management 
development’ with ‘development management’. The former functioned on the 
assumption that once ‘managerial capabilities’ were in place, which Esman viewed as a 
longer-term exercise, public sector entities would be endowed with the ability to 
undertake developmental tasks. The latter emphasised the shorter-term need to manage 
concrete development activities, which encapsulated the process of carrying out 
programme operations with the managerial resources that exist at the time. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
5International administration referring to the administrative form and functions of international 
bodies, such as the United Nations 
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This study submits that its interpretation and working definition of capacity can best be 
accommodated under an administration of development approach, as this focus allows 
for a factoring in of the organisational and operational processes through which public 
administrations carry out development activities. Section 2.5 will shift direction somewhat 
to enquire into the relationship between administrative capacity and the ‘development’ 
content of these activities, as defined from an administration of development focus. 
 
 
2.5 The administration of development activities and administrative 
capacity 
 
This section will show that the development activities that came to be associated with 
administrative capacity, within the comparative and development administration literature, 
exhibited a particular normative character that triggered debates about how public 
administrations in developing countries should respond when carrying out these 
activities. It is necessary to discuss this normative problem as it might affect the process 
of attempting to systematically observe and identify factors influencing the capacity of 
public administrations to carry out these activities. 
 
A good example of the potential challenge that normative descriptions of development 
activities have posed for assessing administrative capacity can be attributed to Grindle 
and Hilderbrand’s (1995: 445) discussion of public sector capacity in developing 
countries. In this instance, the researchers described capacity as the ‘ability to perform 
appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently and sustainably’. The inclusion of the word 
‘appropriate’ attaches normative value to the tasks to be carried out, based on some 
judgement of their suitability, where analysing the ability to carry out these tasks then 
becomes subject to whether these tasks are deemed appropriate, and if so, on what 
basis. Questions about appropriateness subjects the issue of administrative capacity to 
debates about what is and is not a suitable development task. This results in a knock-on 
effect on the process of defining variables to locate factors that could influence the 
capacity of public administrations to carry out development activities, where this is linked 
to a prescribed course of action. 
 
The above example illustrates how normative questions surrounding the 
appropriateness of development activities may affect how the issue of administrative 
capacity is interpreted. Another example stems from the United Nations Development 
Programmes’ (UNDP) publication, Capacity for Development (2001), which contains a 
chapter that essentially subsumed the issue of administrative capacity in an explicitly 
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normative framework. Malik’s description of capacity in this chapter essentially fused the 
administrative sphere, which he referred to as institutional capacity, with two other ‘inter-
locking categories’ in a developing country setting. The first of these categories was 
termed development vision, which required broad-ranging debates to be undertaken to 
construct priorities for development in line with a nation’s culture and social conditions. 
The second category was termed social capital, which, much like the construction of a 
development vision appeared to require that institutions demonstrate an ability to draw 
on social norms and cultural values in the production of a country’s development vision. 
In the scenario painted by Malik, an understanding of institutional capacity flows from a 
prescribed institutional ability to guide, co-ordinate and facilitate a development vision 
through broad-ranging debate that draws on social capital. This amounts to a process 
that public administrations ought to engage in, in an effort to execute these activities. 
 
The interpretation of administrative capacity adopted by this thesis vis à vis development 
activities proceeds from a more neutral identification of those factors that can be 
observed as affecting the capacity of public administrations to carry out development 
activities. Because the emphasis of this interpretation rests more on the administrative 
sphere of the equation, it would tend to accept that development visions have already 
been articulated in the form of policy, strategic or programmatic objectives, and in 
proceeding to assess administrative capacity, will be oriented more towards 
understanding the effect of the organisational and operational conditions through which 
public administrations try to give effect to these objectives. The orientation assumed by 
this thesis therefore deviates from Malik’s illustration of capacity, which prescribes a set 
of actions which public administrations ought to engage in for the purpose of carrying out 
a development activity. 
 
The scenario drawn by Malik is just one example of efforts, promoted largely by 
international development organisations, which have cultivated an understanding of 
administrative capacity through a normative lens. A further example is Bolger’s (2000: 2) 
reference to capacity, published as part of an occasional paper series for the Canadian 
International Development Agency. In his paper Bolger describes the issue of capacity 
as containing: 
 
[A]bilities, skills, understandings, attitudes, values, relationships, behaviours, 
motivations, resources and conditions that enable individuals, organisations, 
networks/sectors and broader social systems to carry out functions and 
achieve their development objectives over time. 
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Underpinning Bolger’s description of capacity is a normative orientation that defines the 
issue to the extent that public administrations and actors outside the administrative 
sphere should work together to reach development objectives that are acceptable to all 
parties. Hope’s (2006: 589) description of capacity in the context of development 
employs a similar construct to Bolger, by focusing on the ‘competency of individuals, 
public sector institutions, private sector entities, civil society organisations, and local 
communities to engage in activities in a sustainable manner that permit the achievement 
of beneficial goals’. As with Bolger’s account, Hope’s reference to capacity exhibits a 
more normative direction by emphasising that public administrations and outside actors 
should engage each other in activities of mutual benefit. Such normative constructions of 
capacity as the ability to work together to achieve mutually desirable development 
objectives again tend to deviate from a more neutral attempt at identifying factors 
observed as having affected the capacity of public administrations to carry out 
development activities. 
 
This thesis must define an analytical approach that neutralises the normative problem of 
how development activities ought to be carried out, by accepting how the purposes and 
objectives have been specified for a development activity. This should not assume a 
normative stance, which would tend to critique and outline a preferred development 
objective and specify a corresponding administrative course of action to achieve it, and 
where this would condition and therefore narrow the analytical lens through which the 
capacity to carry out such a course of action may be examined. Rather, this study will 
accept how development objectives have been specified and endeavour to identify 
factors that can be observed as influencing the capacity of public administrations to 
organise themselves to carry out the activities which are intended to realise these 
objectives. 
 
The next task for this chapter is to begin to elevate what has largely been a conceptual 
discussion to a more theoretical level, which can inform the empirical application of this 
study’s interpretation and working definition of administrative capacity. To begin to do 
this, the chapter will revert to an earlier discussion of the literature in comparative and 
development administration. 
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2.6 Development versus ‘comparative’ administration: adopting a 
middle range theory approach to researching administrative 
capacity 
 
Viewed as a subsection of the academic field of Public Administration, comparative and 
development administration has endured a turbulent intellectual history in the 
deliberations of the wider discipline. This history has been characterised by long-
standing debates about the ability of research in this area to render scientifically 
orthodox ‘comparable’ studies of administrative systems spanning a variety of country 
contexts. A major challenge for comparative and development administration has 
therefore been establishing consensus on the basis of comparison itself. 
 
The task of researching the transformation of state institutions in developing countries 
undergoing political transitions presented an exceedingly complex challenge for 
researchers in comparative and development administration. The difficulty for 
comparative scientific research lay in isolating and delineating the properties of 
administrative systems for comparative study, whilst controlling for the explanatory 
complexity of political, social, and economic features accompanying their transformation. 
Henderson (1969 quoted in Heady 2001: 26) pointed out that this particular context 
proved challenging for scientifically stringent comparative research, where the work 
being spearheaded by the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) in the United 
States, for example, lacked a central thrust and in particular anything that was distinctly 
‘administrative’ in that thrust. This comment was reflected in Riggs’s claim (1998: 23) 
that CAG was not able to nor did it try to establish a common (administrative) framework 
or paradigm, where this could have facilitated ‘comparative’ research. Having said this 
however, Riggs (ibid) also conceded that the implicit premise behind the research grants 
which funded CAG’s work was that American administrative experience and know-how 
could be drawn upon to enhance the ability of developing countries to carry out 
development projects. This coincided with development administration’s emphasis on 
transmitting Western thinking and practical know-how to resolving administrative 
problems in developing countries, which also attached a normative character to these 
activities not dissimilar to how this was described in section 2.5. 
 
A research focus that emphasised the execution of development projects in developing 
countries, based on the explicit transmission of particular models of administrative 
practice from developed countries, was seen by some as inhibiting the scientific 
objectivity required to isolate elements of administrative systems for comparative study. 
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In this regard, criticisms arose that the early emphasis adopted by development 
administration projected a cultural bias between (superior) Western administrative 
behaviour and practice and that observed in developing countries. Essentially, the task 
of seeking a more scientifically acceptable basis of comparison to research public 
administrations was viewed as being obscured by political, social, economic and cultural 
factors.6 Peters (1988: 3) described this as the administrative focus being clouded by 
undertaking a series of excursions into the exotica of world political systems. Similarly, 
Derlien (1992) and Page (1995 quoted in Brans 2003: 425) observed that studies in 
development administration tended to yield ‘impressionistic’ conclusions that were overly 
dependent on vague variations in political culture.7 Essentially, the critics of development 
administration were arguing that scientifically orthodox comparative study based on 
objectively isolating the fundamental elements of public administration systems, was 
being obscured and in some instances prejudiced by how Western practitioners viewed 
these systems. 
 
The criticism of development administration as it had developed resulted in greater 
discussion of how the comparative element in administration could be rehabilitated. In 
this regard, one of the observations made about development administration was that 
research in this area had tended to emphasise ‘grand’ theorising (Welch, Wong 1998: 
44). This had the consequence of obscuring the administrative level of analysis for 
comparative study, because of the manner in which political, economic, social and 
cultural attributes of the societies within which these institutions functioned were 
incorporated in analyses. The solution for those seeking to reposition comparative 
administration was to settle on a more restricted focus or level of analysis that could 
yield more scientifically reliable results. In contrast to grand theorising, then, a different 
theoretical approach emerged which defined itself as ‘middle range’. This approach 
advocated a narrower and sharper theoretical scope by identifying sub-areas of an 
administrative system that could enable more focused comparative study (Brans 2003 
427, 431). Presthus (1959: 26) was one of the first to articulate this middle range 
perspective, noting that it attempted to explain a restricted set of relationships as 
opposed to factoring in the characteristics of a broader social system. Presthus argued 
moreover that the need for a middle range theoretical approach, in the context of social 
science as a whole, was greater in the field of comparative administration than 
                                               
6 In their discussion of an ‘impending crisis in development administration’, Nicholson and 
Connerley (1989) also linked this to studies that lacked scientific validity. 
7This takes into account the functioning of public administrations in broader social systems 
(incorporating economic, political, and cultural factors), as in Riggs’s prismatic model. 
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elsewhere because it was almost impossible to obtain consensus about the impact of 
cultural forms and values on administrative systems (ibid). 
 
The significance of the shift in emphasis towards middle range theory, for this thesis, is 
reflected in this study’s need to identify organisational and operational factors that 
influence the capacity of public administrations to carry out development activities. It is 
imperative that this study give sharper definition and focus to these administrative 
elements, through which development activities are carried out, in an effort to 
systematically isolate and examine the impact of factors on the capacity of public bodies 
to function. This will also allow this study to avoid subjecting its interpretation and 
application of administrative capacity to normative meanings associated with 
‘development’ activities. 
 
On a more practical level, it has been accepted in the comparative administration 
literature that in addition to comparing attributes of more than one administrative system 
(i.e. between countries), this area of study can also accommodate single country cases 
(within countries, such as that proposed by this thesis). Sigelman and Gadbois (1983 
quoted in Van Wart, Cayer 1990: 240) have for instance submitted that a relatively 
stringent test for comparative study, in the case of single cases, is that these are ‘more 
readily theoretically comparable either by comparing intra-national governments, by 
being theoretically oriented, or by testing hypotheses’. It has elsewhere been recognised 
that a comparative perspective could be employed to examine changes in administrative 
systems within single country studies, emphasising the study of difference or change 
across time or space (Baker 1994; Farazmand 1999; Peters 1994; Benjamin 1982, 
Gladden 1972 in Peters 1988: 5). 
 
Whereas this study’s research question does not strictly propose to test a hypothesis, it 
is structured in a way that could contribute theoretically useful data about the nature of 
the factors stemming from the organisational and operational conditions under which 
public administrations function, which can be observed as influencing their capacity to 
carry out development activities. To this end, Jreisat (2005: 239) has observed that 
although early contributors to comparative administration were largely single-case or 
country studies, ‘[m]any foundational concepts and practical insights have been derived 
from such international experiences’, where ‘[i]nvariably, these scholars agreed that 
contextual or environmental constraints do influence organisational capacity to act 
effectively.’ 
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This thesis will, in employing a middle range theoretical approach, need to identify a 
level of analysis within an administrative system that can best speak to the perspective 
of administrative capacity being advanced. A number of researchers have made useful 
contributions to the application of middle range theory by defining the sub-components 
or levels at which a system of public administration could be studied. Aberbach and 
Rockman (1999: 488) identified three levels in a middle range approach, comprising: 1) 
Structures (organisations); 2) Actors (bureaucratic officialdom); and 3) Actions 
(behaviours). Jreisat (2002: 54) presented a slightly different listing of three levels, 
consisting of: 1) Organisation and its capacity; 2) Individual and group behaviours; 3) 
Overall characteristics and performance of national bureaucracy. Peters (1988) 
described four levels of analysis: 1) Organisation; 2) People; 3) Attitudes (behaviour) 
and 4) Power (relationship/interaction between political executives and career civil 
servants. These are presented in table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Levels of analysis from the perspective of middle range theory 
 Aberbach & 
Rockman (1999) 
Jreisat (2002) Peters (1988) 
Level 1 Structures 
(organisations) 
Organisation and its 
capacity 
Organisation 
Actors (officials) People Level 2 
Actions (behaviour) 
Individual and 
Group behaviour 
and performance 
Attitudes (behaviour) 
Level 3  Overall 
characteristics and 
performance of 
national 
bureaucracy 
 
    
Level 4   Power 
 
There is some consistency in identifying three primary levels of analysis from a middle 
range perspective. These comprise the public organisation (structures), public officials 
(individuals and groups), and administrative behaviour (i.e. actions, attitudes). Jreisat 
presented a more complex relationship between the levels, by combining within one 
level individuals and groups, and adding to this, behaviour and performance. Finally, he 
referred to a super-organisational level by suggesting that research could also compare 
the general characteristics and performance of national administrative systems. Peters 
extended his list of three levels by including as a factor, power, referring to the 
relationship between political executives and public servants (officials). This level would 
appear to cut across the other three, in its potential to influence how public organisations 
are structured and staffed, and the behaviour of public servants. 
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The organisational level seems to have acquired a particularly favourable rating within 
middle range theorising. Jreisat (2002: 68) observed that the most effective use of 
middle range concepts has been at the organisational level, via case studies. He added 
that the organisation was considered a superior unit for comparative analysis because of 
its durable and measurable characteristics, referring to features such as specific purpose, 
concrete structures, determinable boundaries, established routines and technologies, 
and central co-ordination systems (March, Simon 1958: 2-9 quoted in Jreisat 2002: 55). 
Peters (1988: 104-105) gave further support to the organisational unit by referring to the 
likelihood that it would exhibit a relatively distinct legal standing and more easily 
distinguishable mandate. 
 
Taking this study’s perspective of administrative capacity into account, it is likely that this 
thesis would gravitate towards the structural/organisational level of analysis, where it has 
been argued that more prevalent interpretations of administrative capacity in South 
Africa risked ignoring the potential impact of factors on capacity, associated with the 
organisational and operational circumstances under which public bodies functioned. 
Moreover, an inclination towards the individual level of analysis, comprising the study of 
individuals and groups of administrators, would be resisted in the context of this study’s 
perspective of capacity because of the risk that focusing on the possession of, for 
example, skills, competencies, experience, know-how and formal qualifications, might 
not easily accommodate this key organisational perspective. Having said this, it may be 
more likely that broadening a perspective to the organisational level, or in other words 
placing the functioning of a public organisation at the centre of the analysis, might more 
easily accommodate the activities of the human resources that are deployed within, and 
that are integral to, the functioning of these entities. In this vein, Jreisat (2002: 25) has 
suggested that ‘organizations coordinate and facilitate individual efforts, converting them 
into sustained collective actions that accomplish or service goals, above and beyond the 
capacity of any individual’. 
 
In other words, it is contended that a fuller exposition of factors that could influence the 
capacity of a public body, beyond the particular qualities possessed by individual public 
servants, could be generated by situating the actions of these individuals in the 
organisational environments in which they function. This firstly sets aside a focus on the 
individual level, which runs the risk of favouring an interpretation of capacity that 
emphasises the possession of, in this case skills, competencies, experience and know-
how, and qualifications. Secondly, it links a middle range emphasis on the public 
organisation to the visibility of this level of analysis of the conceptual description of 
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administrative capacity in section 2.3. These references accentuated the public 
organisational level in an analysis of capacity, by exhibiting an interest in inter-, intra- 
and extra-organisational relationships and institutional settings within which public 
bodies carried out development activities. 
 
The next and final section of this chapter will suggest that engaging with debates 
concerning the effects on capacity of the ‘bureaucratic’ characteristics of public 
organisations will add theoretical depth to the adoption of an organisational level of 
analysis. 
 
 
2.7 The bureaucratic characteristics of public organisations, middle 
range theory and administrative capacity 
 
The bureaucratic form of public organisations represents one of the most influential and 
enduring frameworks of analysis in the study of Public Administration, the impact of 
which has also been seen in the application of middle range theory. The framework is 
probably best associated with the ideal-type rational-legal model of organisation as 
articulated by Weber (see Gerth, Mills 1948). In the sixth edition of Public Administration: 
A Comparative Perspective, Heady (2001: 47) wrote that there has been an increasing 
recognition of the bureaucratic model as the dominant conceptual framework within 
middle range theory. Heady (1998: 34) had also made this statement three years earlier. 
In associating the development of middle range theory with two tracks, one problem-
driven, linked to environmental determinants, the other discipline-driven, emphasising 
the disciplinary development of comparative administration, Brans (2003: 427 - 429) also 
associated the subject matter of the latter track with the bureaucratic model, referring to 
its utility for acquiring comparative data on administrative issues. 
  
Jreisat (2002: 43) also referred to the influence of the bureaucratic model, relating its 
appropriateness for comparative study to its prevalence as a global institutional type, 
and correspondingly to the relative applicability of its framework compared to grand 
models that generally sought to incorporate ‘sweeping visions and characterisations’. He 
also noted more pragmatically that the popularity of the framework, which lends itself to 
single as well as multiple case analyses, has meant that more information has generally 
been available about bureaucracies (ibid). In Comparing Public Bureaucracies, Peters 
(1988: 5) also remarked on bureaucracy’s durability, arguing that it was especially well-
suited to informed historical analysis (i.e. across time, within single countries) because it 
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had been an identifiable institution longer than other institutions associated with 
contemporary government. 
 
In addition to facilitating comparative studies of administrative systems, the 
characteristics attached to the bureaucratic organisational framework have also had a 
long association with the carrying out of development activities, and with capacity in 
particular. One contributor to the literature, Esman (1991: 31), following Blau’s (1963) 
earlier work, described some of the key organisational properties of the term 
bureaucracy as exhibiting ‘hierarchical structures of authority with explicit divisions of 
labour, formal rules governing flows of work and information, and specific provisions for 
interaction with the public’. Milne (1973: 415) interestingly debated ‘[b]ureaucracy as an 
impediment to development administration’ nearly 20 years prior to Esman, whilst also 
paying particular attention to the features of organisational ‘hierarchy’ and the adherence 
to ‘general rules’.  
 
A further review of the literature revealed a view that the bureaucratic organisational 
form might adversely influence the capacity of public administrations to carry out 
development activities. Van Ufford (1988: 9) noted for example that ‘development 
bureaucracies’ were facing a new crisis, where questions were being asked about their 
‘capacity’ to solve development problems in Third World countries. He then suggested, 
more pertinently to this thesis, that organisational problems arising ‘in between’ the 
intentions of development policy and its effects were badly under-researched (van Ufford 
1988: 12). It is precisely the ‘in between’ organisational and operational conditions 
through which development objectives are sought, through the vehicle of programmes, 
that this thesis is interested in examining capacity against.  
 
Other observations citing the characteristics of bureaucratic organisations have also 
pointed to their effect on the carrying out of development programmes. These include 
Jain’s (1990: 42) reference to an ‘implementation gap’ in his presentation of the role of 
bureaucracy in India, noting that: ‘[p]erhaps the most important intervening variable 
between development plans and their implementation is the bureaucratic machinery, 
whose function it is to translate planned goals into action. It has been argued that, 
despite the relative effectiveness of bureaucracy in India in the area of policy execution 
and implementation, the traditional bureaucratic structure and processes are 
incompatible [sic] the implementation of developmental tasks.’ (cites Chowdhry 1979). 
Nicholson and Connerley (1989: 404) also noted that ‘although there is an anti-
hierarchical [i.e. characteristic of bureaucracy] current in the development administration 
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literature at the moment, that position, like the American preference for hierarchy, is 
based more on normative preference than on empirical research on hierarchies and their 
effects in development settings’. 
 
As to the substance of the argument that bureaucracy adversely influences 
administrative capacity, in Managing Development in the Third World, Bryant and White 
(1982: 24) explained the point as follows: 
 
[J]ust as development has its obverse in under-development, development 
administration has its observe in administrative incapacity. Administrative 
incapacity is an inability to respond to needs conveyed by citizens. It is 
characterised by swollen bureaucracies encumbered with formalistic 
procedures that delay rather than expedite service delivery and program 
implementation. 
 
The crux of Bryant and White’s submission was their equating bureaucracy with 
administrative capacity (or incapacity), on the basis of swollen public organisations 
hampered by formalistic procedures that delayed implementation of service delivery and 
(development) programmes. The inability of public bureaucracies to respond to 
development matters was therefore viewed as being constrained by cumbersome 
organisational structures and rigid functional adherence to required procedures. Wallis 
(1989: 16), writing on the role of bureaucracy in Third World development, interestingly 
employed the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ – which conventionally referred to the 
ability of developing country governments to use foreign aid for its intended purposes – 
as a means of transcending a narrower concern for developing country governments 
having insufficient human resources to execute development programmes. In the 
process, he explicitly sought to broaden this to encompass the wider administrative 
context or set of circumstances which could affect a bureaucracy’s absorptive capacity, 
which similar to Bryant and White’s observation, focused on organisational and 
procedural arrangements: 
 
Bearing in mind that absorptive capacity is not merely a matter of staff but 
also of organisational structures and methods of working, questions may 
also be asked about such superficially minor factors as the design of forms, 
the sequencing (or phasing) of activities, job descriptions, and the allocation 
of resources within projects. 
 
Recognition of a kind of bureaucratically induced inability to respond to development 
activities has also been associated with the character of the development activities 
which public administrations have been expected to respond to. Dwivedi and Henderson 
(1990: 15) have for instance argued that development bureaucracies needed a 
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framework that was, among other things, more ‘flexible in its operation’. Kiggundu (2002: 
293), citing a number of bureaucracy’s ‘limitations’ in industrialised and developing 
countries, included among these a need to shift the focus from ‘bureaucracy to 
organisation and management of complex, interdependent systems operating in 
dynamic environments’. Wallis (1989: 10) continued this theme by comparing the 
Weberian notion of goal achievement efficiency through adherence to structural and 
procedural norms, with what Merton (1952) referred to as ‘trained incapacity’, or 
conforming to a rigidity of approach that made it difficult to adjust to altered 
circumstances. 
 
Remarks about what could be described as the reactive inflexibility of public bureaucratic 
organisations to respond to a more dynamic set of circumstances accompanying 
development activities was given greater detail by Rondinelli (1993: 7-8). He submitted 
that the introduction of development policies that aimed to, for instance, alleviate poverty, 
increase agricultural productivity, expand employment opportunities and provide greater 
access to social services to more and more people, made the design of corresponding 
initiatives more complex and their success more uncertain. He then observed that 
methods employed by public administrations to carry out these initiatives tended to 
reinforce characteristically bureaucratic features: centralised, control-oriented planning 
and administration, apparently as a coping measure, where these were perceived to be 
an effective means of reducing uncertainty and increasing the efficiency of response. 
Rondinelli (1993: 8) added that rational planning and control were also employed to 
preserve the authority of politicians and civil servants over the policy aspects of 
development activities, which may be consistent with trying to cope with the complexity 
and uncertainty accompanying these activities. Following Benveniste (1972: 24, quoted 
in Rondinelli: ibid), he also submitted that in many cases the maintenance of rationalistic 
approaches were related to ‘the inability [in other words, incapacity] of organisations or 
entire governments to function in an environment that has become too uncertain’. 
 
The references discussed in this section essentially displayed an argument that public 
organisational bureaucracies had demonstrated an inability to react to and carry out 
development activities. This was moreover acutely manifested in their structural and 
procedural inflexibility to respond to the relatively more complex circumstances attending 
these measures, and where these conditions were also said to reinforce this inflexibility. 
The significant point for this thesis is recognising that the source of this supposed 
organisational incapacity is said to emerge from the characteristic makeup of 
bureaucratic arrangements, consisting of hierarchical structures and rule-bound 
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procedures. Such a premise has a potentially useful import for this thesis, in that it lends 
additional explanatory power to selecting an organisational level of analysis from middle 
range theory, in proceeding to identify whether factors associated with a public 
organisation’s bureaucratic features can be linked to its capacity to carry out a 
development programme. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter developed the interpretation and working definition of administrative 
capacity in a developmental setting by situating the issue in a wider literature on 
comparative and development administration. This resulted in the acquisition of a more 
detailed and nuanced understanding of the effect on capacity of the organisational and 
operational conditions through which public administrations implemented development 
programmes. The orientation of this study’s reading of capacity towards the analysis of 
organisational and operational circumstances led the discussion to adopt a more 
systematic middle-range theoretical approach, centred on the organisational level, to 
empirically examine factors that influence capacity. In this regard, debate pointing to the 
effects on administrative capacity of the ‘bureaucratic’ characteristics of public 
organisations added additional explanatory strength to the process of identifying factors 
influencing capacity. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS TO RESEARCH ADMINISTRATIVE 
CAPACITY 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The aim of chapter 3 is to present a framework of analysis to identify and assess factors 
observed as influencing the capacity of public administrations to carry out development 
programmes. Before commencing with a discussion on the characteristics that such a 
framework should display, this study would suggest that there are a minimum criteria or 
set of prerequisites that a framework should meet before its suitability for this study can 
be assessed. The criteria should ideally reflect this study’s overall research question, 
interpretation of capacity, and theoretical orientation (i.e. middle range theory) as 
outlined in chapters 1 and 2. In other words, the relevance of prospective analytical 
frameworks will flow from their compliance with the core elements of this thesis. The 
following threefold criteria reflect these elements. 
 
First, a framework of analysis must direct its focus at the organisational and related 
operational conditions under which public administrations carry out development 
programmes, in order to locate factors influencing their capacity to do so. Chapter 2 
showed that researchers had, in describing these circumstances, identified the potential 
influence on administrative capacity of intra-organisational arrangements, inter- and 
extra-organisational relationships and the wider institutional framework which regulated 
the activities of public organisations. This observation also coincides with this study’s 
choice of an organisational level of analysis in the context of middle range theory, which 
the chosen framework will need to reflect. Chapter 2 recognised that the makeup and 
activities of the organisational unit formed an integral component of a public 
administration’s operating environment, where focusing on this unit could permit a wider 
exposition of potential factors influencing the capacity of these bodies to carry out 
development activities. Finally, assumptions linked to the bureaucratic characteristics of 
public organisations added additional explanatory impetus to selecting the organisational 
level for examining the effects on administrative capacity. 
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Second, a framework of analysis should engage with the circumstances that make up 
the development content of the tasks public administrations are charged with carrying 
out. This will require a framework that can relate to the content of the development policy 
agendas being assumed by administrative bodies, whilst remaining insulated from 
normative features associated with these agendas (see chapter 2), which emphasise 
how public administrations ought to carry out these mandates. It was suggested in 
chapter 2 that this thesis should accept how public administrations translate their 
development objectives into corresponding activities (for example, strategies, projects, 
and programmes). The task would then be to recognise the existence of these objective 
frameworks and concentrate on identifying factors that could be observed as influencing 
the ability of administrations to respond to their objectives by executing these initiatives. 
 
Third, a potential analytical framework should use a concrete definition of the object 
which administrative capacity is to be examined against. This thesis has sometimes 
referred generically to development ‘activities’, as the object that public administrations 
are tasked with carrying out. The process of selecting an analytical framework will need 
to settle on and systematically define a more concrete form of a development activity 
before it can engage in any empirical examination of administrative capacity. 
 
Table 3.1 summarises the minimum criteria that should be met by potential frameworks 
of analysis intending to identify factors influencing the capacity of public administrations 
to carry out development activities. 
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Table 3.1: Criteria for assessing the suitability of frameworks of analysis for 
researching administrative capacity 
  
 
1. An analytical framework must direct its focus at the organisational and 
operational conditions under which public administrations carry out 
developmental activities, in order to locate factors influencing their capacity 
to do so. 
 
 
2. An analytical framework should engage with the ‘development’ content of 
the activities that public administrations are charged with carrying out, whilst 
avoiding a normative judgement about how these activities should be carried 
out. 
 
 
3. An analytical framework must clearly define the development object of 
administrative capacity 
 
 
3.2  Overview of frameworks of analysis 
 
This section will not regurgitate references made in the literature review in chapter 2 
when seeking to identify potential sources of analytical frameworks. Rather, it will have 
to select from amongst this body of research sources that can be shown to best 
correspond with the aforementioned criteria for selecting a framework of analysis. When 
reviewing the literature with this in mind, research by Samuel Paul (1982) and Louise 
White (1987) on the public sector management of development programmes was judged 
to be particularly relevant to this study’s research question and interpretation of capacity. 
 
It may be of initial interest to note that neither Paul nor White employed the term 
capacity in any significant sense in their writing on the management of development 
programmes.8 Having observed this, however, it will be shown that the frameworks they 
proposed focused mainly on the prevailing organisational and operational circumstances 
under which these programmes were carried out by public sector bodies, which is 
consistent with this study’s interpretation and working definition of administrative 
capacity, and which did not define capacity as a concrete item. 
                                                 
8White (1987: 26) makes reference to capacity in her framework, although this is interpreted, from 
the perspective of this thesis, as acquired ability, where the aim is to build or strengthen capacity. 
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The most relevant feature of Paul and White’s research is their specification of a 
framework of variables for analysing the functioning of development programmes. The 
potential applicability of the variable sets proposed by both researchers were assessed 
for their ability to systematically isolate factors that could be observed as influencing the 
capacity of public organisations to execute development programmes. The variable 
frameworks proposed by Paul and White are described in table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Comparison of variables for analysing the functioning of development 
programmes 
 
 
Paul has proposed a set of four variables for analysing the functioning of a development 
programme. This comprises the environment, consisting of external properties in a 
programme’s setting; the strategy or strategic make-up of a programme, encompassing 
its objectives, how these are translated into operating goals, and the resources allocated 
to a programme; the functional and organisational structure that a programme operates 
by; and the processes which influence decision-making and the actions taken in carrying 
it out. White has suggested a fivefold set of criteria to assess the functioning of a 
development programme. This includes a programme working with and co-ordinating the 
actions of multiple organisations and groups; expanding a programme’s resources and 
Samuel Paul (1982: 106-124) Louise White (1987: 24-29) 
• Environment: A development 
programme’s scope: geographical 
spread and sectoral makeup; diversity of 
its setting: physical-geographical, 
cultural, socio-economic and political 
characteristics of its beneficiaries; 
uncertainty: unforeseen changes in the 
conditions of beneficiaries. 
• Work with and co-ordinate multiple 
organisations and groups 
• Strategy: objectives specified by 
government, how these objectives are 
translated into operating goals and action 
plans, resources allocated to the 
programme, impact of programme’s 
environment 
• Contribute to the development content 
of a programme’s design 
 
• Expand a programme’s resources and 
political support 
 
• Structure: functional and organisational 
arrangements in place to support 
implementation 
• Enhance the development capacity of 
implementing organisations 
 
• Processes: means through which 
decisions are reached and actions taken 
in carrying out a programme. 
• Exercise leadership 
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its political support; programming officials engaging with the development content 
required for programme design; building the capacity of intermediary organisations 
involved in delivering a programme’s services (including government offices located at 
more than one level: national, regional, local); and programme officials exercising 
leadership. 
 
Section 3.3 will assess the relevance of Paul and White’s frameworks in more depth by 
observing how they correspond to the criteria introduced earlier in this chapter. 
 
3.3  Assessing the suitability of proposed frameworks for examining 
administrative capacity 
 
The analytical suitability of the frameworks proposed by Paul and White should firstly 
demonstrate a focus on the organisational and operational conditions under which public 
administrations carry out development programmes. This thesis submits that the 
variables referred to by the authors can demonstrate such an interest. In her scenario 
White focuses on features such as multiple organisation and group co-ordination, the 
strengthening of implementing organisations, and the need to expand programme 
resources and political support. These variables correspond to extra- and inter-
organisational relationships, and the institutional environment within which a 
development programme functions, where sponsoring public bodies typically lobby and 
compete for resources and political support through organisationally-based budgetary 
appropriations. 
 
Paul also describes variables that take into account these circumstances, such as a 
programme’s functional and organisational structure, how the objectives of public bodies 
are operationalised and resourced, and the extra-organisational environment within 
which programmes are carried out. He adds that the management of development 
programmes are ‘bound to be influenced by the organisational processes of the 
government which spawns them’. These processes included characteristics that have 
been directly associated with bureaucracy, such as hierarchical authority, rule-oriented 
observance of procedures and inflexible adaptation to changing tasks (Paul 1982: 121). 
  
The variables described by Paul and White should secondly demonstrate that they 
engage directly with the ‘development’ circumstances of the programmes they represent. 
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This is also evident in the work of both researchers. Perhaps the obvious point is that 
both present their variable constructs in the context of public bodies carrying out 
development programmes. More specifically, White (1987: 29) reveals this through a 
concern for programming officials contributing to the ‘development content’ of their 
designs. Paul (1982: 108, 110) also alludes to a concern for the developmental 
circumstances attending the beneficiaries being responded to by a programme, when 
discussing the strategy variable, explaining that ‘[t]he complexity of the environment is 
the other factor that influences the choice of operating goals and action plans of the 
program’. The complexity associated with development programmes recalls a similar 
discussion in chapter 2 (see Rondinelli). 
 
Further, the variables introduced by Paul and White should distinctly define the object of 
administrative capacity, which in the context of this thesis requires a concrete identity to 
be given to a development activity. Both researchers do in fact demonstrate this by 
systematically defining the characteristics of a development ‘programme’. Before 
outlining these features, it is necessary to note that this thesis recognises some 
distinction drawn in the literature between development ‘programmes’ and ‘projects’, with 
the former representing a more comprehensive set of activities of which the latter 
constitutes a subset (Paul 1982: 7; White 1987: 10; see also Nel 2001: 609). 
 
White (1987: 8-12) defines the development programme according to the following five 
characteristics: 
 
• Programs are connected to an ongoing host country organisation: Programmes 
are said to be integrally linked to existing organisational units, in other words they 
work within existing structures. 
 
• Programs continue over time: Recognises that unforeseen problems and 
opportunities will continually arise. Programmes will also need to ensure a 
continued supply of resources to sustain activities. 
 
• Programs are ongoing systems for delivering services: Reflects a growing 
number of programmes that are structured for delivering a variety of related 
services, as opposed to the once off delivery of a good or service. 
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• Programs are systems of activities and services designed for different settings: 
Programmes usually have to adapt to a number of different settings and will need 
to develop procedures to facilitate adaptation. 
 
• Programs have a substantive policy identity: Programmes stem from substantive 
policy outlooks, which represent the characteristics of various (development) 
sectors. 
  
Paul (1982: 9-10) also proposes a definition of a development programme, which 
exhibits the following four features: 
 
• Policy Sanction: This would normally stem from a specific legislative enactment 
preceding the creation of a new development programme. Executive sanction will 
suffice if a programme is part of an already existing national development plan. 
 
• Development Focus: Contrasting with regulatory programmes whose 
development impact might be indirect, development programmes would be 
expected to generate economic and social outcomes (measurable and 
immeasurable) consistent with national development goals, such as income 
growth and distribution, and improving quality of life. 
 
• Organisational Identity: A development programme should possess an identity of 
its own, reflected in an organisational structure, budget and personnel. It should 
be possible to identify a programme by reference to a relatively permanent 
organisation with its own structure, assignment of tasks and responsibilities, and 
reporting relationships. Recognises that a programme may also be under the 
administrative control of an existing organisational structure such as a ministry or 
government department. 
  
• Replication: The programme’s mission tends to be the replication or adaptation of 
a developmental product or service over the entire country or some of its 
constituent regions for the benefit of a specified client group. The developmental 
service may also consist of a system designed to deliver a product or service. 
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The constituent features of development programmes as described by Paul and White 
have a visible track record in the study of comparative and development administration. 
Hirschmann (1999: 288) for example, relied on Schaffer’s definition of development 
administration as being ‘about development programmes, policies and projects in those 
conditions in which there are usually wide and new demands and in which there are 
peculiarly low capacities and severe obstacles to meeting them’. Schaffer’s definition 
also interestingly encompassed the subject of capacity. The ‘project’ mechanism through 
which governments pursue their development objectives has however not gone without 
criticism in the literature. Jreisat (2001: 28) acknowledged one of these criticisms which 
focused on the ‘projectising’ of administrative tasks, where Morgan (1983 quoted in 
Jreisat: ibid) in particular feared that this could run the risk of insulating developmental 
problems, organised into discrete project tasks, from potentially important elements 
existing outside the project structure, including the characteristics of the labour force, the 
quality of institutional support, or impact on population. Jreisat (2001: 29) responded to 
this criticism by arguing that: 
 
[I]t is important to recognise that forming a disciplined, focused 
conceptualisation of project management … cannot be equated with having 
autonomous project authority. Generally, projects are organisations or parts 
of organisations. Therefore project management is consistent with 
organisation management, and the competence of one contributes to the 
competence of the other. 
 
Jreisat’s situating of a programme or project mechanism within a public organisational 
setting confirms the relevance of the public bureaucratic organisation, in the context of 
middle range theory, as the primary level of analysis for this thesis, where this study will 
principally seek to identify factors influencing the capacity of these bodies to carry out 
distinct development activities, where the latter assume the identity of a programme. 
This is consistent with other descriptions of the development programme-public 
organisation interface, where Brinkerhoff (1991a: 16) has noted that ‘[b]ecause 
programs are located in organizations, a program is subject to the bureaucratic context 
in which its implementing organization(s) are situated’. This, together with Jreisat’s 
suggestion that there is a kind of symbiotic relationship between a project and the 
organisation of which it is a part, assumes that it will be possible to identify factors 
affecting the capacity of public bureaucracies to carry out development programmes. 
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This section reviewed the extent to which the variable frameworks proposed by Paul and 
White spoke to a minimum criteria for selecting a relevant framework of analysis for this 
thesis. It was found that both generally corresponded to these prerequisites. The next 
section will contrast the frameworks proposed by both researchers in an effort to identify 
which of these might more effectively contribute to this study’s research question and 
interpretation of capacity. 
 
3.4 Contrasting frameworks for assessing administrative capacity 
 
Before deciding which of the frameworks presented by Louise White and Samuel Paul 
would be the most suitable for this study it is necessary to acknowledge that each 
variable-set tested favourably against the minimum criteria described earlier. Although 
they responded to these prerequisites in different ways, it cannot be concluded that this 
variance is sufficient to favour one set of variables over the other. The reason is that, at 
this stage, the prerequisites constitute untested assumptions stemming from this study’s 
interpretation of capacity and its research question. The task facing this section is 
therefore to determine which one of these variable constructs may be able to generate a 
fuller explanatory understanding of factors observed as influencing administrative 
capacity. 
 
One discernible difference between the variables presented by Paul and White is that 
the activities to which these are attributed, in White’s framework, tends to reduce the 
analytical scope from which factors influencing the capacity of programme implementing 
bodies can be observed. Examples include programme implementing bodies 
contributing to the development content of a programme’s design; a need for these 
bodies to enhance the development capacity of implementing organisations; and a need 
to expand programme resources and political support. The advantage of specifying 
these activities in this way is that it gives clear direction to the researcher when applying 
these to actual cases, which would require an investigator to look for instances where 
public bodies are, or are not as the case may be, contributing to the development 
content of their programmes; acting to enhance the development capacity of 
implementing organisations; and working to expand programme resources and political 
support. Given the orientation accompanying the variables described in White’s 
framework, the identification of factors observed as influencing the administrative 
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capacity of public organisations to carry out a development programme would 
necessarily be influenced by either the presence or absence of these conditions. 
 
A potential disadvantage of employing White’s perspective on the activities carried out 
by a public organisation to implement a development programme also stems from the 
observation that these have been given a relatively narrow focus. This would in practice 
reduce the analytical space for this thesis to be able to identify factors that influence the 
capacity of programme-implementing bodies to execute these interventions, where these 
are not limited by the presence or absence of a set of conditions. This then raised the 
question of whether Paul’s variable framework might equip this thesis with wider (i.e., by 
being less conditional) analytical space.  
 
The specification of variables in Paul’s framework did generally appear to facilitate 
greater explanatory scope, when directly compared with those described by White. 
Firstly, the four variables described by Paul were defined by a set of somewhat more 
generic categories, comprising a programme’s ‘environment’, ‘strategy’, ‘structure’ and 
‘processes’. Secondly, the properties or sub-variable elements associated with each 
main variable also appeared less narrowly conceived in their description. For example, 
where the strategic emphasis for White is on actions that contribute to the development 
content of a programme’s design, the strategy variable in Paul’s framework suggested 
that this may be influenced by the objectives set for a programme by the government, 
how these are translated into operating goals and action plans, and how the programme 
is resourced, coupled with the effects of the programme’s environment. Whilst a 
structural concern for White included actions that enhanced the development capacity of 
implementing organisations, which in any event represents a perspective of capacity as 
acquired ability, Paul submitted that the functional and organisational correspondence or 
its lack, between a programme and its sponsoring public bodies could reveal constraints 
that affect its implementation. 
 
Acknowledging the broader scope emanating from the explanatory variables employed 
by Paul, it should further be noted that there is explicit recognition in the title of his 
publication, Managing Development Programs: the lessons of success, that the 
discussion and application of the four variables to actual cases ultimately attempted to 
identify the more or less ideal circumstances under which the variables operated, and 
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their effect on programme performance. Having said this, Paul (1982: 106) also 
suggested that his study would attempt to highlight the inter-relationships among the 
variables, recognising ‘the possibility that there might be varying combinations of the 
variables influencing performance and which are appropriate under different conditions’. 
The perspective guiding Paul’s employment of variables then offered relatively wider 
analytical space for this study to try to expose the particular conditions and attendant 
variable factors found to have affected administrative capacity. 
 
To summarise, this section has suggested that the framework employed by Samuel Paul 
to analyse the functioning of development programmes could be usefully adapted to 
inform this study’s examination of administrative capacity. Section 3.5 will consider 
Paul’s contribution within wider scholarship on public sector-implemented development 
programmes. 
 
3.5 Development programmes and administrative capacity in the 
context of broader research 
 
This chapter has not yet demonstrated why, in the context of more recent research, 
Samuel Paul (1982) and Louise White’s (1987) decades-old studies on the management 
of development programmes are considered especially relevant to this study’s 
interpretation of administrative capacity. The systematic construct and orientation of the 
frameworks devised by Paul and White for assessing the implementation of 
development programmes was an important feature underpinning their relevance. 
 
More recent research on the management of development programmes, such as 
Brinkerhoff’s (1991b: 4) Looking Out, Looking In, Looking Ahead: Guidelines for 
Managing Development Programs,9 have also proposed systematic constructs for 
understanding how these initiatives are carried out, based on tasks clustered under a 
programme’s internal administrative operations (‘looking in’); its setting within wider 
organisational, political, economic and social settings (‘looking out’), and its outputs and 
impacts (‘looking ahead’). Brinkerhoff’s construct is, however, similar in orientation to 
that of White, where the actions clustered under these three dimensions are more 
narrowly oriented. 
                                                 
9See also Brinkerhoff, D.W. 1991a. Improving Development Program Performance: Guidelines for 
Managers. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers 
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For example, the ‘looking in’ task in managing a development programme includes 
programme officials: examining the level of innovation required by the initial programme 
design in terms of predictability of outcomes, and proceeding with programme design 
using a team approach. The ‘looking out’ task requires programme officials to conduct a 
rapid initial reconnaissance to prioritise the relevant factors in a programme’s external 
environment (i.e. economic, socio-political, technical, and cultural), and to conduct a 
stakeholder analysis. Finally, the ‘looking ahead’ task requires officials to balance the 
pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness within a programme; and to assess who is 
interested in the programme’s performance and why? (Brinkerhoff 1991b: 5-7, 12) 
Overall, Brinkerhoff’s (1991b: 1) contribution is very useful for highlighting practices 
which can enable development programmes to be carried out more effectively, with its 
focus on presenting ‘practical guidelines for managers’ based on applied research 
findings. The perspective of and analytical approach to administrative capacity adopted 
by this thesis is however dependent on a less-prescriptive framework for examining the 
implementation of development programmes by public bureaucracies. 
 
Other recent research has also framed its observations of development programmes in 
narrower and more prescriptive terms, where this has been particularly oriented towards 
methods of evaluating or appraising programme performance. Examples include Bond’s 
(2002) contribution on ‘Planning and Managing Development Projects’. In his discussion 
Bond emphasised recommended approaches and techniques for planning, implementing 
and monitoring development projects, including illustrations of planning and monitoring 
cycles and constructs. Weiss’ (2002) chapter from the same volume also focused on 
recent developments in ‘project appraisal and evaluation’. An earlier edited volume by 
Analoui (1994) contained a variety of contributions that continued this more didactic 
approach to the treatment of issues such as management techniques in development 
projects, and project planning and evaluation methodologies. Finally, Hubbard’s (2000) 
input also concentrated on development project evaluation methods, introducing what he 
termed a ‘potential-impact’ assessment that could be employed to ‘assist project design 
and evaluation’. Finally, an emphasis on understanding the practical applications of 
development programmes has also been evident in the South African literature, which 
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most notably includes Nel’s (2001) discussion of a ‘project management approach’ as a 
tool in development programme implementation.10 
 
The development programme management literature exhibits a mixture of empirically 
grounded observations, models and practical guidelines to assist researchers to 
systematically study these initiatives and the public bodies that implement them. A great 
deal has been learned and documented about what makes the activities that contribute 
to implementing a development programme effective or not effective. Having said this, 
this study’s research question emphasised the identification and analysis of the nature of 
those factors found to have influenced the capacity of public organisations to carry out 
development activities, or ‘programmes’. Given that the source of and particular 
characteristics of these factors was not assumed, a priori, and that these programmes 
were not being evaluated in relation to their expectant performance, it was necessary for 
the thesis to select a framework that could apply a wider explanatory breadth to 
identifying potential factors influencing the capacity of their implementing public 
organisations. The next section will translate Paul’s framework for use by this thesis. 
 
3.6 Translating Samuel Paul’s development programme management 
framework for application by this thesis 
 
This study submits that an analytical framework capable of identifying and defining 
factors that influence the capacity of public organisations to carry out development 
programmes could be usefully based on the variables employed by Samuel Paul to 
examine the functioning of public sector-driven development programmes. The following 
sections will describe the conditions associated with each variable as described by Paul, 
and the assumptions that inform these conditions, including the inter-relationship 
between the variables he proposes. This thesis will suggest that the definition of these 
variables by Paul could be usefully employed to isolate factors affecting the capacity of 
development programme implementing bodies to carry out these interventions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10See also Public Service Commission (2007), for a non-academic South African example that 
adopts a more evaluative approach to examining development programmes. 
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3.6.1  A development programme’s environment 
 
A development programme’s environment consists essentially of the characteristics of its 
external setting, which its implementing organisation(s) would need to negotiate in order 
to carry out the intervention (Paul 1982: 103). Moving away from what he terms the 
‘conventional’ view of environmental analysis, which emphasises the segmentation of an 
environment according to economic, political, social, and technological circumstances, 
Paul (1982: 107) submits that there are certain underlying properties associated with a 
development programme’s external environment that could affect how it is carried out. 
These properties constitute three dimensions or sub-variables, for the purposes of this 
study. 
 
The first sub-variable is the scope of a programme, defined by the extent of its 
geographical or spatial spread, and its sectoral profile, which takes into account the 
profile of the services it offers. Paul (1983: 49) gives the example of ‘[a] programme 
which deals with one crop or commodity [that] has a more limited environment than a 
multi-crop programme or a programme which attempts to integrate agriculture with social 
services.’ This indicates that a programme might cross-cut more than one sector. He 
adds that the scope of a development programme will have implications for the design of 
its strategy and structure. For instance, an increase in a programme’s geographical 
and/or sectoral scope will increase the likelihood that a programme will implement its 
services sequentially (ibid), where sequencing is elsewhere defined as the phased or 
incremental expansion (i.e., delivery) of a programme’s services. The rationale for this 
relates to managing, in the absence of a phased expansion, the rolling out of services 
concurrently across a relatively wide geographical and/or sectoral environment, 
recognising that ‘[p]rogramme failures arise from the lack of a strategy for sequential 
expansion’ (Paul 1983: 66). Paul (1982: 108) also argued that an expansion of 
environmental scope may put pressure on ‘conventional’, or in other words, overly rigid 
organisational structures through which development programmes deliver their services. 
He added that ‘hierarchical’ control over some parts of an organisation’s structure may 
become increasingly unfeasible where a development programme’s environmental 
scope expands. 
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The second feature of a programme’s environment is termed diversity, which relates to 
the physical-geographical, cultural, socio-economic or political characteristics of a 
programme’s beneficiaries/clients, particularly where there is variety in these 
circumstances. The argument is that problems may arise if the package of services 
defined by a development programme does not correspond with the diversity of needs 
evident among its beneficiaries. The assumption is that if diverse beneficiary groups 
have to be served, it becomes necessary to adapt a programme’s service offering to 
their various needs (Paul 1982: 108). Paul also notes that a diverse beneficiary 
environment also affects a programme’s organisational configuration, where relatively 
greater diversity tends to favour more decentralised organisational structures. 
 
The third element in a development programme’s environment is uncertainty, defined 
broadly as unforeseen changes, and which Paul (1982: 108) relates to sudden or even 
unpredictable occurrences precipitated by the socio-economic, political and even 
physical conditions of programme beneficiaries.11 He added that ‘[c]hanges in the 
perception of clients or their dissatisfaction with a service can significantly change their 
response to a programme’ (Paul 1983: 50). The likelihood that a development 
programme will experience greater environmental uncertainty will, it is said, demand 
greater flexibility from its strategy and structure, which could for instance include greater 
participation by beneficiaries in the design and delivery of a programme’s services, and 
increased autonomy (as well as organisational decentralisation) of field-level 
bureaucrats/functionaries to expedite adaptation to changing circumstances (Paul 1982: 
108; Paul 1983: 50). The description of ‘uncertainty’ in Paul’s framework recalls 
Rondinelli’s (1993: 7-8) observations in chapter 2 about the relationship between 
centralised control-oriented development planning and the ability of public organisations 
to function in complex and correspondingly more uncertain environments. 
 
3.6.2  A development programme’s strategy 
 
The second variable discussed by Paul (1982: 110; 1983: 57) is termed strategy, which 
comprises at least three properties. The first is the objectives laid down by the 
government for the programme. This relates closely to the next element, which looks at 
                                                 
11Physical changes include the example of changeable weather patterns affecting farmers’ 
behavior and responses to an agricultural development programme (Paul 1983: 50). 
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how these objectives are translated by programming officials into operating goals and 
action plans, and a further feature, which refers to the resources allocated to a 
programme. Features in a development programme’s environment can also have an 
effect on its strategic make-up. 
 
Although the specification of a development programme’s objectives might appear 
obvious, there may be conditions associated with this process that could affect the 
capacity of its implementing bodies to carry it out. Paul (1983: 58) notes for instance that 
if the goals of a programme do not fit the objectives of the government that sponsors it, 
programme leaders will find it difficult to obtain resources and other forms of support. 
Alternatively, depending on the level of specificity attached to the objective(s) of a 
development programme, programme implementers may experience limited space (in 
other words, flexibility) to determine the best operational means of achieving the 
objective(s). 
 
In discussing the resources allocated to a development programme as part of its 
strategy, Paul (1983: 69) acknowledges that this is commonly thought of in financial 
terms. What he stresses with this sub-variable, however, is the likelihood that 
programming officials will need to ‘mobilise’ these and other kinds of resources, serviced 
by inter-agency co-operation and support from political leaders, in order to facilitate a 
programme’s pursuit of its objectives. He expands on this by arguing that the process of 
implementing a development programme may: 
 
[E]ntail co-ordination with several other agencies whose support and active 
cooperation become critical to the success of the programme. External 
linkage building may turn out to be a key function of the top management of 
a multi-sectoral program which has to deal with diverse beneficiary groups 
and several departments in the government whose resources, both political 
and financial, are important for the program. (Paul 1982: 115) 
 
Finally, although it is reasonable to assume that the makeup of a development 
programme’s resources will include tangible (i.e. financial) as well as other related forms 
of support (i.e. administrative and political co-operation), it is advisable to include the 
circumstances under which programmes are human resourced, where this has exhibited 
particular resonance in the literature on administrative capacity in South Africa. Overall, 
the notion of resource ‘mobilisation’ extends the ability of this thesis to scrutinise the 
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organisational and operational conditions under which programmes function, in order to 
locate resourcing-related factors that may have affected the capacity of programme 
implementing bodies. 
 
3.6.3  A development programme’s structure 
 
The third variable associated with a development programme is its structure, which 
according to Paul refers to the functional and organisational arrangements in place to 
support a development programme’s implementation. The distinction between 
‘functional’ and ‘organisational’ structure was interpreted as follows: Paul (1983: 77) 
defined functional structure as the division of organisational tasks according to what is 
relevant to a particular service. ‘Organisational’ structure, meanwhile, which is the 
phrasing applied by the researcher, refers to what Paul (1982: 117) described as 
‘centralised structures’, which essentially relates to how decision-making authority is 
organisationally configured to carry out a development programme, and within which 
functional tasks are defined and implemented. 
 
A relevant theoretical assumption stemming from Paul’s (1982: 116) portrayal of the 
structure variable corresponds with the bureaucratic features of public organisations as 
discussed in chapter 2, where he argues that ‘[t]o the extent that the environment, goals, 
and tasks of a development program differ from those if its sponsoring ministry, there is 
a case for designing the program’s organisational structure along lines which differ from 
the bureaucratic mode’. He goes on to suggest that features of the bureaucratic mode 
could pose ‘severe constraints’ on the organisational structure of development 
programmes, which also recalls the concerns about reactive inflexibility mentioned in 
chapter 2. As to the features of the ‘bureaucratic mode’, Paul (1982: 117) submits that 
the constraints emanating from the bureaucratic mode are likely to emerge when a 
development programme is embedded within the existing line functions of its 
implementing bodies, where these bodies are also more likely to employ centralised 
decision-making structures – the bureaucratic hierarchy referred to in chapter 2. The 
extent to which there is correspondence between the demands introduced by new 
development programmes and the structures within which these are accommodated will 
likely reveal structural dis-functionalities and the kind of bureaucratic inflexibility that 
might affect the capacity of a public organisation to carry out a programme. 
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Research by J.C. Ickis (1983) on the ‘structural responses to new rural development 
strategies’ in five Latin American countries12 represents a useful application of a 
structural perspective not unlike that presented by Paul. Ickis studied rural development 
programmes in the five countries between 1976 and 1978; he was specifically 
concerned about the relationship between the strategy and structure of the programmes, 
and the design of the implementing organisation or network of organisations (Ickis 1983: 
5). Findings from the study included observations of dysfunctional organisational 
processes, for example between central and field structures/offices, undifferentiated 
structures, particularly where differentiated client groups were being served (see same 
point under environment variable earlier), and over-centralised decision-making (Ickis 
1983: 24-28). 
 
Implicit in Paul’s description of the structure variable, as well as being evident in the 
work by Ickis, is the likely participation of more than one public organisation in the 
implementation of a development programme, for instance at a lower/field/localised 
level. In his discussion of development bureaucracies, Van Ufford (1988: 12) also 
referred to this as the linkages between development organisations at different levels. 
This thesis should therefore expect to see the contribution of more than one public 
organisation in the implementation of individual development programmes. 
 
3.6.4  A development programme’s process 
 
The fourth variable, defined as ‘process’, refers to the characteristics that shape 
decision-making and actions taken in a development programme, or in other words, 
‘how’ decisions are made and how actions are taken (Paul 1982: 121; Paul 1983: 93). 
The features that Paul associates with the study of a programme’s processes include 
participation, monitoring, human resource development, and motivation. Paul firstly 
hypothesises that a wider participatory process to inform decision-making may be 
beneficial to a programme’s planning and operations. Monitoring refers to the extent that 
information and reporting systems have shifted from the observance of ‘procedures’ 
(connoting bureaucracy), which refers to the rules governing decision-making processes 
and budget control, compared to programme ‘performance’. Human Resource 
Development deals with the extent to which the recruitment, development and 
                                                 
12Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua 
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compensation procedures employed to staff development programmes depart from that 
of government norms in general and so called ‘routinised’/‘conventional’ tasks in 
particular (another feature commonly associated with bureaucracy). Finally, motivation 
concerns the use of incentives to encourage commitment, including monetary incentives, 
status and recognition, participation, ideology and authority (Paul 1982: 122-124). 
 
It is submitted that applying the process variable may either be superfluous, relative to 
the other three variables, to the ability of this study to effectively respond to its research 
question, or in other cases be irrelevant to its interpretation of administrative capacity. 
For example, Paul (1982: 121) was earlier quoted as stating that the processes 
employed by a development programme are an important consideration where 
programmes ‘are bound to be influenced by the organisational processes of the 
government which spawns them’. Although an otherwise noteworthy point, it may be 
difficult in this instance to distinguish the process variable from the structure variable, 
which also concerns itself with a programme’s organisational arrangements. The 
structure variable’s interest in assessing the functional and organisational consistency 
between development programmes and the structures through which these are carried 
out presumes that the processes emanating from these arrangements will emerge and 
can therefore be analysed. In addition, the ‘organisational processes’ to which 
development programmes are subject could also affect capacity at a strategic level, 
where Paul (1983: 94) has observed that: 
 
In formulating a programme strategy, allocating funds and choosing a 
structure, heads of ministries or departments commonly convey their 
decisions to subordinates for implementation. Centralised government 
structures reinforce this practice. Those below in the hierarchy have little 
discretion in this ‘top-down’ process of decision making. 
 
In other cases, the nature and form of beneficiary participation in a development 
programme may be examined as a component of a programme’s environment, and in 
particular its adaptation to uncertainty as noted earlier. The monitoring processes of a 
development programme could also be assessed as a feature of the roles that structures 
perform, including the carrying out of ‘information and reporting’ activities (Paul 1982: 
122-123). Elsewhere, features associated with the ‘process’ variable appear more 
closely attuned to an acquisition of capacity perspective. This includes the human 
resourcing processes adopted by a development programme, through efforts to build or 
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strengthen human resources. Finally, the use of incentives to encourage and motivate 
administrative commitment also appears to coincide more closely with direct efforts to 
strengthen capacity. 
 
Table 3.3 summarises how this thesis will adapt the variables described by Samuel Paul 
to examine administrative capacity.  
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Table 3.3: Analytical framework employed to research administrative capacity (adapted from Samuel Paul) 
1.  A development programme’s ‘environment’ 
 
• 1(a): Scope: This will entail collecting data on a development programme’s geographical/spatial spread, and its sectoral profile 
 
• 1(b): Diversity: This will entail collecting data on the physical-geographical, cultural, socio-economic, and political characteristics 
associated with the circumstances and needs of a development programme’s beneficiaries 
 
• 1(c): Uncertainty: This will entail collecting data on unforeseen changes associated with the social, political, economic and physical 
conditions of a development programme’s beneficiaries 
 
2.  A development programme’s ‘strategy’  
 
• 2(a): Objectives: This will entail collecting data on the objectives specified for a development programme by a government 
 
• 2(b): Operational planning: This will entail collecting data on the translation of a development programme’s objectives into operating 
goals and action plans 
 
• 2(c): Resources allocated to the programme: This will entail collecting data on the circumstances associated with a development 
programme’s resourcing (i.e. financial, human) and resource mobilisation. 
 
3.  A development programme’s ‘structure’ 
 
• 3(a): Functional and organisational arrangements: This will entail collecting data on the functional and decision-making authority 
relationships between development programmes and their sponsoring organisational bodies (ministries/departments) 
 
Application of framework: 
 
This thesis firstly recognises an intersection between these variables, in accordance with Paul’s approach. Secondly, this thesis will apply this 
framework of variables to individual development programme cases, a process that will, together, expose a set of organisational and operational 
conditions from which factors can be observed as having influenced the capacity of programme implementing bodies to carry out the interventions 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
62 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by stating that an analytical framework capable of identifying factors 
influencing the capacity of public administrations to carry out development programmes 
would need to meet certain prerequisites corresponding to the research question, 
interpretation and theoretical perspective of capacity adopted by this thesis. An 
analytical framework modelled on a set of variables proposed by Samuel Paul to 
examine the public sector management of development programmes was identified for 
its suitability in identifying factors observed as influencing the capacity of public bodies to 
carry out these interventions. On the basis of the literature review and analytical 
framework described in chapters 2 and 3, chapter 4 will give a more explicit description 
of the research methodology that will apply the analytical framework described in this 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has outlined the conceptual and theoretical questions underpinning its 
enquiry into administrative capacity. This has included a description of the research 
problem and a question in response to that problem; a working definition of the research 
subject (administrative capacity); a means through which this subject can be researched 
(development programmes); a unit of analysis for undertaking the enquiry (public 
organisations); and an analytical framework through which the research question can be 
examined. Chapter 4 will build on the introductory discussion on research methodology 
provided in chapter 1, by giving a more detailed outline of the methodology employed by 
this thesis, including research design, the data gathering process, and the approach to 
data analysis. 
 
4.2 Approach to research methodology 
 
The introductory chapter noted that a case study methodology would be employed by 
this thesis. The choice of a case study approach was driven largely by the nature of the 
research enquiry, which seeks to understand the quality of the factors that could be 
observed, through detailed analyses of individual cases, as influencing the capacity of 
public organisations to carry out development programmes. As this thesis did not 
hypothesise what these factors would be, apart from suggesting that the three variables 
making up this study’s analytical framework could help to identify and explain them, the 
makeup of the research question was exploratory, with the aim of systematically 
isolating and explaining how these factors influenced administrative capacity. A case 
study approach was therefore considered well suited to the demands of the research 
question. 
 
Further discussion on the relationship between case study research methodology and 
this study’s research question could also be seen in Mouton and Marais’ (1990: 103) 
description of the concept of ‘analysis’ in social science research. The researchers 
indicated that analysis results in isolating the ‘constituent variables or factors that are 
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relevant to the understanding of a phenomenon or an event’. This holds methodological 
value for this thesis in two respects: first, it mirrors the intention of the research question, 
which seeks to identify factors that influence the capacity of public administrations to 
carry out development programmes. In this instance, analysis, approximating the 
exploratory search for factors relevant to understanding a phenomenon or event (if a 
development programme is viewed as a series of events) is appropriate. Second, the 
use of the term ‘understanding’, as in the goal of the research question being to 
understand a phenomenon or event based on the identification and analysis of particular 
factors, might also affect a useful methodological outcome in how this study proceeds to 
capture and organise case study data to facilitate an understanding of the phenomenon 
or events (through development programmes) which it represents. 
 
In discussing the relationship between research methodology and the objectives of 
social science research, the question of approach, or how to apply methodology, is also 
raised. This includes the distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods. In 
trying to distinguish these major types of social science methodology, Mouton and 
Marais (1990: 168, 170) have suggested that the former (qualitative) was oriented to 
‘understanding’ social phenomena by emphasising more in-depth inquiry. This 
supposedly differs from the latter (quantitative), which is oriented towards ‘explaining’ or 
‘describing’ this phenomenon through identifying causal relationships between variables; 
or describing a phenomenon on as broad a scale as possible, including for the 
construction of typologies. Drawing a distinction between ‘understanding’ and 
‘explaining’ social phenomena may be questionable, since both terms could be said to 
contribute to the end-goal of this thesis: that is, to isolate, explain and understand the 
effect of factors influencing the capacity of public organisations to carry out development 
programmes. It would therefore be advisable not to project such a distinction between 
the supposed inclinations of qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches. 
 
It has, however, elsewhere been recognised that qualitative and quantitative approaches 
do use different techniques for gathering data. Generally speaking, quantitative methods 
tend towards the use of statistical techniques, especially to provide an aggregate picture 
of data being studied, whereas qualitative methods generally employ more interpretative 
analysis of smaller and more limited segments of data (Kelle, Erzberger 2004). 
Recognising the differing contributions that each approach can make when trying to 
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define social phenomenon, it is suggested that the use of both techniques could 
complement the analysis of data in so far as both can yield ‘a more comprehensive 
picture of the object under investigation’ (Kelle and Erzberger 2004: 175). It has also 
been observed that the use of qualitative procedures is ‘particularly indispensable when 
investigators have no a priori access to the typical meaning patterns and action 
orientations in the subject area being investigated’ (Kelle and Erzberger 2004: 176). 
 
Picking up on Kelle and Erzberger’s last point, it was mentioned earlier that the 
interpretation of administrative capacity adopted by this study did not advance a specific 
hypothesis concerning the identity and nature of factors observed as influencing the 
capacity of public organisations to carry out development programmes. Save for 
recognising in the literature the potential importance of the organisational level of 
analysis for generating insights about capacity, this thesis did not therefore proceed on 
the basis of an a priori understanding of what could be termed ‘typical’ meaning patterns 
and action orientations, where only a limited indication of how these factors might 
present themselves was evident in the assumptions attached to the analytical framework 
presented in chapter 3. Instead, this thesis took the decision that a more qualitative 
approach would better serve the interpretation of administrative capacity being 
promoted. 
 
4.3 Exercising a qualitative approach to methodology 
 
The adoption by this thesis of a qualitative methodological approach raises a further 
question of how this translated into instruments for gathering and recording relevant 
data. It was earlier mentioned that this thesis employed case studies as the vehicle 
through which it sought to isolate and analyse those factors affecting the capacity of 
public administrations to carry out development programmes. Using the case study as 
the focal point of the research enquiry, this thesis then employed a mixture of primary 
and secondary qualitative data gathering methods in order to inform its research 
question. 
 
Relying principally on the interpretation of primary and secondary sources, where this 
was framed by the three variables in the analytical framework described in chapter 3, the 
author first sourced a range of secondary materials on the development programme 
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cases selected for study, which existed in the form of published and in-house (i.e. non-
published departmental documents) generated by the public organisations overseeing 
the programmes under study. These included scoping or feasibility studies, 
organograms or institutional arrangements, strategic and business plans, monitoring and 
evaluation reports, policy documents and speeches, quarterly reports, regulations 
concerning financial allocations, and policy and legislative oversight documents (such as 
parliamentary hearings). 
 
Then the author analysed the primary data consisting of qualitative interviews, which 
were carried out largely with individuals (mainly government officials) directly involved in 
the implementation of the development programme cases through their affiliation with 
the public organisations (i.e., government departments in the main) responsible for 
implementing these programmes. The data generated by these interviews represented 
the core findings of this research, where interviews were able to give a more precise 
identity to and provide a more extensive description of factors affecting the capacity of 
public organisations to carry out development programmes. Section 4.3.1 provides 
further details on the use of interviewing in this study. 
 
4.3.1  Qualitative interviewing 
 
As indicated above, qualitative interviews were considered particularly useful for this 
study, including when consulting some of the literature on interviewing in social science 
research, such as Rubin and Rubin (1995) and Wengraf (2001). Before interviewing 
could begin, it was recognised that interviewing as a particular type of social enquiry 
could also take more than one form. These include unstructured and semi-structured 
formats (Rubin, J., Rubin, I.S. 1995: 5). The following passage from Wengraf (2001: 5) 
on the use of semi-structured formats was particularly noteworthy: 
 
Semi-structured interviews are designed to have a number of interviewer 
questions prepared in advance but such prepared questions are designed 
to be sufficiently open that the subsequent questions of the interviewer 
cannot be planned in advance but must be improvised in a careful and 
theorized way. 
 
Following Wengraf’s description, this thesis was guided by a semi-structured format for 
qualitative interviewing. The rationale for adopting this format flowed from this study 
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having used a pre-constructed analytical framework (i.e., see chapter 3) comprising 
variables and sub-variable categories, as a guide to locating factors that could be 
observed as influencing administrative capacity. In practice this consisted of questions 
prepared in advance that asked interviewees to describe factors associated with the 
strategy, the environment and structure of their development programmes, which 
affected the capacity of their departments to implement these. Follow-up questions 
depended on the initial responses of interviewees, and were designed to probe for 
greater detail and clarity. The next section will give details of how this study applied the 
methodology just introduced. 
 
4.4 Research design 
 
This chapter has thus far identified the approach to and exercise of a qualitative 
research methodology to identify and examine factors influencing the capacity of public 
organisations to carry out development programmes. The chapter will now discuss the 
process used by this thesis to identify the objects of its research enquiry, or the actual 
development programme cases studied. 
 
4.4.1  The identification and selection of development programme cases 
 
The process of identifying development programme cases began by cataloguing all the 
relevant programmes that were currently being carried out by public sector organisations 
in South Africa. The decision to target programmes that were currently being 
implemented was taken to increase the likelihood of sourcing a wider array and larger 
volume of secondary materials, as well as identifying a larger sample of interviewees 
who could more easily recall and provide detailed testimonials on existing programmes. 
This study’s research enquiry therefore covered the period from 2004 to the end of 2007, 
which coincided with the introduction and partial implementation of the development 
programme cases that were eventually selected. 
 
The process of identifying and selecting development programme cases firstly 
acknowledged that although South Africa’s Constitution recognises three spheres of 
government (national, provincial, local), it is only at the national sphere, consisting 
mainly of ministries and corresponding departments, where programmes would typically 
exhibit a national focus. This is significant because it speaks to the criterion of 
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‘replication’ in Paul’s description of a development programme (see chapter 3). This 
thesis therefore limited its selection of candidate development programmes to those 
being carried out by public organisations in the national sphere. 
 
Identifying the programmes began by scanning the latest available annual reports 
(2004/05) of all national-level government departments in South Africa from the 2004/05 
financial year. These departments are legally recognised public institutions that derive 
their status from Schedule 1 of South Africa’s Public Service Act (No. 103 of 1994). The 
Act in question also incorporates the transformation of national and provincial 
government departments brought about by political changes after 1994. It should be 
noted that this thesis deliberately confined its selection of public organisations operating 
at the national sphere to ministries and their associated departments, which together 
with provincial departments legally constitutes the public service in South Africa. In so 
doing it excluded other potentially eligible national level organisations such as public 
entities. Public entities, as defined in South Africa’s Public Finance Management Act 
(No. 1 of 1999), are specialist entities operating independently from national and 
provincial departments, but which are otherwise functionally associated with and legally 
overseen by government departments. Public entities are tasked with performing a 
range of largely regulatory and specialist service delivery functions relevant to the 
portfolios of the departments which oversee them. 
 
The process of cataloguing all potentially relevant development programmes carried out 
by national departments began by sourcing the annual reports of these organisations. 
Annual reports proved useful for identifying potentially relevant development 
programming activity, as these reports typically contained a broad, descriptive and 
generally similar portrayal of a department’s administrative, programmatic and financial 
activities for a specified period. In cases where the 2004/05 annual reports were not 
obtainable, as in the case of the Secretariat for Safety and Security, a recent strategic 
document pertaining to the activities of the primary organisational component of the 
Secretariat (South African Police Service) was consulted. In addition, it was only 
possible to obtain a copy of the 2003/04 Annual Report of the National Intelligence 
Agency. Despite these difficulties, it was in the end possible to scan the 2004/05 annual 
reports for 29 of 31 government departments at the national level. Hard copies of these 
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documents were sourced from Government Publications at the University of Cape Town 
and from the Document Stores section of the South African Parliament. 
 
Once an up-to-date list of national departments had been identified, and their annual 
reports obtained, each report was scanned to identify programmes that exhibited the 
development and programmatic features attributed to White’s description of what a 
development programme should be designed to address (see chapter 1), and Paul’s 
description of a development programme’s characteristics (see chapter 3). This was 
significant for the methodological validity of the study, as the selection of candidate 
cases had to conform to a common understanding of a development programme in order 
to record consistent observations about factors influencing the capacity of public 
organisations to carry out these initiatives. 
 
The resultant scan of national department annual reports yielded the list of candidate 
development programmes. These are shown in table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1: Development programmes by national government departments in South Africa 
 
Name of National Government Department Source Name of Relevant Development Programme 
Department of Agriculture 2004/05 Annual Report Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme 
Department of Arts and Culture  2004/05 Annual Report Cultural Development and International Cooperation Programme 
Department of Communications 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Correctional Services 2004/05 Annual Report  
Government Communications and Information Service 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Defence 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Education 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004/05 Annual Report Auxiliary and Associated Services Programme 
Department of Foreign Affairs 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Health 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Home Affairs 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Housing 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Labour 2004/05 Annual Report Service Delivery Programme 
Department of Land Affairs 2004/05 Annual Report Land Reform Implementation Management and Co-ordination 
Programme 
Department of Minerals and Energy 2004/05 Annual Report Mineral Development Programme 
National Intelligence Agency 2003/04 Annual Report  
National Treasury 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Provincial and Local Government 2004/05 Annual Report  
The Presidency 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Public Works 2004/05 Annual Report Expanded Public Works Programme 
Department of Public Enterprises 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Public Service and Administration 2004/05 Annual Report  
Secretariat of Safety and Security  2005/06 Planning 
Information for the SA 
Police Service 
 
Department of Sport and Recreation 2004/05 Annual Report Building for Sport and Recreation Programme 
Department of Science and Technology 2004/05 Annual Report Technology for Development Programme 
Department of Social Development 2004/05 Annual Report Poverty Relief Programme 
Department of Trade and Industry 2004/05 Annual Report Enterprise and Industry Development Division 
Department of Transport 2004/05 Annual Report  
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 2004/05 Annual Report Working for Water Programme 
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Of the 31 national departments scanned, 12 were observed to be implementing 
programmes that corresponded to the developmental and programmatic criteria outlined 
by White and Paul. These included the Departments of Agriculture, Arts and Culture, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Labour, Land Affairs, Minerals and Energy, Public 
Works, Sport and Recreation, Science and Technology, Social Development, Trade and 
Industry, and Water Affairs and Forestry. 
 
The next task was to select from among these 12 programmes those that could be 
employed as case studies. This had a direct effect on the methodological question of 
representivity or, in other words, how would such a selection affect the ability of this 
study to present findings considered to be generally representative of all government-
sponsored development programmes? This study offers no simple answer, save to say 
that it deliberately opted for a smaller number of cases consisting of two development 
programmes. Although recognising that the more cases under study the greater the 
ability to generalise findings, it was decided to concentrate on a fewer number of cases 
in order to facilitate a more in-depth examination of programmes, especially in view of 
the complex multiple variable and accompanying sub-variable categories that constituted 
this study’s analytical framework. 
 
However, this study cannot claim to offer findings that are representative of or 
generalisable to development programmes being carried out by government 
departments in South Africa. In defence, the interpretation and working definition that 
this thesis applied to the issue of administrative capacity in South Africa is atypical of 
how the issue has been more commonly examined (see chapter 1). It was therefore 
thought that a more prudent approach would be to begin with a smaller case 
assessment in view of the nascent perspective being employed, and in order to test the 
efficacy of the methodology applied. In deliberately opting for a smaller number of cases, 
this thesis did try to compensate somewhat in how it eventually narrowed down its 
selection of two cases. It was decided to choose programmes of relatively greater 
organisational complexity so as to enable a fuller application of this study’s analytical 
framework. It was also decided to select programmes that appeared to exhibit a 
comparatively higher profile or priority within the South African government’s 
development programmes, to capitalise on the potential for greater sources being 
available. Based on these criteria the two programmes that eventually emerged as 
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strong candidate cases were the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) and the 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP). A brief overview of these two 
programmes follows. 
 
Since 1994 government-sponsored public works programmes have had an explicit 
developmental focus, emphasising employment creation, income generation and 
enhancing productive capacity as a means of contributing to the reduction of poverty. 
The EPWP is the latest incarnation in this public works orientation. The programme is 
co-ordinated by the national Department of Public Works and was among only a few 
short-term programmes mentioned by Aliber et al (2006: 50-51) in their overview of 
government interventions designed to address underdevelopment and poverty in South 
Africa. 
 
The EPWP exhibits a particularly complex sectoral profile, including the participation of a 
range of national departments, provincial governments and municipalities, grouped 
according to four sectors (Department of Public Works, not dated b: 3). The programme 
also has a strong profile across government, as an intervention designed to create 
significant numbers of work opportunities in response to a persistently high rate of 
unemployment in South Africa. 
 
The argument for including the Department of Agriculture’s Comprehensive Agricultural 
Support Programme (CASP) as a second case study can be traced back to a 
Parliamentary address by South African President Thabo Mbeki in May 2004, where 
CASP was explicitly mentioned among only a handful of development interventions that 
the government intended to make following South Africa’s third democratic elections in 
April 2004 (South Africa Government Online 2004). Two years after his speech, the 
South African President was joined by the leader of Tanzania in accentuating the 
importance of state interventions in agriculture to respond to underdevelopment, at a 
meeting of the World Economic Forum (Iafrica.com 2006). 
 
The CASP programme also responds favourably to the development programme criteria 
presented earlier by White. This includes the objective of improving productive capacity, 
incomes and welfare circumstances through promoting agricultural development in rural 
areas (Department of Agriculture 2005a). The CASP programme was also highlighted in 
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the list compiled by Aliber et al (2006: 52, 54, 56) of short-term programme interventions 
in response to underdevelopment in South Africa, raising its profile among public sector-
administered development programmes in general. Finally, the relatively more complex 
sectoral circumstances of CASP, involving the participation of the national and provincial 
departments of agriculture, as well as the national Department of Land Affairs, also lent 
impetus to its inclusion (Department of Agriculture 2003?).13 
 
This section has provided an overview of the process employed to identify and select 
development programme case studies to support and inform this study’s enquiry into 
administrative capacity. The next section will describe the actions employed by this 
thesis to gather secondary and primary data on these two programme cases. 
 
4.5 The data gathering process 
 
The process of gathering data on the two case study development programmes selected 
for this thesis used a mixture of primary and secondary sources to try to build a 
comprehensive picture of each programme’s organisational and operational activities. 
This was necessary to facilitate the search for factors that could be observed as 
influencing the capacity of the programme’s implementing organisations to carry out 
these initiatives. The following illustrates how the researcher proceeded to source 
primary and secondary data, as well as the nature of the data. It will begin with 
secondary materials, as this was the first type of data sought in trying to construct an 
initial overview of the two programmes. 
 
4.5.1  Secondary source materials 
 
This chapter referred earlier to examples of secondary data on development 
programmes, where these generally consisted of published and internal documents on 
the structure and operations of development programmes. The initial step in gathering 
secondary source material relevant to the two cases under study was identifying 
precisely what had been produced on each programme. The researcher began by 
searching for specific document references to these programmes identified in the annual 
                                                 
13
 The question mark ‘?’ accompanying the date given to this and other references denotes how 
these were catalogued in the Government Publications collection, University of Cape Town, and 
reflects uncertainty about year of publication. 
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reports of the Department of Public Works (DPW) and the Department of Agriculture 
(DOA), which appeared to be the sponsoring departments of the EPWP and CASP, 
respectively. The next step was to consult all available hard copy documents held under 
the public works and agricultural sectors in the Government Publications library, at the 
University of Cape Town. This activity did in fact yield documentation pertaining to the 
two programmes. The contents of these documents were broad in their descriptions of 
the programmes, containing information on policy objectives, operational design, 
stakeholder environment and organisational structures. Although these were relevant, 
they were not sufficiently detailed to construct a satisfactory initial description. 
 
In an effort to expand the sources of potentially relevant secondary materials available 
on both programmes, the researcher next scanned the websites of the DPW and DOA. 
In the case of the DPW, a separate website dedicated to the EPWP programme was in 
operation, which housed a range of more detailed documentation on the programme 
including overviews, sector profiles, legislative and implementation frameworks, and 
progress reports. These documents were downloaded for later analysis. Information 
pertaining to the CASP programme was not as extensively available on the DOA’s 
website, which contained a page giving an overview of the programme and its 
objectives, contact information, as well as a limited number of progress reports, which 
were also downloaded for later analysis. 
 
A further step taken by the researcher to expand the availability of secondary sources 
entailed arranging three separate research trips to the headquarters of the DPW and 
DOA in Pretoria.14 These trips took place between 18 October 2006 and 17 March 2007. 
During the course of these trips, meetings were arranged with departmental officials 
specifically assigned to the two programmes. The trips yielded commitments from 
departmental officials to assist the researcher with accessing documents that had not 
been found or were not available through initial library and internet searches (particularly 
fruitful in the case of CASP), and a commitment to facilitate access to departmental 
colleagues for a later phase of interviewing. The third research trip, which took place 
between 15 and 17 March 2007, was arranged to attend a workshop organised by the 
DOA, where findings were to be presented from an official review of the CASP 
programme. 
                                                 
14The researcher is based in Cape Town. 
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4.5.2  Primary source materials 
 
Primary data on the operations of the EPWP and CASP programmes was informed 
through qualitative interviews. In total, 45 interviews were carried out by this study and 
constitute its primary source material. The bulk of these comprised interviews with 
programme-related officials with a smaller number of interviews with academics who had 
written on the subject of administrative capacity in the context of South African public 
administration. Preparation for interviewing began after the researcher had held initial 
face-to-face meetings with representatives of the DPW and DOA, which were preceded 
by a letter sent to the Heads of the two departments, which outlined the purpose of the 
research and made an official request for co-operation. 
 
The organisation of interviews was purposive rather than random, the aim being to target 
a wide range of officials directly involved in the implementation of the two programmes. 
However, the sheer number of officials involved across various spheres of government 
meant that it was not possible to speak to a representative sample of officials. The 
targeting of interview respondents sought to cover a broad cross-section of officials 
primarily in senior level positions in their departments, where the span of responsibility 
resting with these officials could try to compensate for the challenge in both time and 
resources required to accommodate a representative sample. In the end, about 
66 per cent of the interviews held with government officials were with individuals in 
senior management (director and above), which is the highest functional level in the 
South African public servic . The designations of the remaining government officials 
included those holding middle management and other supervisory designations, 
including assistant and deputy directors, senior and chief planners, and programme 
managers. 
 
The interview roster began to take shape after requesting information from the DPW and 
the DOA on the implementing structures of the EPWP and CASP programmes 
respectively. This mainly took the form of a programme organogram, in the case of the 
EPWP, and a departmental organogram in the case of CASP. In the EPWP case, this 
was followed by a request for the names and contact details of senior officials heading 
the various functional components of the programme. These officials were then 
contacted individually by fax to request an interview. The fax covered the subject of the 
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research, and indicated that the researcher had already sent correspondence to the 
Department and had held an initial meeting with a member of the programme (on an 
earlier research trip). In the case of CASP, the researcher began to develop a roster by 
making face to face contact with a number of relevant senior officials attending the 
programme’s Review workshop held in March 2007, as well as requesting and then 
receiving the contact details of national and provincial department officials directly 
involved in the programme’s implementation. 
 
Another source of primary material used in the analysis of interview data was a series of 
testimonials given by beneficiaries of the CASP programme. These testimonials were 
delivered during the course of a workshop reviewing the CASP programme, which the 
researcher attended in March 2007. As part of the Workshop’s agenda, programme 
beneficiaries representing South Africa’s various provinces were invited to address the 
gathering on their observations and experiences with CASP. In total, beneficiaries 
representing eight provinces addressed the gathering one by one, providing firsthand 
testimonials about their specific experiences. The researcher was able to record (in 
writing and in real time) the observations and cross-reference these with a recording 
captured by an official rapporteur at the review workshop. For the purposes of verifying 
these observations, relevant excerpts of the official rapporteur’s version were used in the 
analysis (see Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007, chapter 6). 
These did however correspond directly with what was captured by the researcher.15 
 
4.5.3  Interviewing protocols 
 
The actual process of interviewing programme-related respondents involved the initial 
preparation of a small number of questions requesting respondents to describe the 
conditions that affected the capacity of their departments to carry out the programmes 
under study. Respondents were given some guidance in formulating their responses by 
indicating that the researcher was particularly interested in learning about environmental, 
strategic and structural factors, and a general description of these variables was given in 
accordance with the analytical framework employed by this study. Respondents were 
then requested to elaborate on these circumstances, with follow-up questions probing for 
greater detail guided by information that had already been conveyed by interviewees. 
                                                 
15The researcher’s record of beneficiary testimonials is provided in appendix 2.  
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The interviewing of academics entailed a different process, which involved the 
preparation of a questionnaire, attached in appendix 1, which was emailed to a select 
group of academics who had written on the subject of capacity or who had contributed 
more broadly to the literature on public administration and development in South Africa. 
The researcher then arranged face to face interviews with each of the academics except 
one, which was held telephonically. The academic interviews held a dual purpose. The 
first and foremost aim was to supplement the limited local literature that this study was 
able to identify, which dealt with the subject of administrative capacity in a context 
characterised by public organisational restructuring and changing development policy 
mandates. The second purpose was to obtain a view from academics, based on their 
research and experience, on what they believed to be key constraints, present among 
the organisational and operational conditions through which public bodies carried out 
development programmes, which affected their capacity. 
 
The questionnaire contained three questions: 
 
1. What do you consider to be the key ‘inherent’ constraints that affect the capacity 
of South African public administrations to carry out development programmes? 
(see appendix 1 for an explanation of what was meant by ‘inherent’ constraints) 
2. What is the impact that development programmes have had on the capacity of 
public administrations to carry out these interventions, which in practice took into 
account changing development policy mandates accompanying South Africa’s 
transition to democracy? 
3. What are the key issues, associated with a development programme’s 
environment, strategy and structure, following Paul’s framework, which in your 
estimation affect the capacity of public administrations to carry out these 
initiatives? 
 
4.5.4 Overview of interviews 
 
The following illustrations give a statistical breakdown of the final interview sample. In 
the case of government officials and other stakeholders directly involved in the 
implementation of the two case programmes, a list covering the departments, date and 
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place of each interview is presented in appendix 3 to this thesis. The names and 
designations of officials and programme stakeholders, excluding academics interviewed, 
are not given in order to preserve the anonymity of the respondents.16 In total, 45 
qualitative interviews were carried out. Figure 4.1 shows that these consisted of 37 
interviews with a range of government officials and other principals directly involved in 
the implementation of the EPWP and CASP programmes. Two further interviews were 
held with other key informants. The first was with a senior official of the Public Service 
Commission, which undertakes research on, among other things, the implementation of 
development programmes by government bodies. The second was with a senior official 
in the National Treasury (Department of Finance) responsible for monitoring and 
evaluating inter-governmental financing instruments for service and programme 
implementation, which included mechanisms used in both EPWP and CASP. Finally, six 
interviews with public administration academics were also recorded. 
 
Figure 4.1: Overall breakdown of interviews (N=45) 
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A further breakdown of the interviews is shown in figure 4.2, which shows the 
organisational affiliation of each respondent. 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Reference is made to Wengraf’s (2001: 187) discussion of anonymity and confidentiality in 
qualitative interviews.   
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Figure 4.2: Breakdown of interviews by organisational affiliation* (N=39) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
EPWP CASP Other
N
u
m
be
r
DPW/DOA
Other National
depts.
Provincial depts.
Other
 
*Excludes interviews with academics 
 
Before discussing the contents of figure 4.2, it must be conceded that, as with the 
selection of only two development programme cases, interviews with officials and other 
individuals associated with the two development programmes is not generalisable to all 
members directly involved in their implementation. This would have to potentially take 
into account a great many individuals functioning at various organisational levels in order 
to carry out the programmes. The selection of respondents therefore had to be more 
selective, where in respect of figure 4.2, the figures show that for the EPWP, the majority 
of interviews were held with officials attached to other national departments which, 
according to the programme’s structure, were required to contribute to the programme’s 
overall objective of encouraging labour-intensive expenditure in four sectoral areas: 
Infrastructure, Social, Economic, and Environment and Culture. In other words, the 
structure of the EPWP saw the bulk of implementation channelled to various national 
departments (and their provincial counterparts) whose contributions were clustered 
under the programme’s four sectors. A smaller collection of interviews were held with 
officials of the national Department of Public Works, which was designated as the 
programme’s co-ordinating department, and which entailed a responsibility to support as 
well as evaluate the sector-specific contributions of partnering national and provincial 
departments, and municipalities. This thesis was however able to interview DPW officials 
who retained a responsibility to co-ordinate all four sector areas which defined the study, 
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as well as DPW officials responsible for other key functional and administrative elements 
of the EPWP: training, monitoring and evaluation. 
 
Finally, in accordance with the comment on generalisability, it should be noted that it 
was simply not feasible to extend interviewing to provincial department counterparts of 
national departments contributing to the EPWP, as well as municipalities, where all 283 
local governments in the country were expected to contribute to the programme’s 
Infrastructure sector. An effort was however made to include within the national-level 
interviews, representatives of private sector entities, public entities and Members of 
Parliament who, as stakeholders, were directly involved in the programme’s 
implementation and who could speak firsthand about the experiences of sub-national 
departments. These interviews were included under ‘other’ in figure 4.2. 
 
A similar logic was employed in purposively selecting CASP interviewees, where the 
bulk of these were held with officials of provincial departments of agriculture. According 
to the structure of CASP, provincial departments were allocated primary responsibility for 
implementing the programme. The researcher was able to interview officials from seven 
of South Africa’s nine provincial departments of agriculture, where an effort was made to 
contact officials in all provinces. In all cases, the officials that were selected for interview 
were directly responsible for co-ordinating or otherwise overseeing the implementation of 
CASP in their provinces. It must be restated that these officials were not the only 
members of provincial departments involved in the implementation of CASP, and so their 
observations cannot be generalised to those of all relevant provincial officials. A 
comparatively smaller number of interviews were held with officials of the DOA which, as 
with the DPW, retained responsibility for oversight, co-ordination and rendering support 
as part of the programme’s implementation. The relatively smaller number of DOA 
representatives did however include a full-time CASP Programme Manager, along with 
two senior officials responsible for performing direct strategic oversight over CASP. 
Interviews were also held with officials of the national Department of Land Affairs, which 
partnered the DOA in executing CASP, and with an official of the National Treasury 
responsible for overseeing budgeting for the agriculture and land affairs sectors. Finally, 
the researcher was also able to interview a member of a consultancy team which carried 
out an officially sanctioned mid-term review of CASP. 
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The ‘other’ category illustrated in figure 4.2 includes the two interviews held with senior 
officials in the Public Service Commission and the National Treasury mentioned earlier. 
 
Figure 4.3 provides a breakdown of the formats used in the interviewing. The 
percentages are calculated on the total number of interviews held (45), and show that 
over 75 per cent of the interviews were held in person, whilst the remainder were 
conducted by telephone. Interviews by telephone, although not as favoured as face-to-
face situations, have nonetheless been generally accepted in social scientific 
methodology, where time and costs present difficulties (Rubin and Rubin 1995: 141-142; 
Babbie 1998: 272). Time and cost constraints did arise for example when preparing to 
interview officials of provincial departments of agriculture, which were located in seven 
provinces. All but one of these interviews (excluding the Western Cape, where the 
researcher is based) was therefore conducted by telephone. 
 
Figure 4.3: Breakdown of Interviews by format 
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Figure 4.3 also shows that over 91 per cent of the interviews were tape-recorded, which 
enabled the researcher to prepare written transcripts of each interview conducted.17 An 
observation by Babbie (1998: 266) was instructive here: ‘[w]henever the questionnaire 
contains open-ended questions, those soliciting the respondent’s own answer, it is very 
                                                 
17Before each interview respondents were asked if they would consent to the discussion being 
tape recorded. This was meant to ensure the accuracy of data collection. 
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important that the interviewer record that answer exactly as given’ where the ‘exactness 
is especially important because the interviewer will not know how the responses are to 
be coded before processing’. In the few cases where interviews were not recorded, this 
was due to the unavailability of recording equipment, the unexpected failure of recording 
equipment, and in one case a respondent requesting that the interview not be recorded. 
The written transcripts of the tape-recorded interviews comprised the source material for 
the later coding of interview data. 
 
4.6 Approach to data analysis 
 
The approach to analysing primary data (based on interviews) followed generally 
accepted procedures. In discussing the analysis of primary data, i.e. in the form of semi-
structured interviews, Schmidt (2004: 255-256) defined the coding of interview data as 
the relating of particular passages in the text of an interview to categories, or the 
classification of material captured in an interview according to analytical categories. 
Another description of coding viewed it as a ‘process of grouping interviewees’ 
responses into categories that bring together the similar ideas, concepts, or themes you 
have discovered, or steps or stages in a process.’ (Rubin, H.J., Rubin, I.S. 1995: 238) 
The key point stemming from these observations of how qualitative data is interpreted is 
the search for and discovery of themes that might be relevant to a particular research 
question. 
 
To assist the process of coding interview data, this thesis used a pre-existing framework 
of analysis consisting of three variables and associated sub-variable categories defined 
by Paul (see chapter 3). This framework constituted what Schmidt (2004: 255-256) 
referred to as ‘analytical categories’, which represent a kind of explanatory guide derived 
from existing theoretical or conceptual thinking. The process of coding essentially 
entailed the identification of themes, patterns and commonalities in the text material of 
interviews, which were deemed relevant to the research question (see Esterberg 2002: 
158). In other words, the text material of interviews was systematically analysed and 
categorised according to the variables in the analytical framework employed by this 
thesis, and coded where text material revealed conditions affecting the capacity of public 
organisations to carry out the development programmes under study. 
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In practice, this entailed initially preparing written transcriptions of all recorded 
interviews, where in the few cases where interviews were not able to be recorded, 
written notes were taken during the course of the interviewing. The physical process of 
coding involved breaking up interview data into distinct sections or segments, where 
these were then coded according to which variable and sub-variable categories these 
segments best corresponded with, in remarking on circumstances which affected the 
capacity of programme-implementing organisations. Table 4.2 below illustrates the 
coding process.  
 
Table 4.2: Interview coding process 
Variables employed 
(Samuel Paul) 
Sub-variable categories Coding process 
1. Environment 1(a): Scope  
 
1(b): Diversity 
 
1(c) Uncertainty 
 Group segments of text 
according to sub-variable 
categories 
2. Strategy 2(a) Programme objectives 
 
2(b) Operational framework 
 
2(c) Resources allocated 
 Group segments of text 
according to sub-variable 
categories 
3. Structure 3(a) Functional arrangements 
 
3(b) Organisational arrangements 
 Group segments of text 
according to sub-variable 
categories 
 
Not all pieces of interview text were found to have been directly relevant in describing 
instances where a public organisation’s capacity to carry out a programme was affected. 
These segments of commentary tended to describe or raise more general points, issues 
or circumstances surrounding the functioning of the development programmes under 
study. These segments of interview text, which comprised useful background 
descriptions of the programmes, were separated from coded segments, and were 
subsequently brought into the analysis of each case where they could clarify or augment 
impressions coming out of the coded data. 
 
Finally, the recording of interviews and the coding process itself was carried out with the 
aid of a computer and basic word processing software. Firstly, each interview was 
assigned a number so that the extraction of the contents of each could be easily traced 
back to its source interview. The researcher then went through each interview 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
84 
individually, separating out each relevant segment of text and assigning a code to these, 
which corresponded with a relevant sub-variable category (see table 4.2 above). 
Interview data was then ready to be analysed. The process of analysing the final coded 
segments of interview text entailed an initial examination of these within each sub-
variable category, which then moved to an analysis of each of the three major variable 
groups. Due to the qualitative nature of the study, and the fact that the interviews could 
not feasibly draw on a representative sample of officials directly involved in programme 
implementation, coded as well as un-coded interview data were analysed together, 
along with observations drawn from a range of secondary materials and other primary 
sources (CASP beneficiary testimonials) on each programme case, in an effort to 
generate a more comprehensive set of findings. 
 
4.7 Reliability and validity 
 
This chapter concludes the discussion on methodology by commenting on steps that 
were taken by this thesis to strengthen the reliability and validity of its results. Reliability 
in social science methodology has been defined as ensuring the dependability of data 
and the procedures used to record and document it (Flick 2002: 220-221). Peräkylä 
(1997: 203) has also remarked that the quality of tapes and transcripts has important 
implications for the reliability of what she termed conversation analytic research (i.e. 
interviews). Important elements of reliability include the selection of what is recorded, the 
technical quality of recordings, and the adequacy of transcripts (Peräkylä 1997: 206). 
This thesis did take what it regards as relevant steps to comply with these general 
expectations of reliability. This principally included the use of multiple sources of data for 
preparing the analysis (secondary literature plus primary interview data). In its audio 
recording of data, which covered over 91 per cent of respondents, this thesis captured 
the entire contents of interview sessions and subsequently prepared written transcripts 
of these sessions before coding could take place. 
 
It has been said that validity involves the ‘correspondence between a theoretical 
paradigm and the observations made by the researcher’. (Peräkylä 1997: 212) Validity 
therefore refers to how the results of research are interpreted and arrived at. Kirk and 
Miller (1986: 29-30) have added that asking the wrong question is often the source of 
most validity errors. In trying to comply with expectations attending the validity of data, 
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this thesis consistently applied a tripartite (or three variable) framework of analysis in 
collecting, presenting and analysing both secondary and primary data, the source of 
which can be traced back through to this study’s research question. This ensured that 
responses solicited from interviewees could be guided and ultimately linked back to this 
study’s research question. 
 
4.8 Methodological limitations 
 
Although this chapter has already alluded to limitations experienced by this study, it is 
necessary to collectively acknowledge these before proceeding to review the findings. 
Firstly the selection of case programmes could not purport to be representative of and 
generalisable to all public sector-implemented development programmes in South Africa, 
since the choice of only two cases was taken in order to employ a more in-depth 
qualitative enquiry in keeping with the exploratory (in other words, under-researched) 
interpretation of administrative capacity being proposed by this thesis. A related 
limitation was experienced at a data gathering level, where only a limited number of 
interview respondents could be selected.18 In this regard, observations conveyed by 
respondents cannot be considered representative of or generalisable to all government 
officials and other individuals directly involved in the implementation of the two 
programmes. With this said, and recalling a statement made in chapter 1, it should be 
stated that this thesis was not intended to be an evaluation of the programmes in terms 
of their end of term outputs, outcomes and impacts, which might be more sensitive to a 
more extensive process of consultation with programming principals. 
 
Having acknowledged these methodological limitations, it is necessary to state that, in 
the pursuit of more scholarly insights into the organisational and operational conditions 
under which development programmes functioned, and the effects on their capacity to 
do so, it was necessary for this study to combine primary (e.g., interviews, questionnaire 
to academics) and a large variety of secondary data sources, including published and 
unpublished documents, in order to derive substantive impressions about the factors that 
influence administrative capacity. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 In a few instances requests for interviews were not responded to, or officials were unavailable. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the research methodology employed by this thesis to locate 
factors affecting the capacity of South African public sector organisations to carry out 
development programmes. The methodological approach adopted by this thesis 
consisted of a mixture of primary data, mainly in the form of qualitative interviews, and a 
variety of secondary materials including published as well as non-published documents 
accessed on the functioning of two development programme cases. The next series of 
chapters will present the findings of this study on these cases. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
COMPREHENSIVE AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME: BACKGROUND 
 
 
5.1 A historical overview of the public agricultural sector and the issue of 
comprehensive agricultural support 
 
This chapter will give a historical picture of the emergence of the Comprehensive 
Agricultural Support Programme (CASP). This will take account of the changing 
administrative circumstances accompanying South Africa’s transition to democracy in 
the mid-1990s, and its effect on the delivery of farmer support services. It is worth 
recalling for instance that prior to 1994 South Africa’s system of public administration 
was highly fragmented, and which according to the Public Service Commission (1995: 5-
6), consisted of as many as eleven public services, each with its own legislation, 
structures, systems and personnel composition (see also Ncholo 2000: 89, 95). This 
structure was spawned by the government’s policy on race relations, or apartheid (see 
chapter 1), which had a profound effect on South Africa’s public agricultural sector. 
Lewis (1990: 43) for instance cited data showing that of the total arable land (in 
hectares) available in the territory of the white minority-controlled RSA (Republic of 
South Africa) and the African homelands, 84 per cent was within the RSA. It should also 
be noted that with the passage of the Natives Land Act (No. 27), the acquisition and 
hiring of land by Africans was restricted to areas designated for this purpose, which 
served as the genesis of the future homelands policy (Government Printer 1913). The 
political transition of the country to a non-racial democracy in 1994 would effectively 
result in these separate geographic and administrative zones being collapsed into a 
single geo-political entity. 
 
The national Department of Agriculture (DOA), the forerunner of the pre-1994 
department of the same name, is the primary organisational sponsor of CASP.  Although 
the DOA along with other national departments underwent organisational restructuring 
as a result of the country’s political transition, the DOA had actually begun to render 
technical and related support to ‘emerging farmers’19 in 1992, two years prior to the 
                                                 
19The term ‘emerging farmer’ has been used in the public agricultural sector to refer to black 
South Africans who were discriminated against under apartheid period governments. 
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beginning of large-scale public sector restructuring. A scan of DOA Annual Reports just 
prior to the South Africa’s political transition showed that the department had been 
involved in black farmer support activities of a kind not dissimilar to what would later 
emerge as CASP, as early as the 1992/1993 financial year. In its 1992-1993 Annual 
Report, the DOA (1993: 6) explained that a Chief Directorate called ‘Agricultural 
Advancement’ had been created, resulting from a Cabinet decision to phase out the 
Department of Development Aid (DDA), which was specifically mandated to support 
economic development in self-governing territories. The disestablishment of the DDA 
resulted in its agricultural functions and staff being assigned to the DOA. The new Chief 
Directorate was specifically tasked, through its Directorate: Farming Development, to 
essentially continue the work of the DDA by maintaining State land for the settlement of 
black farmers, and to support this constituency to achieve greater self-sufficiency and 
economic independence in production (Department of Development Aid 1992: 1, 41, 43). 
Other objectives of this Directorate were to: 
 
• Support the planning of farming units on State land (originally purchased as 
quota land for self-governing territories) with the aim of establishing profitable 
and stable agriculture, 
• Develop State land for the settlement of farmers on an economic basis, 
• Select aspirant farmers in conjunction with the authorities of self-governing 
territories 
• Coordinate after-care for established farmers 
 
(Department of Agriculture 1993: 57) 
  
Although the general form of these services was not unlike a continuation of efforts to 
support black farmers after 1994, it should be pointed out that prior to 1992/1993 the 
DOA did not render services to black farmers, where its functions were oriented towards 
assisting and regulating more established commercial agricultural activity in the then 
RSA, which due to factors such as land ownership restrictions involved primarily white 
farmers. 20 Responsibility for supporting black farmers was largely assumed by a 
combination of homeland government departments of agriculture and other RSA national 
                                                 
20This can be confirmed for example by viewing the programming activities in annual reports of 
the DOA prior to 1992/1993. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
89 
departments, such as the Department of Development Aid and its predecessor the 
Department of Co-operation and Development. These entities were specifically charged 
with providing assistance to homeland governments in various aspects of social, 
economic and physical planning, which included agricultural production (Bureau for 
Economic Research 1976: 77-85; Department of Cooperation and Development 1985; 
Department of Development Aid 1987). The reintegration of the self-governing and 
homeland territories into the RSA bureaucracy from 1994, and the consequent 
disestablishment of departments such as the DDA, would result in the DOA taking on 
greater policy responsibility for black farmer support. 
 
Before remarking on the content of these policy changes, it is necessary to describe the 
functional structure of the public agricultural sector as it coincided with South Africa’s 
transition to democracy. South Africa’s 1993 interim Constitution, which preceded the 
country’s first non-racial democratic elections, defined Agriculture as a provincial 
legislative competency in Schedule Six. Significant changes to the country’s political 
system after 1994, including the abandonment of policies designed to segregate 
populations based on race, was accompanied by a stronger socio-economic policy 
orientation aimed at redressing a nation-wide backlog of services that was most acutely 
experienced by the country’s black African population. This, coupled with a new 
governing party, the African National Congress, intent on substantiating this shift in 
policy direction through introducing measures such as the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), as well as establishing its own national executive 
authority, ultimately led to the national sphere of government retaining an influential 
hand in determining the future policy priorities of the public agricultural sector. A year 
after the 1994 political settlement, a government White Paper on Agriculture (1995) 
reflected this by acknowledging that although the agriculture function was provincialised, 
agriculture had a ‘national character as an integrated sector.’ The following year, South 
Africa’s final Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) confirmed this view by explicitly making 
agriculture a ‘concurrent’ or shared legislative competency between the national and 
provincial levels of government. 
 
Perhaps the most significant early indication that South Africa’s 1994 political transition 
had prompted a sizeable shift in policy concerning support to black farmers came in 
1995, with the publication of the Broadening Access to Agriculture Thrust (BATAT) 
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strategy. The BATAT initiative essentially represented the DOA’s post-apartheid 
reconstruction and development strategy, aimed at broadening access to agriculture for 
primarily black Africans who lacked or were subject to restricted access to land and 
agricultural production assistance under previous governments (Department of 
Agriculture 1995a: 1). The document in question, entitled: Preliminary Findings of the 
Broadening Access to Agriculture Thrust (1995) provided some clues about the thinking 
around why past administrative support to black farmers needed to change in view of the 
political transition that had occurred a year earlier. The document effectively argued that 
the entire spectrum of administrative support to black farmers had to be re-evaluated, 
implying that existent administrative functions in the agricultural sector would need to 
undergo some measure of reform in order to facilitate broadened access to a black 
farmer constituency. The scale of this reform was to apply to a range of agricultural 
services, including marketing, financial services, human resource development and 
training, technology, and agricultural extension. In other words, the intention was to bring 
black farmers into the commercially oriented mainstream functions of the DOA. 
 
The policy ideal of ‘broadened access’ held potentially considerable administrative 
implications for the DOA. This was suggested by the comment that ‘the Government 
must not only ensure access to existing services for emergent and small farmers, but 
also ensure that they have a chance to prosper’ (Department of Agriculture 1995a: 3). 
The accompanying expectations was spelled out more explicitly in Chapter 9 of the 
White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (Government Gazette 1994), which 
proposed a reformed policy agenda for the DOA, including: 
 
To initiate, promote and support the contribution of Agriculture to the 
development of rural communities, society at large and the national economy, in 
order to enhance income, food security, employment and the quality of life in a 
sustainable way. 
 
This was to be catered for programmatically through ‘entrepreneurial development with 
special reference to broadening access to agriculture’. A change in political 
circumstances had essentially brought with it a concomitant shift in the DOA’s historical, 
if brief, activities in providing direct production support to black farmers, where these 
efforts would henceforth need to be scaled up to mitigate the socio-economic 
consequences of food insecurity and unemployment (i.e., poverty), and to foster greater 
numbers of sustainable farmer entrepreneurs. 
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The earliest policy seeds of what would eventually grow into CASP can be traced back 
to the DOA’s first major articulation of this post-apartheid shift in policy. The CASP grew 
out of a relatively incremental and organic policy debate within the Department, 
beginning with the publication of a 1995 White Paper on Agriculture. The White Paper 
would pick up from where the RDP White Paper left of, by acknowledging an expectation 
that a transformed DOA would, in delivering services to black farmers in particular, 
ensure that this constituency would have a chance to prosper. The attendant challenges 
of meeting this expectation, where the political stakes of not demonstrating progress had 
increased in a non-racial democracy was rendered more difficult because the DOA was 
also being asked to maintain its traditional focus on supporting larger-scale commercial 
agricultural production. Section 2.2 of the White Paper (1995b: 7) noted for example 
that: 
 
Agricultural production systems and practices will be organised in such a manner 
as to improve national as well as household food security. The Government 
should therefore support the full spectrum of production systems and practices, 
from urban food gardens and small-scale production for household incomes and 
food security to large-scale production systems which can add considerably to 
national food security.  
 
This section of the White Paper was also prefaced by the statement that a country can 
be a net exporter of food whilst many of its people lived on the poverty line. The 
document’s acknowledgement that a post-apartheid DOA had to simultaneously support 
parallel production tracks in order to mitigate the adverse consequences of food and 
nutritional insecurity was largely driven by black farmer support. This departed from past 
orientations, by foregrounding the consequences of an absence of economic 
independence, self-reliance and sustainable income generation, contributing to a 
condition of poverty, which became more pronounced in policy terms after 1994. 
 
This emphasis was renewed in 1998, when the DOA issued a further discussion 
document concerning agricultural policy in South Africa. In section 1.3, which dealt with 
‘Agriculture, Rural Poverty and Food Security’, the document noted that departmental 
programmes were to be examined in terms of their direct and indirect contribution to 
household food security through their effect on rural incomes and the distribution of 
those incomes. The document argued more specifically that ‘Increasing the production of 
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small scale farmers will improve the availability and nutritional content of food, and 
hence food security generally among the poor.’ (Department of Agriculture 1998: 7) 
 
Given that land was the primary material resource for rendering targeted agricultural 
support to black farmers, this issue would also become a prominent feature of the DOA’s 
policy on black farmer support after 1994. This again can be traced to the RDP White 
Paper, where the Agriculture Ministry was expected to settle and support new farmers 
on state land ‘in collaboration with the Department of Land Affairs and the provinces.’ 
Section 3.10 of the 1997 White Paper on Land Policy also argued that the beneficiaries 
of post-apartheid land reform initiatives21, designed to increase access to land for black 
Africans in particular, whose ownership access had been historically restricted (see 
earlier footnote), required the government to render financial, technical and marketing 
assistance to facilitate the productive use of land (See: http:/www.gov.za Accessed 5 
September 2006). 
 
Before CASP was even on the policy map, the land element entered into the agricultural 
support equation with the introduction in 2000 of a Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD) programme, designed jointly by a national Department of Land 
Affairs (DLA) and the DOA, which after 1994 were clustered under a single Ministry for 
Agriculture and Land Affairs (2000: 13-14). The creation after 1994 of a separate 
national Department of Land Affairs was testament to the significance of redressing land 
restriction policies practiced under apartheid. The purpose of LRAD was to facilitate 
access to land for agricultural production purposes by black South Africans, who were 
previously discriminated against, through assisting these individuals to purchase land 
through matching grants. Under LRAD, The DLA administered grant applications for the 
purchase of land for agricultural use, and assisted applicants throughout the purchasing 
process. The DOA was then required to provide extension services to advise and assist 
grantees with agricultural production activities. (Department of Land Affairs 2002?: 11) 
 
Despite the building-in of the land question into black farmer support activities, the 
Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture published in 2001 observed that greater 
administrative attention needed to be given to the ‘support’ element. The Plan argued 
                                                 
21Includes programmes in land restitution and land redistribution, carried out by the Department of 
Land Affairs. 
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that whilst considerable organisational energy and funding had been expended on 
facilitating access to land for new entrants to farming since 1994, ‘less attention has 
been given to farmer support programmes’ 22 (Department of Agriculture 2001a: 9). It 
added that post land settlement support to participants in land reform programmes had 
been organised on an ad hoc basis (ibid: 9). A similar observation was made in the 
government’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Review on agriculture which preceded the 
introduction of CASP in 2004 (National Treasury 2003a: 134). In the DOA’s 2002/3 
Annual Report (2003: 35), it appeared as if this message was being heard, where a sum 
of R3, 7 million was transferred to provincial departments for what was described as 
LRAD support, ‘as part of the initial phasing in of the Comprehensive Farmer Support 
Package’. 
 
The way was then being paved for the first substantive policy description of what was to 
become the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme or ‘CASP’ in 2003. In one 
of the first descriptions of the Programme, it was evident that in addition to supporting 
land reform, the programme’s policy heritage could be traced back to the very 
foundations of post-apartheid policy thinking on black farmer support. The document 
cited the following as constituting the policy framework for CASP: 
 
• The White Paper on Agriculture (1995) 
• The White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (1994) 
• The BATAT (Broaden Access to Agricultural Thrust) Strategy (1995) 
• The White Paper on Land Reform (1995) 
• The Strauss Commission Report (1996), which investigated the provision of rural 
financial services, stressed the financial impediments faced by black farmers in 
growing and consolidating viable farming businesses, and ultimately to prosper, 
as recorded a year earlier in the BATAT document. The significance of the 
Strauss Commission’s findings for CASP is seen in the programme’s inclusion of 
a financial assistance service pillar, namely MAFISA. (Commission of Inquiry into 
the Provision of Rural Financial Services, Strauss Commission 1996: 72) 
                                                 
22Examples of black farmer support interventions introduced after 1994 included a Grant 
Assistance for Small-Farming Development Scheme, which saw the provision of grant assistance 
for the development of infrastructure in the small farming sector. The Department’s 1996-1997 
Annual Report (1997: 1, 59) indicated that R42,9 million was transferred to provincial 
departments to support seventy-four projects under the scheme.  
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• The Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture (2001) 
 
(Department of Agriculture 2003?: 10) 
 
 5.2 Conclusion 
 
This historical background to the introduction of CASP was designed to present a limited 
yet pertinent set of facts about the evolution of black farmer support in South Africa’s 
post-apartheid public agricultural sector, until the official launch of CASP in 2004. 
Chapter 6 will engage in a more extensive discussion and analysis of the findings from 
interviews together with an analysis of secondary materials, which together will be used 
to identify factors found to have influenced the capacity of CASP’s implementing 
organisations to carry out the programme. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
COMPREHENSIVE AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME:  
CASE STUDY 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will present an analysis of findings from interviews conducted mainly with 
officials of the national Department of Agriculture (DOA) and as many as seven of South 
Africa’s nine provincial departments of Agriculture, which together have been charged 
with implementing the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme. In total, 16 
qualitative interviews were conducted for the CASP case study. Findings from the 
interviews were analysed together with a reading of secondary literature sourced on the 
programme, which included a range of documents covering official programme and other 
government reports, speeches, presentations, and statistical data. These primary and 
secondary sources were analysed together in order to locate and explain factors found 
to have influenced the capacity of implementing organisations to carry out CASP. The 
analysis will be structured according to the three variables of ‘strategy’, ‘environment’, 
and ‘structure’, as adapted from Paul’s work on public-sector implemented development 
programmes, and will be assessed against the assumptions contained in his description 
of these variables, as outlined in chapter 3. 
 
6.2 The ‘strategy’ variable 
 
A development programme’s strategy as adapted from Paul’s framework encompasses 
the following three elements: the objectives specified by the government for the 
programme, how these objectives are translated into operating goals and actions plans, 
and how resources are allocated to a programme. Prior to the analysis of interviews, an 
initial but superficial impression of possible factors associated with the strategic make-up 
of CASP, which could have affected the capacity of its implementing bodies, was 
observed in a November 2006 briefing to a new Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs 
(Lulama Xingwana). This included references to ‘lack of capacity’, which in this context 
meant human resources in the form of engineers and economists; a lack of 
understanding of procurement procedures, which also entailed a resourcing issue; and 
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poor planning and alignment of planning structures, including with land reform 
programmes (Department of Agriculture. 2006a: 11). 
 
A more in-depth search and analysis of factors influencing the capacity of CASP 
implementing organisations, which goes beyond this more symptomatic portrayal, will 
now be presented in relation to each of the three sub-variable elements of the strategy 
variable. This will begin with the objectives specified for the programme by the South 
African government. 
 
6.2.1 Factors associated with CASP programme objectives 
 
 
The content of the objectives specified by a government for a development programme 
could constitute a factor(s) affecting the capacity of its implementing bodies to carry it 
out. This may yield direct and possibly adverse effects, according to Paul, depending on 
a number of conditions: the congruence between political objectives and how these are 
translated into on-the-ground implementation goals and plans; and the level of space 
accorded to implementing officials to determine how best to achieve, at an operational 
level, a programme’s objectives, where the content of the latter allows for this flexibility 
(Paul 1983: 58). Depending on the content of these conditions, the objectives of a 
development programme could yield factors that are influential to understanding the 
capacity of its implementing bodies to act. In the case of CASP, it is first necessary to 
outline the objectives specified for the programme by the South African government. 
 
In a speech preceding the launch of CASP in 2004, the then Minister of Agriculture and 
Land Affairs Thoko Didiza stated that the ‘overall aim of the Comprehensive Agricultural 
Support Programme is to provide post settlement support to beneficiaries of the Land 
Reform processes - namely restitution, land redistribution - including LRAD and in the 
coming period, land tenure reform.’ (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2004) The 
Minister’s statement not only confirmed the close sectoral relationship that existed 
between the agriculture and land affairs portfolios, over which she held joint executive 
authority, but also conceded that a ‘gap’ had developed in providing agricultural support 
to beneficiaries who had newly acquired land. To this end, the Minister also revealed 
that budget increases in land delivery to facilitate access to land had ‘not been matched 
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adequately by the agricultural budget, posing a threat to sustainability of agricultural 
programmes as highlighted in the case of land restitution and LRAD specifically’ (ibid) 
 
The objective imperative stemming from the Minister’s statement has its roots in the 
historical issue of access to land for agricultural purposes, where it was mentioned in 
chapter 5 that access to and ownership of land for black Africans was severely restricted 
under apartheid-period legislation. In an effort to remedy this situation, the DOA 
commented on how it would support a government-wide commitment after 1994 to 
promote black Economic Empowerment (BEE), by ‘contribut[ing] through its existing 
programmes to increasing access and acquisition of agricultural land by black South 
Africans;’ (Department of Agriculture 2004a: 11). Moreover, this document made specific 
reference to CASP when discussing government initiatives in relation to ‘agricultural 
support services’ (ibid: 14). 
 
The objective significance of the land issue for CASP was clearly identified in the 
programme’s Business Plan Framework (Department of Agriculture, Not dated a: 5). 
This document indicated that 70 per cent of the funding allocated to provincial 
departments in the form of a grant for CASP must be directed at land reform initiatives 
and their corresponding beneficiaries, including programmes such as LRAD and the 
government’s Land Restitution Programme.
23
 The importance of the land reform sector to CASP was also signalled in a preliminary 
interview with the DOA, where the Department pointed out that agreement on realistic 
medium-term expenditure for CASP (according to a three-year funding cycle) was 
largely dependent on the setting of land reform targets. 24 Moreover, the conditions 
attached to CASP’s Grant Framework (Government Gazette 2005b, 2004b) also 
included amongst its ‘measurable objectives/outputs’, the ‘number’ of targeted 
beneficiaries, in other words from land reform programmes, gaining access to 
agricultural support services. 25
                                                 
23One of the first tasks that a post-apartheid government set itself was the establishment of a 
Land Claims Commission, which was mandated to investigate cases involving past statutory 
dispossession of lands occupied by black Africans (Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 
1996: 7). 
24Interview national Department of Agriculture, 7 December 2006, Department of Agriculture 
offices, Pretoria. 
25CASP also accommodated non land reform beneficiaries, that is, clients who had been able to 
acquire land through private means. 
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The Minister’s description of CASP, together with the sectoral commitments made under 
the AgriBEE and the programme’s funding guidelines, indicates that CASP shouldered a 
significant responsibility to provide support to existing government land reform initiatives. 
An additional element embedded in the aim of providing post-settlement support to 
beneficiaries of land reform concerned the issue of ‘support’. This was spelled out 
elsewhere by the DOA, where ‘[t]he aim of (CASP) is to enhance the provision of 
support services to promote and facilitate agricultural development targeting the 
beneficiaries of the land and agrarian reforms’ (Department of Agriculture 2004c: 1). In a 
presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Agriculture in the same year, 
the DOA also described the aim of CASP as being to ‘enhance the provision of support 
services’ (Department of Agriculture 2004b: 2) 
 
Seeking to enhance the provision of agricultural support services suggests that CASP 
was also developed in order to improve the efficacy of existing support services being 
delivered by the public agricultural sector. The strategic significance of enhancing the 
provision of existing agricultural support services was captured in the DOA’s (2003?: 10-
11; see also Department of Agriculture 2004c: 9-10) first major description of the 
programme, which situated CASP in the context of a 2003-2006 Strategic Plan for the 
Department of Agriculture, as well as the National Treasury’s (Department of Finance) 
2003 Intergovernmental Fiscal Review of the agricultural sector. The former observed 
problems with the alignment and co-ordination of ‘deliverables in agriculture’. The latter 
described ongoing measures in the sector to ‘develop common budget programmes’ in 
the provinces and align these with the separate budget programme structure of the 
DOA.  
 
The objective of enhancing the provision of agricultural support services in the context of 
a more coherently aligned intergovernmental framework
 
has also been recognised in the 
statutory conditions attached to CASP’s grant funding, which will be discussed in a later 
section dealing with the programme’s resourcing. For present purposes though, the 
conditional Framework attached to the disbursement of CASP funding stated that:
 
 
The development of support services is a national priority given that they will 
enhance the productive capacity and economic success of resource limited land 
users; households and communal food producers; beneficiaries of the Land 
Reform and Agrarian Reform Programmes 
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Source: Division of Revenue Act: Frameworks for Conditional Grants to Provinces 
(2004b, 2005b) 
 
The aim of enhancing the provision of agricultural support services is also consistent 
with a number of objectives/outputs attached to CASP’s funding mechanism, including: 
increased access to and improvement in the quality of agricultural support services 
provided to targeted beneficiaries, and improvement in the capacity of the departments 
of agriculture (at provincial level) to deliver agricultural support services (ibid) 
 
In summary, the objectives specified for CASP by the Government of South Africa were 
essentially twofold: firstly to provide post-settlement agricultural support to beneficiaries 
of land reform, and secondly to enhance the provision of existing agricultural support 
services by improving intergovernmental co-ordination and programming between the 
national and provincial departments of Agriculture. It is against this background that the 
findings from interviews will be assessed, to obtain som  impression of the effect that 
CASP’s objectives have had on the capacity of implementing bodies to carry out the 
intervention. 
 
Those interviews which did express concerns about the objectives of CASP pertained 
exclusively to the provision of post-settlement agricultural support to beneficiaries of land 
reform, where these essentially coalesced around an objective distinction that was being 
drawn in practice between the programme’s concentration on the needs of land reform 
beneficiaries, versus the more limited portion of funding that could be directed at non 
land reform beneficiaries. This included concerns about the widening of the programme 
to assist inexperienced, in agricultural terms, new land entrants (beneficiaries of land 
reform), and the extent to which some provincial implementing bodies felt able to 
enhance the production sustainability and economic success of a beneficiary pool that 
was expected to overwhelmingly cater to new entrants (70 per cent). One potential 
consequence of the objective constraint referred to above was portrayed in the following 
passage from an interview: 
 
I think a problem with CASP at the moment is that it’s … all things for all people 
and we need to have a serious discussion around whether or not it CASP should 
remain this kind of broad extension support fund, or whether it should be 
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narrowed in focus to become something more clearly defined, perhaps a 
commercial farmer development programme 
 
 
Another interviewee also believed that CASP was too broad in its focus and that it 
needed to be narrowed around a clearer definition of ‘commercialisation’, expressing a 
more gradual movement of producers from subsistence towards commercialisation or 
moving farmers ‘from stage one to stage two’. An expressed need for CASP to narrow 
its focus around commercialisation indirectly appeared to harbour concerns about the 
level of farming/production experience displayed by the beneficiaries being prioritised, 
remembering that CASP implementing bodies were required to direct 70 per cent of 
allocated funds to individuals that had recently gained access to land via state-
sponsored land reform programmes. The implication in these references is that CASP, 
as it was initially designed, was likely to be heavily constrained in the extent to which it 
could assist beneficiaries to achieve commercially viable production. This suggests a 
possible tension between one of its core objectives: providing post-settlement support to 
land reform beneficiaries, and a key output of its second core objective: strengthening 
existing agricultural support services, which was intended to enhance the ‘productive 
capacity and economic success’ of its beneficiaries. 
 
Other interviews with provincial departments, tasked with the on-the-ground 
implementation of CASP, further indicated that this objective constraint also manifested 
itself in the form of risks being assumed in directly servicing the programme’s land 
reform clientele in particular. One provincial official for instance contested the 
requirement that 70 per cent of monies allocated for CASP had to be directed at land 
reform beneficiaries, arguing that it posed ‘a very huge challenge’ for their department. 
They also added the following, which hardened the distinction between land reform and 
non-land reform beneficiaries: 
 
[T]here’s a guy who buys himself a farm through the bank, he’s been trying to 
make ends meet, never received any kind of support from government at all … 
and then now you are dictated to by CASP to look after the person who has been 
given funding to buy that farm, and also who probably has had a bit of change to 
buy a few things over and above the land, and now you are forced to ignore a 
person who has never received anything from government, who has tried hard to 
show …this person, because he was prepared to use his money, that this man 
has got passion for this thing, and now you are forced to take on board a person 
who might be a risk 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
101 
The official clearly viewed servicing land reform beneficiaries as being a greater risk for 
their department as compared to beneficiaries who had risked their own resources and 
therefore appeared to display a greater determination to farm. It was also evident in this 
description that the Department was concerned about the sustainability of projects and 
its investment in those involving land reform beneficiaries, compared to projects 
involving apparently more committed producers. An official in another province 
expressed a similar sentiment: 
 
[W]e really have seen that land reform farmers are people who are just pushed 
into farming by virtue of the right that they have, whereas there are people who 
go and buy farms themselves, and those are real farmers because those people 
have passion, and they take risks, those are business people. And CASP is not 
supporting those people, except by training. 
 
 
A sharper distinction between land reform farmers and other farmers was again being 
drawn in practice, and linked to characteristics such as potential, risk taking, and 
attitude, which can be traced back to questions about the potential of CASP to 
encourage commercially viable agricultural production. Finally, other comments offered 
by an official in a third province took a slightly different tack in observing a lack of 
farming capability in land reform beneficiaries, and its extraordinary effect on the 
servicing department. The official described new entrants as ‘not understanding the 
environment of agriculture … I think that’s our biggest challenge at this stage is that we 
are not working with traditional farmers’, where their department is not using CASP on 
people ‘whose got a history in agriculture’. The official commented that ‘[w]e are not 
looking, in the selection process, we are not looking at the client, who are bringing into 
agriculture here, we are not selecting the farmers out there, … [s]ometimes those 
farmers just haven’t got the capability to farm’. 
 
Overall, factors emanating directly from the makeup of CASP’s objectives were 
mentioned by just over half of the provincial departments (four) interviewed for this 
thesis, where this study might uncover more explicit capacity-related consequences of 
the programme’s objective makeup in other strategy-related sub-variables (e.g., 
operational goals and plans, resource allocation).  Having said this, of those interviews 
that did offer relatively pointed critiques of CASP’s objective framework, it was at least 
evident in the context of Paul’s discussion of a programme’s objectives that the 
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conditions under which the programme was expected to direct support to beneficiaries of 
land reform programmes (70 per cent requirement), generated concerns amongst a 
number of observers and provincial officials about the relative circumstances of this 
constituency (including limited farming background, potential and commitment, and 
commercial viability) and its potentially burdensome effect on the capacity of provincial 
departments to render effective services. These concerns also revealed the limited 
flexibility that provinces appeared to have had in defining the land reform beneficiary 
audience being prioritised in the objectives of CASP. 26 
 
The next section will look at factors associated with the translation of CASP’s objectives 
into operating goals and plans. 
 
6.2.2 Factors associated with CASP’s operating goals and planning 
 
The operational planning of a development programme refers to how its objectives are 
translated into goals and action plans, and how these are affected by its environment. 
The assumption is that the conditions under which the translation and environmental 
influences occurs, may provide clues about the effect on an implementing organisation’s 
capacity to carry out a programme. 
 
Firstly, the specification of a development programme’s operating goals and actions 
plans have been recognised by Paul as being intimately entwined with its broader policy 
objectives. It was earlier observed that the conditions under which CASP’s implementing 
bodies could influence the shape of the programme’s beneficiary audience was largely 
limited in view of the objective emphasis directed at servicing land reform beneficiaries. 
This was found to have elicited uneasiness amongst officials of some provincial 
departments about the relative agricultural potential and commitment of these 
beneficiaries and the attendant difficulties this posed for rendering support services. 
Beyond the limited space accorded to provincial departments to influence the shape of 
CASP’s beneficiary constituency, and in view of the twofold objective of CASP, it would 
also be necessary to observe the conditions under which the DOA along with provincial 
departments were expected to enhance existing agricultural support service delivery, 
where Paul (1982: 110) has suggested that  ‘some situations yield greater flexibility to 
                                                 
26This point will be developed in a later discussion on the environment of CASP. 
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the program manager [or in this case the provincial implementing departments] to 
choose, interpret and sequence operating goals’.  It would consequently be necessary 
for this thesis to enquire into the conditions relating to the interpretation, selection and 
sequencing of support services available under CASP, and the implications for and 
effects on implementing body capacity. 
 
Outlining the conditions that affected the interpretation, selection and sequencing of 
support services under CASP begins with the observation that the programme borrowed 
extensively from the BATAT strategy (1995), in terms of its twofold objectives of 
providing post-settlement agricultural support to beneficiaries of existing land reform 
initiatives and enhancing the provision of existing agricultural support services. The idea 
under BATAT was to improve black farmer access to support in various mainstream 
services that were already being provided by the public agricultural sector in South 
Africa, such as marketing, financial services, technology, and extension. CASP 
essentially borrowed from this approach by focusing on the provision of support services 
in six areas or so-called service ‘pillars’: 
 
1. Information and knowledge management 
2. Technical and advisory assistance, and regulatory services 
3. Marketing and business development 
4. Training and capacity building 
5. On/off farm infrastructure 
6. Financial support 
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Figure 6.1: CASP service delivery framework27 
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Source: Department of Agriculture 2005b: 3 
 
The process through which South Africa’s public agricultural sector was expected to plan 
the delivery of the six service pillar areas was guided by the observation that ‘[t]he roles 
of the nine Provincial Departments of Agriculture in implementing CASP is being 
articulated through the Intergovernmental Review Process’ (Department of Agriculture 
2003?: 18). This process has its roots in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution, which 
designated agriculture as a concurrent or shared function between the national and 
provincial spheres of government. Reference to this process was therefore a formal 
acknowledgement of the country’s constitutional framework for inter-governmental 
relations, which constitutes a formal system of revenue-sharing and planning in which 
programmes such as CASP have to operationally adhere to. 
 
The operational realities of this inter-governmental system of service delivery were 
marked however by a public agricultural sector that had in the past, and as noted earlier, 
experienced ‘deficits in service delivery’ in its attempts to promote food and agricultural 
production, which furthermore saw a ‘fragmentation of service delivery within the three 
tiers of government’ (Department of Agriculture 2004c). The response of CASP was 
correspondingly aimed at removing ‘limitations in effective service delivery within the 
                                                 
27Regulatory services was subsumed under technical and advisory assistance, and financial 
support was brought in as a sixth pillar. 
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agricultural sector’, and developing a mechanism for enhancing provincial programming 
and budgeting for farmer support as well as progressively aligning provincial activities 
with national priorities overseen by the DOA (2003?: 16, 11). The operational imperative 
of alignment was then married with the strategic objective of enhancing the provision of 
post-settlement (agricultural) support services. This was further projected in operational 
terms into a scenario where ‘the provincial departments of Agriculture are implementing 
and managing CASP activities and functions on behalf of the National Department of 
Agriculture (DOA)’ (Department of Agriculture, Not dated b: 3). The operational 
consequences of this arrangement has seen the national department assume a role that, 
in practice, is largely defined by oversight, monitoring, guidance and support to 
provincial departments. This has been translated into the following responsibilities: 
 
• Agreement on outputs and targets with provincial departments of agriculture in 
line with grant funding objectives 
• Providing guidelines and criteria for the development and approval of business 
plans by provinces 
• Monitoring implementation 
• ‘Provide[ing] Support’ 
• Submitting quarterly performance reports to National Treasury (Department of 
Finance) and Parliament (National Council of Provinces) 
• Submitting allocation criteria, MTEF allocations and the final conditional grant 
framework relating to this grant to National Treasury 
• Submitting approved business plans to National Treasury 
 
Source: Government Gazette 2005b 
 
With regards to its oversight and monitoring role, the operational procedures associated 
with CASP required the DOA to convene a National Assessment Panel to evaluate and 
approve business plans submitted by provincial departments. The Panel was expected 
to comprise designated departmental officials and representatives of the Department of 
Land Affairs, given the programme’s land reform beneficiary audience. The Panel was 
further tasked with ensuring that provincially generated business plans complied with the 
conditions underpinning the grant that provinces received to implement CASP 
(Department of Agriculture, Not dated b: 2). A service delivery agreement was then 
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agreed between provincial departments of agriculture and the DOA, which constituted a 
‘commitment by provinces to implement and manage the [CASP grant] allocation and 
function in their provinces’ (ibid). The sign-off on this agreement triggered the transfer of 
funds to provinces, which according to the grant Framework was disbursed according to 
a staggered payment schedule. 
 
The Business Plan Framework devised by the DOA (Not dated a) for CASP appears to 
provide some scope for provincial departments to define their CASP interventions 
according to the agricultural circumstances prevailing in their jurisdictions, so long as 
their proposed activities are consistent with the service pillars of CASP,28 and in line with 
the objective emphasis on beneficiaries of land reform programmes (the 70 per cent 
rule). Having said this, the Framework does not appear to go so far as to prescribe a 
uniform model for how CASP interventions ought to be made by provincial departments 
in the six service areas. (Department of Agriculture 2005b: 11). Furthermore,  apart from 
provinces being expected to comply with specific reporting conditions, and 
demonstrating ‘confirmed capacity to implement projects and operational funding to 
support this capacity’29, the conditions in the grant framework under which provincial 
departments received monies for CASP were limited to utilising funds ‘to supplement 
provincial budgets in order to improve and increase farmer support services within the 
CASP framework’ (Government Gazette 2005b, see also Government Gazette 2004b), 
and according to the service pillars illustrated in figure 6.1. This appears consistent with 
the second objective of CASP, which was to enhance existing agricultural support 
services. Overall, these conditions suggest that provincial departments of Agriculture, 
which were handed the primary task of implementing CASP services under the 
guidance, oversight and support of the DOA, assumed relatively greater flexibility to at 
least select and sequence the provision of the programme’s six service pillars in their 
jurisdictions30. 
 
                                                 
28CASP’s Operational Manual described this as provincial departments ‘Agree[ing] to use 
allocated funds for agreed programmes under the comprehensive package’ (Department of 
Agriculture 2005b: 11). 
29
‘Capacity’ in this usage was not defined. 
30Relative to the limited flexibility afforded to provincial departments of Agriculture in defining the 
Programme’s beneficiary audience, where 70 per cent of funds received for CASP were required 
to be directed at land reform beneficiaries. 
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With this background in mind, findings from interviews began with what could be 
described as a generally expected outcome made by an independent analyst of CASP, 
who indicated that provincial departments of Agriculture were exercising considerable 
room in interpreting the delivery of agricultural services targeted by the programme. The 
interviewee recounted the following: 
 
[T]he problem lies with the kind of monitoring systems that are in place … there 
is a great deal of recalcitrance, if you can put it that way, in the provinces, where 
they’re basically spending CASP on their core functions, what they see as 
important, and the monitoring systems are not really picking that up because the 
focus of monitoring at this point is really on expenditure … are they hitting their 
expenditure targets … but no one’s actually going out to look at where are they 
and what are they spending that money, and I think that’s a major weakness in 
the programme 
 
This description is noteworthy however in pointing to a ‘problem’ concerning the 
apparently wide operational discretion being exercised by provincial departments in what 
they allocated CASP monies on, suggesting that what they regarded as priorities might 
differ from the DOA’s expectations. It also spoke directly to Paul’s (1982: 122; 1983: 
102) description of a development programme’s monitoring processes, and specifically 
the emphasis on observance of procedures and rules compared to ‘performance’ 
outputs. These rules encompassed among other things, ‘budgetary control’, which in this 
case clearly involved provincial expenditure. Moreover, a DOA official interviewed for 
this study similarly recalled, with reference to the Department’s monitoring of provincial 
implementation, that ‘it’s typically been, “get your spending up”, that’s what we’ve been 
doing in the past, but I think even in future we’ll be looking to use these [monitoring] 
teams to look at other issues that arise.’ Paul (1983: 102) offered a more frank 
description of a development programme’s monitoring processes, arguing that ‘[t]hose 
who monitor and control programmes are concerned about how money was spent and 
whether the proper procedures were followed.’ 
 
A more detailed analysis of interviews together with secondary sources appeared to give 
greater definition to what might have contributed to this problem. This suggests an 
operational vacuum created by insufficiently developed and incoherently applied national 
implementation guidelines having influenced the apparent operational flexibility being 
exercised by provincial departments, and which might have otherwise impaired the 
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monitoring ability of the DOA to ensure that alignment between national and provincial 
service priorities was being attained. 
 
Other findings based on analysis of more extensive interview data seemed to portray a 
more nuanced picture to that described by the interviewee however, where the apparent 
operational flexibility being exercised by provincial departments did not appear to 
encompass the selection and sequencing of service pillars, but may have been confined 
to how the various services available under CASP were to be implemented. This 
moreover could have arisen as a consequence of insufficient national guidelines having 
been drafted. Indeed it appeared that the programme’s objective of providing post-
settlement agricultural support, and the key land reform beneficiary constituency being 
targeted by this objective, limited the capacity of provincial departments to exercise 
flexibility in the selection and sequencing of service pillars, where the rules encountered 
in rendering agricultural support services to land reform beneficiaries also constrained 
provincial as well as national department capacity. Before discussing these issues, 
evidence outlining the insufficiency of implementation guidelines will be discussed. 
 
One of the responsibilities of the DOA in CASP’s implementation was the provision of 
guidelines and criteria for the development and approval of business plans by provincial 
departments. Interview findings revealed that there was some degree of ambiguity and 
related confusion expressed by provincial officials in particular about the existence of 
implementation and project assessment guidelines, where one official interviewed at the 
National Treasury indirectly remarked on the inadequacy of guidelines: ‘[i] think we need 
to get guidelines … assessment of applications, what measure do you use to say this 
guy deserves … one Rand and this one two Rand’ This remark was situated in a 
broader context in which the interviewee questioned the existence of a criteria or set of 
guidelines against which applications for funding could be assessed. An official of a 
provincial department of Agriculture was more direct on this score: 
 
When you dedicate a new programme to provinces, also have to give guidelines 
to how that must be administered, also have to give capacity to such, and I think 
that’s what lacks from national. It’s not uniform across the provinces as to how 
CASP is managed. You never got any dedicated admin budget, but also 
guidelines as to how we should operate it. 
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Insufficiently clear and consistent implementation guidelines were also indirectly evident 
in this input from an official of another provincial department: 
 
I think the other problem … that’s confusing us is mixed messages from national 
departments [sic] that’s running with CASP … one moment they will tell you but 
you can buy inputs out of CASP, the next moment they say no … it’s a 
commercial project you can’t buy inputs, if it’s a food security project you can 
buy.  You can’t buy machinery from CASP or a tractor here, but they allow other 
provinces to buy that or one other province to buy that … you cannot buy for 
example tractors, you cannot buy inputs from CASP if it’s a commercial project, 
now they’re not quite clear the definition when is a project a commercial project 
and when is it a food security project, you see so where do you draw the line? 
 
Inadequately developed implementation guidelines appeared consistent elsewhere in an 
interview with an official of the DOA, who reported that after three years of 
implementation there were ‘no norms and standards’ linked to the implementation of 
CASP’s various service pillars, or as it later emerged in the interview, that these were 
insufficiently detailed in a form that they could be cl arly ‘measured’. 31 A similar 
conclusion was drawn by the authors of an officially sanctioned independent review of 
CASP which took place in 2006/2007, although they failed to draw a distinction between 
conditions governing service pillar selection and sequencing, and conditions affecting 
‘how’ services were to be rendered. The review submitted that ‘[t]he objectives and 
outcomes set for the programme are not measurable, and at a provincial level CASP 
appears to have become a simple extension service with no strategic objectives or 
frameworks guiding and informing the targeting and nature of implementation.’ 
(Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 98). Further scrutiny of 
secondary documentation did however reveal that norms and standards had in fact been 
published, but that these seemed to be available for only two of the programme’s six 
service ‘pillars’, those for on/off farm infrastructure and marketing (Department of 
Agriculture 2005c: 16, 17; Department of Agriculture. 2004c: 18). Imprecision around this 
issue suggests that implementation guidelines were insufficiently developed in breadth, 
to capture all six of the programme’s service pillars, as well as in depth, in terms of their 
degree of measurability. 
                                                 
31This arose in a follow-up telephone interview on 14 June 2007. This reference might also 
explain the earlier comment by an independent analyst of CASP about the provinces spending 
programme monies on their core functions, or what they saw as important, where the monitoring 
systems were ‘not really picking that up’ 
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The likely consequences of deficiencies in the specification and consistent application of 
implementation guidelines concerning CASP’s service pillars may have also contributed 
to the quality of business planning processes in provincial departments. A DOA official 
observed for instance that, ‘[a]nd at the same time, they [provinces] will just submit 
[business plans] because they’ll know a year in advance how much they are getting as 
provinces so they’ll just thumb-suck and send provincial business plans … but when 
they are to implement, the problem is, if you don’t have a business plan which is 
implementable, it becomes a problem’ Overall it would appear that insufficiently 
developed and in other cases inconsistently applied operating guidelines hindered the 
ability of provincial departments to effectively plan their service interventions, whilst also 
affecting the capacity of the DOA to render effective monitoring, other than through a 
more narrow expenditure lens. 
 
Further analysis revealed other instances where this time both national and provincial 
department planning capacity was being adversely aff cted (through implementation 
delays) by a persistent procedural disjuncture between CASP and land reform 
programmes managed by the national Department of Land Affairs (DLA). The 
disjuncture essentially created a gap between the accessing of land through land reform 
programmes and the provision of agricultural support services under CASP. In keeping 
with the requirement that 70 per cent of grant funding allocated to the provinces for 
CASP needed to be directed at beneficiaries of land reform programmes, the idea was 
for agricultural support services to be rolled out to these clients after they had obtained 
access to land through programmes administered by the DLA. Several Interviews 
revealed that there remained a temporal disjuncture between the rules by which land 
reform programmes, such as LRAD, operated, and those underpinning the functioning of 
CASP, which essentially resulted in a gap between the accessing of land by new 
entrants and their acquisition of post-settlement support via CASP. The persistency of 
the problem was explained by one DOA official: 
 
CASP money gets attached to projects after the project is already launched, so 
there’s some sort of period of delay … between, for example land affairs 
purchases land and transfers land to a beneficiary, the actual CASP money can 
only be added to that for … even if the timing is correct, in terms of, even if the 
application for CASP money arrives when this transfer is taking place … it’s still a 
year later probably only that the money will be available because of the 
bureaucratic process of obtaining money through national department … we’ve 
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got to fix that mechanism so that it is more in synch, exactly how we do that is 
not quite sure, because there’s also an allocation, the total pot across nine 
provinces … but certainly that’s what we’re looking at. 
  
An official of the DLA described a similar set of circumstances: 
 
But now with CASP, the problem has always been, they [beneficiaries] cannot 
even begin to apply for CASP … only once we’ve got the land for them then they 
can go to their PDA and apply for grants, and that gap there has always been a 
problem, because it would have been an ideal situation for them to apply for 
CASP while they still applying for their funds for land … so that the whole … it 
happens simultaneously, so that after buying the land they don’t have to wait for 
implements and other … so that has always been the administrative problem that 
we have 
 
Another DLA official explained that the DLA and DOA had recognised the problem and 
had come up with what was termed ‘CASP and LRAD alignment’, where the 
departments had agreed to try to synchronise the release of monies for the purchase of 
land under LRAD, and the accessing of post-settlement support under CASP. This was 
described as ‘trying to align their [DOA] funding structure because they are different’. 
 
A particular problem arising from the existence of this inter-departmental procedural gap 
was elsewhere described by one DLA official interviewed, where it was found that the 
gap in time between the provision of land and the subsequent availability of agricultural 
support services held potentially harmful consequences for would-be beneficiaries as a 
result of their economic circumstances. It could also have adversely affected the 
capacity of provincial departments of Agriculture to service available land reform 
recipients: 
 
It has been realized that we will give land today, and CASP intervention will come 
at a later stage, by then maybe the project has already disappeared or the 
project has got problems with regard to sustainability, because you’ll find that 
beneficiaries can’t continue with their activities because they still lacking financial 
support or other support that might be relevant to the project 
 
Interestingly, a different manifestation of a planning disjuncture between CASP’s post-
settlement support and DLA-administered access to land programmes was observed in 
the secondary literature on the programme. This referred to observations that in some 
projects beneficiaries had received support for similar purposes from CASP and DOA-
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administered land reform programmes, and were therefore judged to have received an 
unnecessarily high-level/duplication of support. This was termed ‘double-dipping’ 
(Department of Agriculture 2005c: 14). 32 One possible source of the problem was traced 
to confusion between the criteria for support given under CASP, compared to that given 
under LRAD. Findings from the Eastern Cape province of South Africa contained in a 
CASP review report indicated that there was lack of a ‘clear linkage’ between LRAD and 
CASP, where beneficiaries of the former programme were already in possession of 
business plans, suggesting possible confusion around how the post-settlement support 
available under CASP was supposed to differ from what was being considered under 
LRAD (Department of Agriculture 2005d: 59). 
 
In another CASP Progress report, the key responsibilities of the DLA were said to 
include: ‘[p]rovid[ing] land acquisition grants under the LRAD (and ensure that the 
agricultural component is also financed) and planning grant’ (Department of Agriculture 
2004c: 8), where it was difficult to detect how ensuring financing for the ‘agricultural 
component’ and providing a ‘planning grant’ differed from services being offered under 
CASP. Moreover, in another description of LRAD published by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Land Affairs (2000: 7) under which the two separate departments of Land Affairs 
and Agriculture operated, it was noted that the grant support available through LRAD 
could be used for more than just the acquisition of land, where it could be employed to 
cover expenses incurred in making ‘land improvements, infrastructure investments, 
capital assets and short-term agricultural inputs’. This suggests some overlap with 
services being offered under CASP. 
 
It was not possible to explain why this particular problem did not feature in the 
interviews, where it can only be speculated that the issue did not figure as strongly as 
sequencing the availability of post-settlement support via CASP with the accessing of 
land through land reform programmes. Moreover the secondary literature did not remark 
extensively on double-dipping, noting only that it had been observed in some projects. 
Further investigation into the factors that may have contributed to this disjuncture 
included one provincial official of the DLA who referred to ‘communication’ problems and 
an ‘information gap’ between provincial department of Agriculture and Department of 
                                                 
32This was also revealed in a follow-up phone interview with an official in the DOA, 14 June 2007.  
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Land Affairs officials in their respective province, where beneficiaries of land reform 
programmes were not simultaneously being informed about CASP support: 
 
I think one of the things, we will be holding information sessions on LRAD alone, 
but not focussing on CASP, it will sort of those people will lose out, so they’ll wait 
for someone from Agriculture, maybe that person will come after 3 years, after 
they’ve accessed the land … whenever we go to, land affairs, we go to the 
community to talk about land reform/redistribution, we must be accompanied by 
the official from the Department of Agriculture, at the same time programmes 
available from their side which will assist farmers with post-settlement support … 
In the process of land acquisition the people must be informed about the CASP. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that one consequence of such an ‘information gap’ could 
have seen beneficiaries not being able to establish clarity on the distinction between the 
type of assistance available under a land reform programme such as LRAD, and that 
under CASP. The interview findings did not explicitly reveal similar inter-departmental 
communication problems, although the official CASP review (Department of Agriculture, 
Umhlaba Rural Services 2007) documented, via its own set of interviews, incidents from 
at least two other provinces: 
 
• Bypassing of DLA inputs into CASP proposals by one provincial department of 
Agriculture, 
• A confirmation of the ‘communication’-related joint-planning problems between 
provincial DLA officials and provincial agriculture officials, as cited above by a 
provincial land affairs officer. This centred again on a bypassing of DLA inputs 
into agricultural planning, 
• ‘No real engagement’, as cited by another provincial land affairs official, in CASP 
 
Overall, capacity constraints associated with the provision of agricultural support 
services, via CASP, to beneficiaries of land reform programmes administered by the 
DLA, appeared to have arisen in this instance from procedural inconsistencies 
embedded within previously distinct government programmes that CASP, through its 
provincial implementing bodies, was subsequently obliged to align with. This, in an effort 
to satisfy one of its key objectives: rendering post-settlement agricultural services to the 
recipients of land reform. A less significant operational issue concerned the level of inter-
departmental planning between land affairs and provincial department of agriculture 
officials. The potential seriousness of the inter-programming disjuncture involving 
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agriculture and land affairs departments was evident in its appearance in a kind of to-do 
list (‘Land reform support alignment’) prepared by the DOA for a new Minister of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs, Lulama Xingwana, over two and a half years after CASP 
was introduced (Department of Agriculture 2006a: 11). It was also mentioned at a DOA 
briefing to Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Agriculture and Land Affairs as late as 
October 2007, where a department official reported that ‘[t]he DOA had formally worked 
with DLA and it came down to better alignment of CASP and Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development (LRAD)’ (PMG 2007). 
 
Another issue, which recalls an earlier reference to confusion (in the form of ‘mixed 
messages’) expressed by one provincial official about conditions underpinning how 
agricultural support services could be rendered, emphasised the purchasing of ‘inputs’. 
The reference to inputs meant production inputs, including mechanised implements, 
seed or fertilisers, which under CASP rules provincial departments were not allowed to 
fund (Department of Agriculture 2005b: 14). Findings revealed that at least two 
provinces reported that allowing departments to render support in the form of production 
inputs would have been a more valuable source of support to beneficiaries in their areas. 
33
 Beneficiaries were said to have a greater interest in and more urgent need for 
production inputs, especially in the form f mechanised implements, which could have 
enabled them to generate income more rapidly to meet immediate needs, as opposed to 
infrastructure, which was not viewed as being as ‘burning’ an issue. This example 
showed that although implementation guidelines/norms and standards were recognised 
as being insufficiently developed, in other respects there were clear limitations to the 
operational flexibility that provincial departments were able to exercise. 
 
The reason for raising the production inputs example is that it channels the discussion 
into what was earlier described as the exercise of provincial operational discretion not 
having penetrated the selection and sequencing of service pillars available under CASP. 
The issue essentially revolved around the on/off farm infrastructure pillar, which under 
further analysis was prioritised by the DOA in CASP’s first year, and which required 
provincial departments to spend their CASP allocations only on this service area (as 
                                                 
33An independent review of CASP commissioned by the DOA in December 2006 also observed 
that stakeholders in three provinces, which included government officials, argued for production 
support to be included (Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 86-87). 
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seen in the ‘measurable outputs’ section of the 2004/2005 Grant Framework, as 
reproduced in Department of Agriculture 2005c). 
 
The DOA argued that on/off farm infrastructure was ‘one of the main obstacles 
preventing beneficiaries to produce on their land’ (Department of Agriculture 2004c: 13). 
Whilst this requirement would clearly have limited the capacity of provinces to 
operationally sequence the provision of support services for CASP, it was revealed in an 
interview with a DOA official that the on/off infrastructure pillar was only prioritised in the 
programme’s first year, where ‘the following years we [DOA] said all the pillars, it’s just 
that maybe some provinces were not implementing the decision.’ The phasing in of all 
CASP pillars was elsewhere reported to have been incorporated into new grant condition 
and business planning frameworks for the programme’s second year of operation: 2005 
(Department of Agriculture 2005c: 20). 34 
 
Despite the phasing in of all service pillars from 2005, and the temporary emphasis 
directed at the on/off farm infrastructure pillar in the programme’s first year, the shadow 
of the infrastructure pillar continued to exert considerable influence over the capacity of 
provincial departments to exercise discretion in the implementation of other service 
pillars that may have been regarded as m re significant to their needs. This was evident 
in the findings of an official Review of CASP carried out between December 2006 and 
March 2007, when provincial stakeholders35 were asked to comment or otherwise raise 
concerns about the ‘appropriateness’ of products/services available under the 
programme. The findings showed that despite a removal of the conditions requiring 
spending on the on/off farm infrastructure service pillar in year one, there remained 
dissatisfaction about the lack of support for a wider basket of services, including 
specified pillars available under CASP: 
 
• The lack of production support (i.e., inputs), though this was not strictly a 
service pillar, 
                                                 
34The inclusion of ‘all’ pillars was not however clearly apparent when comparing the 2004/2005 
grant allocation framework with the 2005/2006 version, where the only relevant difference 
appeared to be the inclusion of an additional ‘measurable output’, which focussed on the 
accessing of markets, market information and training on markets for land reform beneficiaries. 
35These stakeholders comprised provincial department officials, DLA officials, and farmer 
representatives. 
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• Lack of technical support to assist farmers to utilise infrastructure 
effectively, 
• Finance, training and marketing seen as ‘critical gaps’, 
 
Source: Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 86-87 
 
Perhaps the most noteworthy observation of all saw stakeholders in seven out of nine 
provinces indicating that a more ‘comprehensive’/broader package of support services 
was still needed, where one commentator observed that CASP was only addressing a 
‘portion of the needs, and that is the physical aspects only.’ (ibid) This pointed to a 
lingering emphasis on the on/off farm infrastructure pillar. To this end, it may be useful to 
consider other observations about the operationalisation of service pillars other than 
infrastructure. For instance, one provincial department official interviewed for this thesis 
criticised the manner in which CASP’s service pillars were prioritised and rolled out, 
expressing concern that the pillar intended to provide farmers with financial support in 
the form of loans, termed MAFISA36, was not rolled out earlier in the programme. The 
interviewee added that the MAFISA pillar was ‘supposed to be strong’, where ‘that could 
have supported most of our projects, other than the infrastructure part’. The official 
review of CASP concurred, observing that ‘A key omission noted in almost all provinces 
is the lack of appropriate agricultural financing for emerging farmers. Mafisa, although 
being piloted in selected districts in the country, is not yet operational’ (Department of 
Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 96). The staggered introduction of the 
financial services pillar then effectively curtailed the capacity of provincial departments to 
exercise discretion in prioritising this service, where it was deemed important to their 
circumstances. 
 
A second observation from the official CASP Review also signalled the possibility of poor 
communication between the DOA and provincial departments concerning the relative 
status of the six service pillars. The Review observed that all nine provinces were 
continuing to spend the largest portion of their funding on the on/off farm infrastructure 
pillar (as high as 75 per cent, with two other provinces estimating 70 per cent). This, 
despite the opening up of grant conditions to all pillars from 2005/2006, and an explicit 
acknowledgement of this change by an official of the DOA interviewed for this thesis, 
                                                 
36This stands for Macro Agricultural Finance Scheme of South Africa. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
117 
and quoted earlier. Indeed, the Review stated that officials in the Free State provincial 
department of Agriculture had even reported that ‘the instruction from National DOA was 
that for the first three years of CASP implementation the emphasis should be on 
infrastructure development’, which contradicts the message received from the DOA37 
(Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 46). This was corroborated 
by a beneficiary from Mpumalanga province who reported being informed that the 
programme only assisted with infrastructure, and was surprised to hear that there were 
actually six pillars (Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 132; 
appendix two). Even more interesting was the limited room that provincial departments 
appeared to have in selecting other service pillars. This was confirmed by the 
programme’s Business Plan Framework (Department of Agriculture, Not dated a: 5), 
which reported that only 10 per cent of CASP funds could be directed at the training 
pillar; with the DOA’s 2006/2007 Annual Report (Department of Agriculture 2007: 22) 
mentioning that five per cent of the grant was available to be spent on the marketing 
pillar. 
 
Although the Review did not indicate a specific source(s) of the continued expenditure 
emphasis on the on/off farm infrastructure service, a possible clue was observed 
elsewhere in a CASP Progress Report (Department of Agriculture 2005c: 7), which 
noted the following: 
 
The rationale for prioritization of infrastructure was due to the fact that this 
element had not be n adequately provided for within the provincial budgets to 
support the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) 
 
 
Reference to LRAD is of course a reference to the circumstances of land reform 
beneficiaries. It could therefore reasonably be suggested that the CASP Business Plan 
requirement that 70 per cent of the funds allocated to provinces had to be directed at 
beneficiaries of land reform programmes, in view of the past neglect in servicing this 
constituency’s infrastructure needs, could have influenced the continued and high-level 
(in terms of expenditure) emphasis on infrastructure spending by the provinces. The 
official CASP Review moreover indicated that of the nine provincial departments 
                                                 
37Speaking before Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Agriculture and Land Affairs in October 
2007, a member of the DOA delegation was also reported to have noted that although CASP had 
a number of pillars, it focussed on the infrastructure pillar, and most of the money went on 
infrastructure. See PMG 2007. 
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implementing CASP, a majority (six) were prioritising beneficiaries of land reform 
programmes, whilst two were not and one was unable to be estimated. This situation 
suggests that the limited de facto operational flexibility enjoyed by provincial 
departments in selecting and sequencing service pillars under CASP was essentially 
engineered by provincial departments having to otherwise comply with a key objective 
attached to the programme: post-settlement support to land reform. Having said this, it 
could be argued that a potential source of tension then emerges within the objective 
makeup of CASP. This arises on the one hand from an emphasis on the delivery of 
specific service areas regarded as being especially important to the key land reform 
beneficiary constituency (i.e., Infrastructure), whilst at the same seeking to enhance the 
provision of support services as a whole, which speaks to the earlier-mentioned goal of 
aligning and co-ordinating deliverables in agriculture by working towards common 
budget programmes between the provinces and the DOA. The following passage from a 
DOA official interviewed for this thesis signals this potentiality: 
 
I think, what we experience, as I said earlier on, we as a national department 
have a particular objective with CASP … now that objective may or may not be, 
100 per cent in line with the objectives of the provincial departments. Remember 
it’s…a supplementary grant, so, there would be an overlap in what they were 
doing anyway, they may well be … it may or may not be so that a particular 
province believed that infrastructure, in terms of their package … had been 
important…it could have been that if you looked at these different pillars that a 
particular provinces says, look, we are quite satisfied … our infrastructure, on 
farm/off farm is fine, we are dealing with [problems with] financing, we are 
dealing with production grants … so here we come and we give them 
supplementary money for infrastructure, so it might or might not be that…that 
was what they were intending to do … now, in as much as there might be a 
disjuncture … in as much as the priorities of the province might be slightly 
different, it could then be that we are imposing upon them something which is 
either an opportunity for them, or not an opportunity but some sort of imposition 
 
 
In the context of the framework adapted from Paul’s research, it would appear that the 
drive to align national and provincial budgeting and programming around the needs of 
land reform beneficiaries resulted in provincial implementing departments having little de 
facto control over the interpretation38, selection and sequencing of the full suite of 
service pillars available under the programme. This seems to have constrained their 
                                                 
38While implementation guidelines/norms and standards were available for the Infrastructure 
pillar, the observation that these were insufficiently developed (i.e., measurable) must be given 
priority. 
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operational capacity to respond to other potentially more pressing service needs 
identified in their areas. In other respects, both provincial department and DOA capacity 
was adversely impacted by the procedural constraints experienced in the process of 
aligning rules governing the delivery of post-settlement support services under CASP, 
with access to land under DLA-administered programmes such as LRAD. Although it 
generated strategic-operational effects, this issue speaks more directly to the structural 
environment in which CASP was introduced, which will be discussed in more detail 
under the structure variable. 
 
The next section will focus on CASP’s resource allocation. 
 
6.2.3 Factors associated with CASP’s resource allocation 
 
The resources allocated to a development programme relate to the conditions 
underpinning its financial as well as human resource makeup, and recalling Paul’s 
description includes the mobilisation of these and other forms of administrative and 
political support. Overall, the assumption is that the extent of and circumstances relating 
to the mobilisation and allocation of a programme’s resources may adversely affect the 
capacity of implementing bodies to carry out the initiative. This section will first cover the 
financial resources allocated to CASP. 
 
The resourcing of CASP corresponds to the inter-governmental makeup of the public 
agricultural sector in South Africa, which is defined as a shared constitutional 
competency between the DOA and provincial departments of agriculture. The document, 
Trends in Intergovernmental Finances 2000/01 – 2006/07 (National Treasury 2004: 84-
85), published by South Africa’s National Treasury (Department of Finance), further 
noted that the national Department of Agriculture is primarily responsible for formulating 
(national) government policy, including the setting of norms and standards of delivery, 
and overseeing equitable access to and distribution of natural resources and support 
services. Provincial departments assume responsibility for ‘implementing national 
policies’, including extension and farmer settlement and support services. The financial 
implications of this arrangement were exposed elsewhere in this document, which noted 
an ‘increase of funding to provinces for the implementation of agriculture programmes, 
specifically farmer support activities’ (ibid: 85-86). The financing instrument designed to 
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deliver increased funding for farmer support activities (via CASP) to the provinces was 
embedded in existing public finance legislation, which governed the allocation of South 
Africa’s national budget across national, provincial and local (municipal) spheres of 
government.  
 
The DOA (2005b: 6) observed that CASP was a Schedule Four conditional grant 
allocation in terms of a Division of Revenue Act (DORA), and as such, was distributed as 
supplementary funding to provincial departments of agriculture from the national fiscus. 
The DORA was invoked each financial year to provide for the ‘equitable division of 
nationally-raised revenue amongst the three spheres of government (Government 
Gazette 2004a, 2005a, 2006).  More specifically, section 7. (1)(a) of the 2004 DORA 
defined a Schedule Four allotment as an ‘allocation to provinces for general and 
nationally assigned functions’. This definition was firstly consistent with the general, or in 
other words, supplementary purpose of the CASP allocation, which was intended to 
augment existing or core provincial budgets for farmer support funded from an 
unconditional ‘equitable share’ of revenue distributed to all three spheres of government. 
It also recognised that the programme was conceived as a national priority, for which 
provinces would receive supplementary funds on condition that these comply with 
expectations in the programme’s Grant framework. 
 
The DOA (2005b: 6) went on to state that the Department was to act as the ‘national 
transferring department’ for the CASP Schedule Four allocation, requiring it to administer 
the allocation and monitor expenditure and non-financial outputs in the provinces 
(Department of Agriculture, Not dated b: 1). The structure of CASP’s funding was 
therefore intended to be consistent with the programme’s objective emphasis on 
enhancing existing agricultural support services, through initiating a supplementary 
funding scheme. This was revealed through conditions stipulating that funding was 
intended to ‘supplement provincial budgets in order to improve and increase farmer 
support services within the CASP framework’ (Department of Agriculture 2005b: 4).  
The financial resources allocated to CASP are illustrated in table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: CASP allocation to provincial departments of agriculture  
(Rand millions)  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Agriculture 2006a: 8 
 
Table 6.2 indicates that the programme did not experience a lack of financial 
commitment, having been initially resourced or a period of three years (2004/5-2006/7), 
with incremental annual increases in grant allocations to provincial departments of 
Agriculture. It also displays how serious the agricultural under-servicing of land reform 
beneficiaries was viewed by the South African government. The successful sourcing of 
funds for CASP proved however to be a more difficult benefit to sustain, as early 
provincial expenditure indicated. Figure 6.2 shows the generally slow and varied pace at 
which provincial departments were spending their CASP grant allocations, with an 
average of 65 per cent expenditure in the first year increasing to 82 per cent in the 
second year. More striking however was the large variance between provinces, with 
some spending below 10 per cent whilst others spent over 80 per cent in the first year, 
with greater equivalence in the second year. 
Province 
 
Year 2004/05 
 
Year 2005/06 
 
Year 2006/07 
 
Eastern Cape 38,043 47,552 57,061 
Free State 16,870 21,088 25,306 
Gauteng 4,582 5,727 6,873 
KwaZulu-Natal 37,016 46,270 55,524 
Limpopo 33,428 41,786 50,143 
Mpumalanga 18,903 23,629 28,355 
Northern Cape 10,518 13,148 15,777 
North West Province 26,875 33,594 40,313 
Western Cape 13,765 17,206 20,64 
TOTAL 200,000 250,000 300,000 
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Figure 6.2: Provincial grant expenditure on CASP: 2004/5 and 2005/6 
0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0%
Eastern Cape
Free State
Gauteng*
KwaZulu-Natal
Limpopo
Mpumalanga
Northern Cape
North West Province*
Western Cape
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2005/2006 % spent (+ rollover)
2004/2005 % spent
 
Source: Illustration based on figures presented in Department of Agriculture 2006b. 
*Figures were not reported for Gauteng and North West province for 2004/2005 
 
Expenditure variation at the provincial level, for a programme that was essentially a 
national, that is, DOA priority, effectively exposed the national department’s level of 
reliance on provincial departments to not only expend resources committed for CASP, 
but also to allocate the supplementary resources received for the programme. This takes 
into account the reality that provincial departments of agriculture had already been 
receiving core monies for farmer support activities as part of their unconditional allotment 
of nationally raised revenue. 
 
The potential consequences of this arrangement for ensuring that resources committed 
for CASP were spent on the activities for which these were intended was reflected in the 
minutes of a Portfolio Committee meeting on Agriculture and Land Affairs in August of 
2006. Here, a department official speaking on CASP was reported to have stated that 
the DOA had ‘followed the money-trail’ to the provinces to establish expenditure 
effectiveness, where it had found that in some cases the funding had been ‘parked’ 
elsewhere. He was reported to have added that although the DOA was receiving 
expenditure reports from the provinces on how monies were being spent, ‘it became 
clear that DOA needed to go to the provinces and investigate everything in detail’ (PMG 
2006). The only reference that this thesis could find on the possible circumstances that 
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may have contributed to the parking of money elsewhere was described in a DOA 2003-
2005 Draft Progress Report on CASP. This cited insufficient early planning and ‘poor 
communication’ between provincial treasuries, to which CASP funds were initially 
transferred, and provincial departments of Agriculture, as the final receivers of the grant 
(Department of Agriculture 2005c: 13). 
 
A related resourcing feature which appears to have further exposed the DOA’s level of 
reliance on its provincial counterparts was linked to the type of conditional grants 
employed to finance CASP, as defined in the Division of Revenue Act. Research on the 
structure of conditional grants conducted by the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC), 
a constitutional body mandated to advise the South African government on public 
finance and budgeting matters, noted for instance that the DOA was critical of the 
relatively greater discretion embedded in Schedule Four type grants such as that 
employed for CASP, which appeared to limit a national department’s level of influence 
over how provinces used the grant. The FFC observed in relation to Schedule Four 
grants that a national department like the DOA could only transfer funds and provide 
support where needed, where it ‘cannot impose its views’. This was described as being 
different from a Schedule Five or ‘specific purpose’ grant which in this instance funded 
another national-provincial agricultural programme called LandCare, where the DOA 
held ‘that it has more control as it actually decides the full programmes of the grant.’ 
(Financial and Fiscal Commission 2007: 31). Consulting the Division of Revenue Act in 
more detail indicated that a Schedule Four conditional grant to provinces differed from a 
Schedule Five allocation in constituting either a ‘general’ or ‘nationally assigned’ 
allocation, as opposed to a ‘specific purpose’ allocation. The difference seemed to be 
that Schedule Four grants provided assistance to provinces to support more generally 
defined activities in functional areas (e.g., agriculture, health, social development) 
without being as specifically-defined as in Schedule Five grants (Government Gazette 
2004a; Government Gazette 2005a). 
 
Distinguishing between conditional grant types, as a factor that may have affected the 
capacity of the DOA to, in this case, exercise greater influence over how the provinces 
spent their allocations, is problematic. This recalls an earlier discussion which exposed 
the de facto emphasis on infrastructure pillar spending, which tends to minimise 
concerns about the actual degree of inconsistency between the DOA’s emphasis on 
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on/off infrastructure and the capacity of provincial departments to pursue needs covered 
by other service areas. Furthermore, it was argued that this situation seemed to have 
been engineered by the need to comply with a key objective and related conditionalities 
of providing post-settlement support to the beneficiaries of land reform. The FFC (2007: 
32) appeared to be hinting at the same thing, in the context of a broader discussion 
noting the emphasis on the infrastructure pillar ‘to the exclusion of other spending areas 
[pillars]’: 
 
The bigger problem of land reform that the grant is trying to address is a critical 
issue that requires consideration. CASP for instance, is a land reform issue and 
cannot be viewed in isolation. Thus, in its design, cognisance of this fact must be 
taken into account. 
 
With this in mind, it may be more useful to enquire into the circumstances underlying the 
expenditure performance of the provinces, as a means of isolating factors that could 
have influenced their capacity to implement the programme on the ground. An early sign 
of this was present in the South African government’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, 
published by the National Treasury (2003a: 134) prior to the introduction of CASP. The 
chapter concerning Agriculture observed that: 
 
The key challenge facing Government is to expand its support services for black 
and small-scale farmers. However, departments of Agriculture in poor provinces 
are unable to provide the necessary support, as their budgets for such activities 
are squeezed out by personnel expenditure. Over two-thirds of provincial 
budgets are dedicated for the payment of salaries of large numbers of low-skilled 
staff, and they are not skilled to provide the support services required by black 
and small-scale farmers. 
 
This is an otherwise curious statement in view of the human resourcing effects of the 
public agricultural sector’s post-apartheid restructuring, where the DOA observed that 
the national department transferred a significant number of posts to the nine new 
provincial departments of agriculture, including ‘[a]ll the personnel involved in extension, 
training and technology development’ (Department of Agriculture 1996: 1) Agricultural 
economists responsible for micro-economic research at farm level and for assisting 
farmers to farm profitably were also placed under provincial control. Over two-thirds of 
the posts attached to the DOA were transferred to the new provincial departments after 
1994 (ibid). This comprised 7000 of 10500 posts transferred on 1 November 1994. The 
national Department also reported that 3709 posts were filled as of 31 March 1995 
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(Department of Agriculture 1996: 71). Over 10 years later, the Department (2005a: 217), 
indicated that it had 2476 posts filled as of 31 March 2005, illustrating the permanence of 
provincial transfers. 
 
 
Attempting to reconcile the apparent inability of provincial department personnel to 
service programmes in black farmer support, despite the provinces having benefited 
from the transfer of a substantial number of technical personnel from the DOA after 
1994, could begin by focussing on one of the intentions of CASP, which was to ‘expand’ 
support services to black farmers, and in particular that beneficiary segment gaining 
access to land through land reform programmes. A number of provincial officials in fact 
recognised the positive contribution that CASP was making in providing supplementary 
funding to aid farmer support activities. One official indicated that ‘for us CASP has 
made a lot of difference because our portion for farmer support was not really adequate 
to reach out to many farmers as we currently doing, since the inception of CASP’ An 
official from another province added that ‘given the backlog since 1994, land reform 
started in 1994, CASP came in recently, … we were not having funds to support 
farmers, using EU [European Union] fund, had its own limitations/conditions’ 
 
Despite the benefit of having received additional monies to scale up their level of support 
to an emerging black farmer constituency, interviews also revealed that some provinces 
were finding it difficult to mobilise their existing human resources to meet the service 
demands that accompanied the additional funds being provided for CASP.  The findings 
exposed gaps in the availability of sufficient numbers of personnel as well as in adapting 
existing employees to the particular needs of CASP beneficiaries. These issues were 
especially acute in the supply of agricultural engineers and extension service personnel. 
39
 
 
The availability of engineers or extension officers with engineering training was acutely 
felt by some provinces, as one official observed: 
 
                                                 
39Officials from three of the seven provincial departments interviewed explicitly identified 
insufficient engineering capabilities as a challenge, whilst this was also mentioned by most DOA 
officials interviewed. 
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[A]s you’d know by now, the main focus, but not the only focus [of CASP] has 
been on infrastructural development. With time, when the farms were bought, 
some of the infrastructure was not in a good state, and some needed to be 
upgraded, some needed completely new construction, and we needed engineers 
to sort of assist in terms of doing the necessary planning, design, and even 
ensuring that the work that was being carried out is according to the standards, 
specifications. So that has been our major challenge. 
 
Concerns about the adequacy of engineering skills available in provincial departments to 
respond to the particular demands and emphasis placed by CASP on the infrastructure 
pillar was more revealingly described by an official in another provincial department: 
 
The biggest problem that we experience out of a program level…first, we did 
extension work … giving advice to farmers … when CASP came it was a total 
different story, they actually made extension officers engineers, because 
infrastructure is actually an engineer’s function … but our people didn’t have 
those kind of technical background or knowledge, but they had to do that … So 
now for the past 3 years … our extension people are doing infrastructure, we are 
not doing support services anymore, because our guys are running around with 
tenders and quotations and all those kind of things 
 
 
An even more enlightening excerpt, which also acknowledged the pressure felt by 
provinces in mobilising available engineering capabilities to carry out CASP, was 
expressed by another provincial department official: 
 
[B]ecause that’s how it’s [CASP] designed you know, it doesn’t come with any 
administrative support, it comes as money … just money … it comes onto a 
department that already has capacity problems, in terms of our ratio of admin to 
technical people, always been a challenge … Then you have to deploy your 
experts to refine business plans, you want now, need to have technical people, 
engineers, to produce specifications for you … and as I speak we only got two 
engineers to do everything that is required by the Department 
 
 
Another official from the same province recounted that the department had to acquire 
specialist engineering expertise from outside the department (from a public entity 
specialising in agricultural research). They also made the following more broadly 
directed comment that ‘the challenge that I think government will have to look at, if we 
want to increase the slice [going directly to farmers] … how can we do it, do we have to 
appoint a lot of people or do we have to go this outsourcing route, where we will then 
appoint consultants to come on board to assist us’ 
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A sustained emphasis on the infrastructure pillar appeared to have placed extraordinary 
demands on an existing supply of engineering resources in some provincial 
departments. This is somewhat surprising when considering that the 2003 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Review (National Treasury 2003a: 120) on agriculture noted 
that before CASP came on stream non-personnel capital expenditure by provincial 
departments increased over five fold between 1990/2000 and 2002/2003, from R37 
million to R201 million. Part of this capital budget was directed at farming infrastructure, 
including the kind of activities being promoted by CASP; where the Treasury added that 
the provinces were actually citing expenditure of R245 million on agricultural 
infrastructure including monies not classified as ‘capital’. It might appear difficult to 
reconcile these figures, which suggests that the provinces were not necessarily 
unprepared to implement infrastructure services before CASP came on stream. The 
interview findings indicated however that the reality may favour the technical inability to 
cope with the significant additional demands being made by an injection of a further 
R200 million for CASP, the great majority of which was and continues to be spent on 
infrastructure. 
 
Some provinces (at least three) were also reporting difficulties with the availability and 
provision of extension service personnel t  support CASP projects. As with engineering 
services, this encompassed both a limited supply of extension officers and insufficiently 
skilled personnel. Interviewees indicated that CASP appears to have had a peculiar 
effect on the way their extension officers were previously used: 
 
[A]lso one challenge, the extension officers, CASP, for you to manage CASP you 
have to have project management, we have to have plans in place and you have 
biggest challenge our extension officers are not trained as project managers, so 
for them it’s very difficult to monitor the projects 
 
 
An official in another province described a similar picture: 
 
 
You’re working with a coal face that’s never been trained, or that has never had 
that culture of managing projects in a more project management style, culture 
operating in, because you’re implementing CASP projects through extension 
service, which is geared to your overall farmers, not necessarily to your CASP 
beneficiaries 
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The official CASP Review discussed the on-the-ground circumstances of extension 
services in each of the nine provinces at great length. The Review (Department of 
Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 59) moreover offered the following 
description, which although it was limited to observations in only one province, appeared 
to give more scope to the kind of project management impact CASP seems to have had 
on existing agricultural extension services: 
 
Most extension officers are poorly trained and equipped to handle the demands 
of emerging commercial farmers. Extension training is dated and at dissonance 
with the multiplicity of demands new farmers face in their attempts to grow into 
successful commercial farmers. 
 
 
The description suggests that the introduction of CASP, which was precedent-setting in 
the scale of its emphasis on agricultural support to land reform beneficiaries, altered the 
orientation of extension by intensifying the planning and delivery of support (ideally to 
facilitate commercialisation) to the relatively greater and more complex agricultural 
needs of this beneficiary audience. In other respects, CASP also appeared to have 
stretched the supply of extension offices in some provinces: 
 
Extension officers, the number that we had over time was not really adequate 
enough to see to the implementation of the new projects and also to go back and 
take care of, after-care, for the old ones, so that the beneficiaries are actually not 
left in the lurch 
 
In another province, an official described a situation where extension officers in some 
areas of the province were being overburdened with the number of CASP projects being 
taken on, in addition to carrying out their usual extension work; whilst extension officers 
stationed in areas where land was not being utilised for CASP projects focussed solely 
on their usual extension support. The official simply noted that ‘so that is one area that 
we have not at this point in time have had time to put systems in place to make sure that 
we correct it.’ 
 
As with engineering-related resourcing capabilities, the interview data could really only 
speak to the challenges faced by some provinces of taking on the additional extension 
support demands introduced by CASP, where according to the National Treasury (2003: 
121-122) the provinces were by 2003/2004, that is prior to CASP, already spending a 
considerable 41 per cent of their agricultural budgets on extension services. Having said 
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this though, a member of a DOA delegation speaking before the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Agriculture and Land Affairs (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2007) was 
reported to have said that in the Department’s medium term expenditure framework a 
request was made to the Treasury for R252 million to be allocated to provincial 
departments of agriculture to expand their extension services. 
 
A final observation on CASP’s resource allocation, drawn from an analysis of interviews 
and secondary materials pointed, firstly, to the inflexibility of government procurement 
regulations, which governed the purchase of physical and professional 
supplies/equipment; and secondly the compatibility between these and CASP planning 
timeframes. This was again only evident amongst some (i.e., three) of the seven 
provincial departments interviewed by this thesis, where in its conclusion the CASP 
Review (Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 97) report also 
appeared to highlight planning constraints ahead of procurement: 
 
A large part of the problem relates to poor coordination and alignment in planning 
between the two principle departments [DOA and DLA] … Lengthy provincial 
procurement and limitations and staff capacity further delay project 
implementation. 
 
In one province, an official reported that ‘it really killed us big time’, when referring to 
procurement rules, noting elsewhere however that insufficient communication between 
programming and procurement officials sustained incompatibility between procurement 
rules and programme planning: 
 
So there is a time where finance will say, they are closing/accepting log1’s on a 
particular day that information will not flow to the project people (implementers), 
sometimes our project cycle not talking to their compliance systems. Since now 
we came up with plan, from April going out on tender, close on particular date. 
Things are now working properly. 
 
The two other provincial departments which raised the issue of procurement emphasised 
the inflexibility of adhering to standardised regulations when more enabling procurement 
solutions appeared to have been identified at ground level. For example, one provincial 
official asked: 
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Our procurement system is just not friendly to deliver on time … it seems that 
National Treasury don’t understand, they keep coming back and saying its poor 
planning, I mean, why must a tender run 28 days if you can go walk across the 
street and go buy the thing there, within one or two days you can deliver that 
thing 
 
An official in another province similarly questioned the rigidity as well as outlined the 
potential impact of the procurement regime on beneficiaries. The official gave the 
example of sourcing a specialist piece of infrastructure, a broiler unit/house, which could 
not otherwise be constructed by departmental engineers: 
 
[O]kay we go on tender, only one company doing that thing in country, then 
subject whole thing into a tender process simply because you have to procure 
according to your procurement. As long as it’s about R500 K, will have to go on 
tender, whether there’s any other service provider for that or not, it doesn’t 
matter. Those are the little hassles, administrative hassles, when you procuring 
from within government system. Now you have to take about six months before 
you put up a structure, in mean time farmer loses contract that he might have got 
with market, loses profit for the six months 
  
Overall, the availability of financial resources was not a factor which affected the 
capacity for CASP to be implemented, where the programme was initially able to secure 
a multi-year funding commitment that also accommodated a year-on-year rollover of 
funds in cases of under-expenditure. The programme therefore enjoyed a high level of 
government support, given the specific contribution it was intended to make to the 
politically significant land reform issue. More notable resourcing-related factors which 
influenced the capacity of CASP’s implementing bodies could again be traced to the 
programme’s objective emphasis on land reform beneficiaries, and its rigid prioritisation 
on services (i.e., Infrastructure) deemed most relevant to the circumstances of this 
constituency. This however exposed gaps in the availability and adaptation of existing 
provincial personnel (engineers and extension officials) to service the extent and nature 
of the needs being introduced. In view of Paul’s framework, this also demonstrated the 
dependency of provincial departments to mobilise the requisite financial and 
administrative support and cooperation from national agencies in particular (DOA, 
National Treasury) in view of the human (personnel) and physical (procurement of 
goods) resource constraints sustained in servicing the demands of CASP. 
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  6.2.4 Overall impressions on the strategy of CASP 
 
An overall impression of CASP’s strategy demonstrated that the programme’s objective 
makeup, and particularly its emphasis on servicing the agricultural needs of beneficiaries 
who had acquired access to land via government programmes, generated concerns 
about the affect this would have on the capacity of provincial implementing departments 
to render services to this beneficiary grouping. The effects this had on capacity became 
more manifest when CASP was analysed at an operational level, which indicated that 
provincial departments had little de facto control over and guidance in relation to the 
interpretation, selection and sequencing of the full suite of service pillars available under 
the programme. This was evident in the effective concentration on service areas tailored 
to the most pressing needs of land reform beneficiaries (i.e., Infrastructure), and the 
limited operational flexibility this afforded provincial departments. Finally, an analysis of 
CASP’s resourcing provided an even more tangible account of factors that affected 
provincial capacity, which again could be traced to the programme’s objective emphasis 
on servicing the needs of land reform beneficiaries. 
 
Findings pertaining to the strategic make-up of CASP also revealed a number of 
bureaucratic constraints affecting capacity, where this reflected characteristics described 
in this study’s theoretical outline (see chapter 2), and explicitly contained in Paul’s 
description of a development programme’s structure and processes. One example was 
the persistent procedural constraints experienced in the process of aligning rules 
governing the delivery of support services under the DOA-sponsored CASP, with those 
regulating the access of land under DLA-sponsored programmes such as LRAD. No 
doubt a key contributing factor to this constraint was the programme’s business planning 
and conditional grant stipulations concerning the percentage of funds (70) required by 
provincial departments to be directed at beneficiaries of land reform programmes. This 
can also be traced to the inter-departmental structural environment in which CASP was 
introduced (to be discussed in a later section on structure). 
 
Another bureaucratic constraint involved the inflexibility of general rules governing the 
procurement of goods and services, which adversely affected the resourcing capacity of 
provincial departments to expedite the implementation of individual projects under 
CASP. This firstly pointed to the constraints arising from CASP implementing 
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departments having to adhere to rules regulating the purchasing of inputs. This was also 
evident in Paul’s description of the resourcing sub-variable, which demonstrated a need 
for programme implementing bodies to ‘mobilise’ support in the form of inter-agency (as 
well as intra-agency) co-operation and support, and which in this instance would have 
involved agencies directly overseeing government procurement regulations (such as the 
National Treasury), as well as the finance sections within provincial agriculture 
departments. 
 
Finally, a further bureaucratic constraint that could be directly linked to a development 
programme’s processes was evident in CASP’s monitoring. Here the DOA’s monitoring 
was criticised for its concentration on ‘procedures’ relating to budget control vis à vis 
provincial expenditure, to the neglect of performance outputs, and where its capacity 
was probably limited by insufficiently detailed national implementation guidelines. Having 
said this, the circumstances under which monitoring was carried out under CASP speaks 
to the structural relationship that defined the DOA’s role in the programme relative to its 
provincial counterparts, where this might offer a more direct and robust explanation of 
what could have affected its capacity. This will be reviewed in more detail in section 6.4 
  
The next section will discuss findings on the ‘environment’ variable. 
 
 
6.3 The ‘environment’ variable 
 
Findings associated with the environmental make-up of CASP revealed a striking 
concentration of factors associated with uncertainty, as defined in Paul’s framework. 
Moreover, these instances were mentioned by most (i.e., five out of seven) of the 
provincial departments interviewed for this thesis. 
 
6.3.1 Factors associated with CASP’s environmental uncertainty 
 
According to Paul (1982: 108; 1983: 50) environmental uncertainty in a development 
programme refers to unforeseen changes in its environment, associated mainly with 
sudden or unpredictable occurrences precipitated by the socio-economic, political and 
physical conditions of programme beneficiaries. These may include changes in the 
perception of beneficiaries or their dissatisfaction with a service, and changes in ‘political 
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conditions’. Such circumstances, he adds, will likely affect the strategic and structural 
makeup of a programme, which would have to be designed with ‘greater flexibility to 
facilitate adaptation to unforeseen contingencies’. Furthermore, he suggests that 
beneficiary participation in the design and delivery of services and increasing the 
operational autonomy of implementation officials might also be ‘interpreted as an 
adaptation to environmental uncertainty’. 
 
Instances of uncertainty were overwhelmingly reported in those interviews commenting 
on CASP’s environment. In general accordance with earlier findings, which showed the 
effects that CASP’s strategic emphasis on land reform beneficiaries had had on the 
capacity of its implementing bodies, it was found that the socio-economic and political 
circumstances associated with these beneficiaries also affected the capacity of some of 
the provinces consulted. Moreover, the primary source of these uncertainties appeared 
to have arisen as a consequence of working with groups of beneficiaries.40 This resulted 
from individuals typically pooling the amount of their own contribution (in labour, kind or 
cash) in order to access larger matching government grants to be able to purchase land 
under programmes such as LRAD. One interviewee based at the national Department of 
Land Affairs noted for example that: 
 
Well it’s not simple to buy a piece of land with this amount of R20 00041, normally 
they will group themselves together in the form of 10 or 12, then the land will be 
purchased … What most implementers will say is actually the high cost of the 
land, because prices are too costly, that’s a challenge 
 
Another interviewee also noted that: 
 
But, as I understand it from the research that’s been done, the bulk of LRAD 
grants are still at the bottom end of the scale, so basically the kind of people that 
are accessing the previous once-off subsidy [called SLAG], still constitute the 
bulk of people accessing LRAD, and they’re accessing small grants and they’re 
doing it as groups, so in a sense we’re still churning out these land reform 
                                                 
40Four out of the five provinces in which instances of environmental uncertainty were mentioned 
referred to working with groups of land reform beneficiaries. A beneficiary attending a CASP 
programme review workshop also commented on a perception that in order to access support, 
beneficiaries had to be part of a group, where this applied in particular to ‘blacks’. See 
Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 134; appendix 2. 
41An amount of R20 000 is the minimum matching contribution available to be accessed for 
making the minimum own contribution, in cash, labour or kind (Ministry for Agriculture and Land 
Affairs. 2000: 7-8). 
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projects with large beneficiary groups, which is giving rise to all of these 
problems that you’ve noticed. 
 
SLAG, which stands for the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant, preceded LRAD. An 
official of the DOA recalled the following in an interview: ‘[i] think as a background, from 
1994 that’s when we had SLAG … which was when Department of Land Affairs was 
buying farms for people who wanted to get into the farming stream, and in that year I 
think people were accessing R16 000 grants, and then the problem then was that R16 
000 was too little and what used to happen is they just group themselves into so many 
people, so that they multiply the R16 000’. Comparing this comment with others cited in 
this section indicates that LRAD, the successor to SLAG, in many instances experienced 
a continuation of individuals grouping themselves to multiply the value of the total grant 
obtainable in order to purchase land. 
 
The nature of the problems referred to in the previous interview passage essentially 
defined the uncertainties experienced and relayed by some provincial departments of 
agriculture when working with groups of land reform beneficiaries. These problems 
resulted from inconsistencies between members of groups about the kind of farming 
assistance they desired under CASP, which sometimes led to conflict between group 
members; as well as unexpected shifts in farming priorities being relayed to provincial 
department officials. Examples included the following observation by one provincial 
official: 
 
As soon as you too much people onto a farm, then it’s conflict, because each and 
every one got their own idea as to what they want to do, because there is no 
owner42, and that’s our biggest problem … In the planning phase they will tell 
you, or when the application, now I need this and this and this, as soon as we 
inform them listen your project is approved, they say no no no no, forget about 
that things that we said before that we want from you, we’ve got a different list of 
priorities now … now we waste a lot of time, now you start into negotiations with 
those people again. 
 
 
The same provincial official remarked on inconsistent intentions amongst group 
members: 
                                                 
42This refers to groups of individuals constituting themselves as a legal entity, usually in the form 
of Trusts. 
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[I]t’s about one or two farmers or three in a group of 60, 70 … that wants to farm, 
but to get the money from government, they must collect a lot of people … so 
they collect all those people and then they become part of this business … and 
the other one is the sleeping partners …they are not part of the farm, they are not 
there … because there name is on the list, but they heard this rumour that they 
have access to a farm now … they’re all quiet in the planning phase, but when it 
comes to moving onto the land, those people are suddenly there … They are just 
shareholders 
 
 
An official in another provincial department recounted a similar set of circumstances: 
 
[S]ome of these projects, more than one beneficiaries, and sometimes they’ll 
have some differences, social problems, political problems, and projects you 
know cannot take off. We’ve got a LRAD project, but when this project, land 
affairs, because they were given R20,000 in order to buy that farm, so you need 
to have 20 people to make that selling price, those people, 20 people cannot 
work together, other people are not keen farmers, they thought that they’ll be 
given money, cash, they didn’t know that they have to work in order to realise 
what they wanted, rather than buying into a farm 
 
An official in a third provincial department remarked on the effect of these uncertainties 
on departmental operations: 
 
A huge effect in a sense that we, most of the times we have to do social 
facilitation, trying got make people understand what are they into, and which, in 
terms of … we need to be implementing projects for this financial year, and we 
cannot just go on someone’s farm and say where is the leader here, show us the 
leader ... we must find where all the community, what their interests is … we 
always say we inherit those problems, with CASP we support people who have 
already been formed into groups. By virtue of the fact that people get the land by 
virtue of their rights, then every time we will have to find conflicting ideas, with 
little exceptio  for LRAD, but with most other programmes, that is very 
predominate. It affects your timeframes that you have, it throws it out and you 
have to go with the flow. 
 
A further problem expressed at the provincial level and resulting from the manifestation 
of intra-group dynamics concerned the sustainability of such projects, where some 
officials cited a tenuous commitment to farming being expressed and/or a lack of 
understanding/knowledge amongst beneficiaries. This included an observation that 
‘[n]ormally most of these beneficiaries have a little knowledge about farming’, or are ‘not 
understanding the environment of agriculture’, as well as the department inheriting 
people that do not have any ‘business acumen’, or not being ‘business-oriented’, where 
the department had to try to ‘sift or work out that you find people who are really farmers’. 
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These kinds of descriptions correspond with earlier concerns recorded under the 
strategy variable, which pertained directly to the objectives of CASP, and which involved 
distinctions being drawn in practice between land reform and non land reform 
beneficiaries on the basis of farming potential, risk-taking and attitudinal attributes. 
 
Enquiring further into the group profile of CASP projects led to the sourcing of DOA 
figures which seemed to indicate that comparing total number of projects with total 
number of beneficiaries was equating to highly varied average project sizes (see table 
6.2) across the provinces. This included relatively large groups of beneficiaries in some 
provinces. These numbers could not be employed to confirm the specific profile of 
groups, as these did not distinguish land reform from non-land reform beneficiaries nor 
clarify whether beneficiaries were directly participating in projects or were indirectly 
benefiting, for instance children and minors. The strategic prioritisation of land reform 
beneficiaries by at least two-thirds of the provinces would otherwise however tend to 
suggest that the presence of beneficiary groups consisting of new land entrants 
generated uncertainties for an appreciable number of provincial departments and which 
influenced their capacity to respond to these clients. 
 
Table 6.2: Beneficiary profile of CASP projects 2005/2006 
  
No. projects No. beneficiaries43 Average beneficiaries/project 
Eastern Cape 240 8544 35.6 
Free State 127 752 5.9 
Gauteng 27 350 13.0 
KwaZulu Natal 136 30773 226.3 
Limpopo 8 8370 1046.3 
Mpumalanga 63 2699 42.8 
Northern Cape 33 777 23.5 
North West 393 4278 10.9 
Western Cape 42 2898 69.0 
 TOTAL 1069 59441 
  
 
Source: Department of Agriculture. 2005c: annexure 7 
 
The environmental effect on the capacity of provincial departments, sustained by 
working with groups of land reform beneficiaries displaying competing intentions and 
                                                 
43Another table produced by the Department of Agriculture (2006a: 9), which was not 
disaggregated by province, recorded a slightly smaller total beneficiary number of 53,206 for 
1069 projects in 2005/2006. 
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uneven commitments to agricultural production, also probably exposed a lack of 
experience on the part of provincial departments in being able to effectively adapt to 
these circumstances. This, given the historical neglect of post-settlement support 
services to land reform prior to CASP, as well as budgetary increases to facilitate land 
delivery not having been adequately matched by the agricultural support budget. A DOA 
official interviewed for this thesis also hinted at the provinces’ lack of historical budgetary 
support to plan for land reform clients: 
 
The motivation also was that now that we are coming up with land reform, and 
land reform is a national programme, then the provinces are now sitting with a 
burden of having to assist, support so many farmers, the farmers that they were 
not planned for within their budgets, so that’s when Treasury gave national these 
conditional grants, in the form of CASP 
 
6.3.2 Overall impressions on the Environment of CASP 
 
 
An overall assessment of the environmental features of CASP tends to coincide with 
findings observed under the strategy variable, which showed that features that emerged 
out of the programme’s objective prioritisation of land reform beneficiaries created 
uncertainties that ultimately affected the capacity of provincial departments in particular 
to service CASP’s targeted clientele. In this instance, the objective emphasis on 
servicing the agricultural needs of constituents gaining access to land via government 
programmes bequeathed a tangible set of uncertainties resulting from the land 
acquisition process (group acquisitions). It was against this background that a sizeable 
number of provincial departments cited difficulties negotiating intra-group social and 
political dynamics in the process of rendering agricultural support services. 
 
The effect on administrative capacity attributed to the intra-group social and political 
dynamics experienced by provincial departments generally corresponded with Paul’s 
(1982: 108; 1983: 50) description of the uncertainty variable. This included 
circumstances precipitated by the socio-economic, political or even physical conditions 
of beneficiaries, where ‘changes in the perception of clients or their dissatisfaction with a 
service’ could affect their responses to the programme. This was mainly displayed in the 
form of divergent beneficiary perceptions concerning the value and use of land for 
agricultural purposes. Having said this, Paul’s suggestion that programmes ‘might’ seek 
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to adapt to instances of environmental uncertainty by encouraging beneficiary 
participation in the design and delivery of services, and increasing the autonomy of 
ground level implementation officials, does not seem to have applied in the CASP case. 
In the first instance, the source of the uncertainties being experienced by provincial 
officials derived from the beneficiaries themselves, where this was influenced by how 
their participation in the programme proceeded (i.e. through group acquisitions). In the 
second case provincial departments had already been handed a considerable degree of 
autonomy, relative to operational flexibility, to implement CASP on-the-ground. Given 
their lack of prior experience in budgeting and planning for land reform beneficiaries in 
particular, it is doubtful that any further autonomy, short of the objective flexibility of 
determining how best to agriculturally accommodate and service land reform 
beneficiaries, would have better enabled provinces to negotiate such uncertainties. 
 
The next section will discuss findings on the ‘structure’ variable. 
 
6.4 The ‘structure’ variable 
 
The structure variable adapted from Paul’s description refers to the functional and 
organisational arrangements underpinning a public organisation’s capacity to carry out a 
development programme. In functional terms, this refers to a situation where 
organisational tasks are broken up, or structured, according to what is relevant for the 
delivery of a particular service. In organisational terms, this refers to the configuration of 
decision-making authority within and between public organisations, through which a 
development programme’s functional activities are carried out. A characteristic that is 
explicitly mentioned in Paul’s (1982: 116) description of the structure variable is the 
appearance of ‘bureaucratic’ constraints, arising from the relationship between a public 
body’s existing functional and organisational structures, and the demands introduced by 
a new development programme. 
 
The discussion thus far, which has focused on the strategy and environment variables 
have already revealed a number of operational dis-functionalities in the course of 
carrying out CASP. 44 These were firstly attributed to provincial implementing 
                                                 
44Another relatively less significant functional problem experienced by CASP provincial 
implementing departments involved adhering to inflexible government procurement regulations. 
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departments having little de facto flexibility and guidance (from the DOA) to interpret, 
choose and sequence the full suite of service pillars available under the programme. 
This secondly referred to the capacity constraints sustained by agriculture departments 
in servicing the support needs of land reform beneficiaries, where this was caused by a 
disjuncture in the operating rules between CASP and government land reform 
programmes being carried out by other departments (such as Land Affairs). This latter 
occurrence partially corresponds with the following scenario drawn by Paul (1982: 117), 
which pertains to the structure of a development programme: 
 
New programs with a different definition of the problem and a set of [functional] 
tasks which cut across different ministries and even external organizations may 
not perform well when structured along the same functional lines [that is, along 
the existing line functions of a given ministry or department] 
 
 
In the case of CASP, the programme essentially reoriented the existing functional 
services of the public agricultural sector towards a beneficiary constituency which had 
mainly been assisted by a separate Department of Land Affairs. This equates to the 
description of ‘[n]ew programs with a different definition of the problem and a set of tasks 
which cut across different ministries [or in this case different departments]’. This 
reorientation or different definition of the problem, which also encompassed the 
introduction by CASP of agricultural support services along six pillars, was accompanied 
by provincial departments of agriculture enjoying a reduced scope to configure the 
services available under the programme for delivery. Finally, the provinces were also 
provided with limited guidance on the implementation of CASP in the form of nationally 
developed norms and standards. These operational conditions produced adverse 
consequences for the capacity of provincial departments in particular to functionally 
embed and service CASP within their existing line function activities. 
 
With this in mind, and given that the very intention of the grant allocated to provincial 
departments for CASP required these bodies to embed their responses to the 
programme within their existing line function activities, it is a priori reasoned under the 
scenario drawn by Paul that structuring a functional response to CASP ‘along the same 
functional lines’ would have likely generated additional bureaucratic constraints on 
capacity, or in other words over and above the operational constraints described above. 
Having said this, the findings did indicate that the structural decentralisation of CASP’s 
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implementation, which was in any case a direct consequence of the constitutional 
concurrency of the agricultural function45, did appear to have augmented the strategic 
dis-functionalities referred to earlier, which ultimately affected the capacity of the DOA to 
achieve ‘parity across the provinces and consistency in delivery’. 
 
The examples begin with two provinces which commented on difficulties experienced in 
making initial functional arrangements for CASP, or in other words integrating the 
programme’s services into their existing farmer support activities, which in one case 
resulted in material under-expenditure. One provincial official noted that: 
 
Initially the challenge that we had … treating CASP, It was not integrated into our 
departmental programmes, it was like a programme on its own, I think that was a 
challenge, we should have used CASP like we are using it currently, just as an 
enabler to fund our programmes, way we were dealing with CASP when it 
started, programme on its own, that’s why the under-expenditure initially, we do 
have programmes already in the department [farmer support], we should be 
using CASP as an enabler to support farmers in the pillars. I’m sure everybody 
did not understand what is this CASP thing? 
 
 
An official from another provincial department recalled that: 
 
 
Initially when we started, challenge, because CASP regarded as just an added 
on thing, but as we progress, we’ve made them to realize CASP not add not add 
on but we have to do it, we were given for the first time R38 million … so we 
were given the biggest chunk, out of 38 million only 12 million [spent]. Everybody 
not ready for this kind of money, we do have other programmes, CASP came in 
regarded as added on, no people were ready to say we’re ready to implement 
programme, so I was roped in, had to identify people, took me some time to 
convince even who people should be in regions. 
 
 
A more serious problem with the functional accommodation of CASP was reported by an 
official in a third provincial department, which recounted in an interview that when CASP 
was introduced into the province, it came into a department that was seriously lacking in 
‘administrative systems’, including a ‘dedicated wing that will just deal with projects, or 
CASP projects or any other developmental projects’ The interviewee also indicated that 
                                                 
45This differed from Paul’s concern for the application of a ‘centralised’ decision-making structure 
to a programme where environmental conditions warrant a more decentralised structure to 
facilitate local adaptation. 
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the department did not at the time make functional provision to provide a ‘marketing’ 
service, which was one of the six pillars of CASP. 
 
These observations point to instances where some provinces were functionally ill-
prepared to absorb the new service demands being introduced by CASP, where this 
could have resulted from a number of factors. This includes insufficient or ineffective 
communication about the programme’s supplementary contribution to existing farmer 
support activities between the DOA and provincial departments, and inadequate 
planning. Moreover, this may have been aided by insufficiently clear or developed 
national norms and standards, as reported earlier. Overall, observations from only three 
departments cannot be considered representative of the entire provincial situation. 
Findings elsewhere did however expose other structural constraints associated with the 
embedding of CASP into existing provincial line functions. In order to better appreciate 
these, it is necessary to give a brief overview of how the DOA structurally arranged itself 
to oversee CASP. 
 
As early as 2002/2003 the DOA was discussing a future comprehensive farmer support 
initiative, where it specifically noted that ‘[t]he policy will be implemented by the many 
directorates within the Department’ (Department of Agriculture 2003: 35). This was 
followed by a more detailed statement indicating that ‘considerable attention was paid 
during 2004/05 to aligning all support services to the six CASP service pillars’ 
(Department of Agriculture 2005a: 26). Citing the direct implementation involvement of 
‘many directorates’ in the Department demonstrated an intention to align the DOA’s 
various functional units to the six service pillars of CASP. 
 
Perhaps the clearest illustration of a deliberate attempt to link CASP’s six functional 
services with core functional units within the DOA was portrayed in the Department’s 
2004/2005 Annual Report, which corresponded with the programme’s first year of 
operation. The Report in question was, on the surface, no different from other annual 
reports published by government departments in South Africa, which generally reported 
on the activities of line function units within the DOA for the year. What was unique 
about this particular report was the space allocated to each directorate in the 
Department to report on the specific contributions each was making to CASP pillars. 
These were tabulated by the researcher and presented in table 6.3 below. 
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Table 6.3: Relationship between CASP functional pillars and DOA line function 
directorates 
 
CASP Functional services 
(‘Pillars’) 
NDA Line functional contributions to CASP pillars (2004/5) 
• Information and knowledge 
management 
• Directorate: International Trade 
• Directorate: Scientific Research and Development 
• Directorate: Plant Health 
• Directorate: Animal Health 
• Directorate: South African Agricultural Food Quarantine 
and Inspection Service 
• Directorate: Agricultural Information Services 
• Directorate: Programme Planning 
• Technical and advisory 
assistance, and regulatory 
services 
• Directorate: Business and Enterprise Development 
• Directorate: Production and Resource Economics 
• Directorate: Animal and Aquaculture Production Systems 
• Directorate: Plant Production Systems 
• Directorate: Genetic Resources Management 
• Directorate: Land Use and Soil Management 
• Directorate: Water Use and Irrigation Development 
• Directorate: Food Safety and Quality Assurance 
• Directorate: Plant Health 
• Directorate: Animal Health 
• Marketing and business 
development 
• Directorate: Marketing 
• Directorate: International Trade 
• Training and capacity 
building 
• Directorate: Agricultural Statistics 
• Directorate: Education and Training 
• Grootfontein Agricultural Development Institute 
• On/off farm infrastructure 
and product inputs 
• Directorate: Water Use and Irrigation Development 
 
• Financial support • Directorate: Agricultural Finance and Co-operatives 
Development 
• Directorate: Agricultural Risk and Disaster Management 
 
Source: Department of Agriculture 2005a 
 
Interviews with senior officials in the DOA also revealed that the Department had already 
been engaging in efforts to monitor and support provincial departments to implement 
CASP activities. One official reported that: 
 
[W]e have nine regional offices … and we call those provincial coordinators, and 
they are mainly looking at land reform programmes, and it’s a system that they 
are managing, we call that LRAD system … they record all LRAD and CASP, in 
fact land and agrarian reform projects, the status, what the problems are, and 
interact with other relevant directorates to say, if there’s a problem with 
marketing, then they need to meet up with the marketing directorate to say, we 
have this project here in this areas … these are the problems, and then they’ll 
have to source that assistance 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
143 
Another official added that: 
 
[W]e as a national department have allocated a, what we call a DEXCO team to 
each province, so each of the management, from chief director above, has a 
province he or she is responsible for and a team of management, that has in the 
past, and will probably in the future, go to a particular province, and oversee the 
spending and, oversee CASP in the province 
 
Despite the rational arrangement of its functional oversight and support to provincial 
implementing departments, the DOA elsewhere admitted to weaknesses in exercising 
oversight and monitoring over provincial department activities. One official, who 
acknowledged reports of human resourcing problems in the provinces, relayed the 
following: ‘but, national department of agriculture, in as much as we have a Secretariat46 
… and we have some people in provinces as well, inspectors … they have not been 
doing intense auditing or oversight of individual projects, so, I don’t think we can tell you 
whether at the project level, where there’s a planning problem or not.’ This generally 
corresponds with comments made by a DOA official speaking before Parliament’s 
Portfolio Committee on Agriculture in August 2006, who, in relation to provincial 
expenditure on CASP, remarked that it was clear that the national department needed to 
go to the provinces and ‘investigate everything in detail’ (PMG 2006). 
 
DOA officials interviewed for this thesis also offered a different perspective on the 
structural scenario underpinning the Department’s monitoring capacity, by describing a 
‘problem that we always have now’, which ‘we need to sort … out’ of provincial 
departments not fully accounting for the activities that they expended CASP monies on: 
 
[S]o the money is transferred to provinces, when they spend, just spend the 
money as support, from provincial side, they just support to all the farmers, but 
what we are saying the CASP cut, when they account, because the DG must 
account to Treasury, they must also indicate what they used the money for 
 
                                                 
46The Secretariat refers to the CASP Secretariat, with the Directorate: Land Use and Soil 
Management tasked with overseeing and ensuring provincial department of agriculture 
compliance with CASP conditional grant funding conditions. This was based on the Directorate’s 
prior experience in grants administration for other national-provincial department programmes 
(i.e., LandCare) (Department of Agriculture 2005c: 8-9; Department of Agriculture, Not dated c: 
1). 
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Although the interviewee also recognised that the supplementary form of the CASP 
grant meant that it was ultimately absorbed into the existing farmer support budgets of 
provincial departments from where it was spent, the programme required the DOA, in 
terms of its designated oversight and monitoring role, to account for how the grant 
portion was spent. This indicates a possible source of structural tension between the 
supplementary nature of the grant, which recognises the shared functional 
responsibilities for agriculture in general, and farmer support in particular, between the 
DOA and provincial departments, and the specific oversight and monitoring role that 
CASP assigned to the DOA vis à vis the provinces. This again seems to accord with 
Paul’s reference to new programmes with a different definition of a problem and a set of 
tasks that cut across different ministries, and in this case spheres of government, not 
performing well when structured along existing line functions. Further exposition of this 
potential structural constraint will be offered a little later, but for the moment the 
problems experienced by a fourth province in embedding CASP within its existing line 
functions will be discussed. 
 
An official in this province described a somewhat different functional experience to other 
provinces which recounted difficulties trying to embed CASP in their existing functional 
structures. The difference was reflected in its ability to more fully integrate the 
programme within its line functions. Having said this, the official’s description was 
otherwise consonant with the kind of bureaucratic impediments referred to by Paul 
(1982: 116-117) in his assumption about new programmes with a different definition of a 
problem being structured along a department’s existing line functions: 
 
There’s a champion for CASP in the province, … she is overseeing/coordinating 
the whole budget that we get for the province, also she’s administering what we 
do, which is 70 per cent of the allocation for land reform, and then 10 per cent for 
training, 10 per cent for food security, etc. Now, it would have been best if that 
person was directly involved in those programmes, because what I find is the 10 
per cent for food security is done for food security is done by the regions, 
manager is responsible for that, budget is directly allocated to those people, and 
they take decisions, sometimes the communication between co-ordinator and 
them is very poor … so I’m saying … it becomes difficult for the coordinator to 
coordinate between different units like it is happening … especially because we 
don’t report to one senior manager, it’s two different sub-components that we are 
belonging to, so it won’t be appropriate if; In our department we have two DDGs 
[Deputy Director Generals], then from those we have Chief Directors, then below 
we have senior managers, I’m saying then, CASP is being managed by one chief 
business office, or one DDG, whereas the most implementation is happening 
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with one DDG. Implementation happens with one DDG, training is with another 
DDG. And putting these people together is very very difficult to someway we 
must try and identify a very seamless way … identify a best way of managing this 
programme. 
 
 
This observation, from a fourth province, indicates that problems experienced trying to 
embed CASP in the existing functional activities (dedicated to farmer support) of some 
provincial departments was not the only type of constraint experienced, where the 
cumbersome outcomes of a fuller integration of the programme appeared to impair 
capacity in other ways. 
 
Adding to this manifestation of bureaucratic constraints on capacity were other 
observations conveyed by more than one official at the DOA, which this time emanated, 
interestingly, from the decentralised organisational structure of CASP, as opposed to the 
imposition of a centralized structure as mooted by Paul (1982: 117). The following 
findings could moreover advance the notion of a structural constraint underpinning the 
problematic monitoring capacity of the DOA as referred to earlier. Following on from a 
DOA official who earlier recounted difficulties obtaining performance output information 
from provincial departments, another official in the Department echoed these concerns 
by recalling an incident where the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs had once 
asked ‘where are the projects’. In other words the Minister asked for a more detailed 
description of outputs generated at the provincial level, where there was a concern that 
officials at this level were choosing only the ‘good ones’, or being selective in reporting 
on projects. The official then interestingly conveyed that greater scrutiny by the national 
department might become a ‘turf issue’ between the DOA and provincial departments. 
This was also curiously mentioned by another DOA official, who in discussing problems 
with obtaining ‘sufficient’ and ‘detailed’ information on the status of CASP projects at 
provincial level, relayed the following concern: 
 
[A]nd I fear that we may well be going even into a more vague environment if we 
go to the CASP arena because it’s not even your own people, you’re in a 
different department, there are other sort of dynamics there, and … unless we 
can prove to provinces … that the effort that they would be going through to give 
us the information for this money that we’re giving them, that we will then capture 
it and provide it back to them in an electronic format which is useful to them, 
unless we can prove that case … they’ll just say this is an administrative 
imposition and it’s not useful. 
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References to a ‘turf issue’ between the DOA and provincial departments, and concerns 
about administrative ‘impositions’ by provincial departments, speaks to the shared 
functional authority that the DOA and provincial departments of agriculture were 
constitutionally invested with, which in operational terms extended to farmer support 
activities. This arrangement therefore necessitated the involvement of both spheres in 
the execution of a national programme such as CASP, and particularly where a specific 
functional activity such as farmer support was already being rendered by both spheres, 
for which supplementary funding was arranged. In accordance with this scenario, it was 
evident that the structural decentralisation of the programme between the DOA and the 
provinces also manifested what could be described as bureaucratic impediments 
exposing conflicts of hierarchy. At one level, this seems to have constrained the capacity 
of the DOA to exercise effective monitoring, whilst from a wider perspective interestingly 
recalls an earlier reference by a DOA official to the potential strategic ‘imposition’ by the 
national Department of service pillar priorities that may not have matched those of 
provincial departments. 
 
6.4.1 Overall impressions on the structure of CASP 
 
This section argued that the strategic design and environmental characteristics which 
accompanied CASP had already contributed to a problematic functional scenario 
between national and provincial departments involved in carrying out the programme. 
This included problems aligning inter-departmental programming rules between the DLA 
and agriculture departments, and provincial departments of agriculture enjoying limited 
room to configure service areas and beneficiary targeting for rendering support services 
available under the programme, which also yielded resource-related consequences for 
their capacity. These conditions primarily stemmed from CASP’s key objective, which 
emphasised the rendering of agricultural support services to the beneficiaries of land 
reform programmes. 
 
Having said this, the initial dis-functionalities which were influenced by strategic factors 
were also found to have been augmented by the programme’s structural configuration, 
which handed on-the-ground implementation responsibility to provincial departments 
whilst requiring the DOA to monitor and account. In functional terms, findings from at 
least four provinces indicated that capacity was affected by difficulties experienced with 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
147 
trying to and the constraints generated by eventually embedding CASP in existing 
department line functional activities. These observations generally coincided with Paul’s 
concern about the bureaucratic effects of introducing new programmes with a different 
definition of a problem into existing functional structures. 
 
Bureaucratic constraints on capacity was also evident in how structural authority for the 
programme was arranged between the DOA and its provincial counterparts, yet unlike in 
Paul’s scenario, this did not arise as a result of the centralisation of national department 
authority but, interestingly, manifested itself in the context of the programme’s structural 
decentralisation. This was in any event a direct consequence of functional authority for 
agriculture being constitutionally shared between the DOA and provincial departments in 
South Africa. In this particular case, the decentralisation of what was a national 
programme saw the creation of inter-organisational authority conflicts, stemming from 
the particular roles that CASP introduced into this shared framework, and which in this 
instance required the DOA to monitor and oversee provincial performance. This appears 
to have adversely affected its capacity to effectively carry out this designated role. It may 
be pertinent to note that this was experienced on the back of an already problematic 
strategic relationship, including on service pillar prioritisation, between the DOA and its 
provincial counterparts. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented an analysis of factors associated with the strategy, 
environment and structure of CASP, which were found to have influenced the capacity of 
its implementing organisations to carry out the programme. The impressions 
documented in this chapter will contribute to a consolidated identification of factors in the 
conclusion of this thesis. Chapters 7 and 8 will present an analysis of the Expanded 
Public Works Programme. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME: BACKGROUND 
 
 
7.1 A historical overview of the public works sector and the issue of job 
creation 
 
This chapter will provide a historical account of the emergence of the Expanded Public 
Works Programme47 (EPWP), which is the latest incarnation under a policy theme 
originally designed to generate large-scale employment opportunities through existing 
government-expenditure on infrastructure. The roots of the Programme are also 
reflected in the transformation of its designated co-ordinating body: the national 
Department of Public Works (DPW). The primary function of the DPW prior to South 
Africa’s 1994 political transition was the procurement, administration and maintenance of 
state-owned or leased property, and the provision and maintenance of physical 
infrastructure (accommodation) for government departments. The Department’s main 
function was therefore to service the physical infrastructure needs of the state (1994: 3; 
1993: 3; see also 1992: vii) These functions entailed activities such as the renovation of 
buildings, their upkeep and repair, property valuation, construction management, and the 
preservation of national monuments. Prior to political reform the Department consisted of 
two branches, each headed by a Deputy Director-General. The first was concerned with 
building services (architectural, engineering, quantity surveying) whilst the other was 
responsible for accommodation and land affairs. 
 
The DPW’s responsibility for providing and maintaining building infrastructure for the 
state had, even before the political transition, recognised the job creation benefits that 
could accrue as a result of such activities. The Department was however never 
sufficiently resourced or accorded the policy space to foreground job creation as a 
primary objective of its construction activities. When commenting on the planning of 
capital works in its 1984 Annual Report, the Department noted for example that ‘In 
                                                 
47Some media reports and government speeches (see The Presidency 2004) have, for unknown 
reasons, substituted the word ‘Extended’ for ‘Expanded’ when referring to the EPWP. The 
Expanded Public Works Programme is the correct and formal name given to the programme and 
is employed throughout in DPW documentation examined by this thesis. In other words, there is 
no Extended Public Works Programme, and nor is this form of the name employed in DPW 
documentation. 
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striving to curtail Government expenditure as far as possible, one of the aims was to limit 
the planning of new building projects to the most urgent cases only, and this effort has 
proved largely successful’ (Department of Public Works and Land Affairs 1985: 43). Four 
years later, the Department again remarked that it was, ‘as a result of the limited funds 
available for the erection of buildings, to a great extent still dependent on hiring to 
provide for the accommodation needs of the user departments’ (Department of Public 
Works and Land Affairs 1989: 66). The limited fiscal scope for new capital projects 
existed until South Africa’s political transition, when the DPW began to express concern 
at the growth of annual expenditure on leasing accommodation, which was outpacing 
spending on capital projects. In response to this situation, the Department noted that it 
‘would like to make a greater contribution to the stabilisation of the building industry by 
executing more capital projects, and in so doing also creating more jobs’ (Department of 
Public Works 1994: 45). 
 
Despite resource limitations, the Department of Public Works and Land Affairs (DPWLA) 
as it was known during the mid 1980s recognised ‘job creation’ as an important bi-
product of its capital projects. In its 1986 Annual Report the Department commented on 
‘Measures for Job Creation’ when reporting on a provision of buildings, structures and 
equipment programme. Here it noted that in the Eastern Cape, where unemployment 
was identified as being especially serious, it had commissioned building projects that 
were estimated to have created 1828 years of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled work in 
building and related industries (Department of Public Works and Land Affairs 1987: 35). 
Bromberger et al (1987: 12) also documented a large-scale public works project taking 
place outside Pietermaritzburg in the province of Natal, although it was not made clear 
which government body was responsible for implementing the project or even if the 
Department of Public Works and Land Affairs was involved: 
 
The severity of unemployment among blacks has prompted the government to 
allocate funds towards projects aimed at creating employment. The recent 
canalization [sic] of the Baynes Spruit near Sobantu Village [near to 
Pietermaritzburg] was allocated R1 356 000 and was considered the largest 
unemployment relief project in the country some months ago.  
 
The Department’s limited efforts and those of other government agencies to create jobs 
and address unemployment through capital works projects were not going unnoticed by 
commentators at the time. Abedian, Schneier and Standish (1985: 37) for instance 
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mooted the possibility of a national public works programme funded through a separate 
budget vote, which had a precedent in public works programmes introduced in the 1920s 
to alleviate poverty amongst South Africa’s white population. 48 Abedian and Standish 
(1986) reiterated their call a year later, this time suggesting that a large scale public 
works programme could be used to alleviate poverty and unemployment amongst the 
African population. Directing a public works effort at this constituency was further 
supported by Reynolds (1984: 16; 26), who concluded that ‘[t]he position in South Africa 
would appear to be one of massive open unemployment in the countryside’, where ‘If the 
public works route is not followed, it is hard to see what else to do.’ 
 
Despite calls to roll out a more ambitious national public works programme to reduce 
unemployment and poverty amongst South Africa’s black and mainly African population, 
the political oppression of this community under apartheid policies was not otherwise lost 
on some commentators. They recognised for example that ‘[i]t is unlikely that the [black] 
people of this country will accept a PWP [public works programme] controlled by 
government and implemented through existing bureaucratic institutions’, where in lieu of 
identifying the precise form that such an implementing body should take, the authors 
confined themselves to suggesting that such a body should ideally be independent and 
at arms length from government, including in how it sourced its funding (Abedian, 
Standish 1986: 30-31).  
 
Interestingly, concerns about unemployment in the 1980s and how to address this did 
not go unnoticed by the South African government, which in 1985/1986 allocated R600 
million to support what it termed ‘special job creation programmes’, described as 
‘temporary and special measures to involve as many unemployed as possible and, as 
far as practicable must not compete with permanent avenues of employment.’ 
(Department of Manpower 1986: 139; see also Barker 1986) The most interesting 
feature of this initiative was its remarkably similar appearance to the Expanded Public 
Works Programme some twenty years later. This was evident in the following 
characteristics exhibited by the scheme (Department of Manpower 1986: 139-140; 
Department of Manpower 1987: 170-172, 176) 
 
                                                 
48Employment for poor and unskilled whites was generated in building railway infrastructure and 
staffing the civil service (Abedian, Schneier, Standish, 1985: 16, 19). 
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• The principle of labour-intensity was being advanced, or that involving the 
participation as many unemployed persons as possible (numbers of 
unemployed benefiting from the programme were tallied along with 
number of man-days worked; 
• Employment was to be temporary; 
• Resources allocated directly to government departments at the national, 
provincial and local levels, including those departments allocating funds 
for projects in independent and self-governing homeland territories, which 
housed South Africa’s black African population; 
• Overall co-ordination of projects and accountability rested with a single 
department, which in this case was responsible for Manpower; 
• A portion of the funding set aside for job creation was allocated to the 
training of unemployed persons and persons entering the informal and 
small business sectors. Training areas covered construction and a range 
of other fields, including industrial, manufacturing clerical/administrative, 
and artisanship activities;  
• Finally, the activities through which jobs were being created varied, 
including the building and maintaining of physical infrastructure; transport 
infrastructure (e.g., roads, dams); services infrastructure (e.g., water and 
power); environmental conservation; and agricultural projects 
 
Despite these similarities, the then Department of Public Works and Land Affairs was, 
curiously, a comparatively insignificant contributor to the special job creation 
programmes. Department of Manpower (1986: 142) figures showing the amount 
appropriated for ‘job creating measures’, which comprised over half the total allocation of 
funds, indicated that around one per cent of the funds were allocated to the DPWLA. 
This was compared to the 41 per cent distributed to the Department of Constitutional 
Development and Planning, to be spent via local authorities and boards on ‘self build 
housing and upgrading of black townships’. Figures for the 1986/1987-1988/89 period, 
which appears to have covered the full duration of the initiative, did not show any funds 
appropriated to the DPWLA (Department of Manpower 1989: 175). 
 
A broader perspective on the scheme’s budgeting further indicated that the emphasis 
was in fact aimed at departments which were more directly involved in the upkeep of 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
152 
South Africa’s racially segregated geo-political system. This contributed to the 
scepticism which commentators attached to how beneficiaries of a public works scheme 
would likely respond to initiatives controlled by the government, given the overarching 
political circumstances in the country. For instance, in addition to the more than 40 per 
cent of funds allocated via the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning 
for job creating projects to upgrade black townships, Departments responsible for 
Development Aid and Foreign Affairs also received substantial funding. These 
departments were responsible for providing development assistance to African self-
governing territories as well as maintaining diplomatic relations with independent 
homeland states. The Development Bank of Southern Africa (1987: 26) also received 
funding to support small business development in homeland states. 
 
The beginning of the end of apartheid just a few years after the special job creation 
programmes came into existence, followed by South Africa’s first non-racial elections 
and the voting in of an African National Congress-led government in 1994, would 
significantly alter the political and administrative environment in the country. These 
changes encompassed the dissolution of or policy shifts in departments responsible for 
engaging with soon-to-be defunct homeland territories, and the beginning of a 
considerable rationalisation and restructuring of provincial administrations and 
municipalities. In this context, responsibility for government-sponsored job creation 
schemes was transferred to the previously marginal Department of Public Works and 
Land Affairs. 
 
The policy transformation of the Department of Public Works (DPW), as it again became 
after 1994 with the creation of a separate Department of Land Affairs, was spelled out in 
the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (1994: 73). The White Paper 
proposed that the DPW needed to go beyond its historical role facilitating the provision 
of infrastructure assets for state institutions, by ‘simultaneously creating sustainable 
employment and building capacity of beneficiaries’, objectives that were recognised but 
not emphasised in its previous mandate. The publication of a Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution strategy in 1996 further mooted the possibility that government 
programmes could ‘add a further quarter of the new jobs, mainly through accelerated 
labour-based infrastructural development and maintenance of public works in urban and 
rural areas.’ (Department of Finance 1996: 19) Although this was not a historically 
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unexploited area in view of the apartheid period special job creation programmes, the 
DPW’s contribution to it was being substantially redefined. 
 
A 1997 White Paper on Public Works consolidated the change in emphasis being 
proposed in the RDP White Paper by commenting in section 2.1.4 that the Department 
was in a position to make direct contributions to overall government objectives ‘in large 
part by including socio-economic [which meant job creation] factors in cost-benefit 
analyses related to departmental operations for the first time’. 49 (Government Gazette 
1997) This included, inter alia, new production regimes that stressed labour-intensity for 
workers. The widening policy mandate being assumed by the DPW after 1994 also had 
a direct effect on the Department’s administrative structure. This could be traced to the 
deliberations of a National Economic Forum (NEF), predecessor to what would later 
become the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a statutory 
body consisting of representatives of government, labour, the private sector and civil 
society. The NEF proposed a framework for the implementation of a ‘national public 
works programme’, which included two notable components. The first was premised on 
a systematic re-orientation of public sector approaches to the provision of infrastructure, 
which would favour the utilisation of labour in order to increase the potential for job 
creation. The second called for a designated fund to support communities to undertake 
their own public works (NEF 1994: iii). Although these proposals were not radically 
different to the thrust of the apartheid government’s special job creation activities in the 
mid 1980s, they would be given a substantially different administrative identity, wherein 
the RDP White Paper not only accepted the NEF proposal but specified in Chapter 9 
that a ‘National public works programme’ (NPWP) should be incorporated as a 
Directorate in the DPW. 
 
Developments in the DPW after 1994 confirmed that the Department had taken up the 
recommendations flowing out of the NEF and RDP White Paper. The Department’s 1995 
Annual Report (1996a: 5) reported that the establishment and staffing of an NPWP 
branch had been approved by the Public Service Commission and that all posts, from 
Deputy Director-General (DDG) down, had been advertised during July 1995. Two years 
later, the Department reported that a DDG had been installed to oversee the NPWP, 
                                                 
49This clause first appeared in the 1996 Public Works Green Paper, which preceded publication 
of the White Paper 
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which was taking forward a new policy mandate designed to increase job creation 
through greater labour absorption in public sector infrastructure spending. This included 
a ‘Technical Development and Reorientation’ (TDR) programme, which according to the 
Department’s 1995 Annual Report (1996a: 3-4), was intended to experiment and 
promote more labour-intensive techniques in the construction activities of relevant 
government departments. The Green Paper on Public Works (1996b) also made 
reference to specialised sector infrastructure being implemented by government 
departments other than the DPW, whose mandates included housing, roads and 
transport, water and electricity, and telecommunications. The Department subsequently 
reported that under the TDR Programme it was overseeing the implementation of 12 
pilot projects to test labour-intensive construction methods. This included the drafting of 
operational guidelines for incorporating labour-intensive principles in the delivery of 
infrastructure projects (October 1996), and the production of similar guidelines for 
incorporating vocational training in infrastructure projects (DPW 1997: 8). 
 
In administrative terms the addition of another branch within the Department, and 
overseen at Deputy Director-General level, was a relatively significant occurrence for 
which policy sanction had effectively been granted by the RDP White Paper. Another 
new initiative that had its roots in the NEF process and the RDP White Paper was the 
creation of a Community-based Public Works Programme (CBPWP), to be housed 
under the NPWP. The CBPWP essentially tried to test the principle of labour-intensive 
infrastructure development at a community level, with the aim of maximising the use of 
localised labour to create, rehabilitate and maintain physical assets in communities, 
whilst beneficiating community members with work and training opportunities (DPW 
1998b: 1; DPW 1997: 9-10). 
 
By 1997, only three years into the DPW’s new mandate, the seeds of a second major 
policy shift were beginning to appear. Section 3.2 of the Public Works White Paper 
observed for example that uncertainty about the duration of the NPWP as a strategy 
translated into uncertainty about its funding, leading to year-on-year planning which was 
deemed inadequate and expensive. It added that the link between the long-term and 
short-term strategies of the NPWP had not been fully explored, developed and exploited, 
which essentially referred to the pace at which people being trained under the CBPWP 
were subsequently able to enter the formal labour market in the construction industry. 
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Moreover, the White Paper also remarked on the limited extent to which the NPWP was 
able to demonstrate a concrete contribution to government-sponsored job creation, and 
to correspondingly exploit the potential for more labour-intensive infrastructure provision. 
Sean Phillips (2004: 3-4), then Chief Operations Officer at the DPW, also reflected 
critically on the contribution of the NPWP. Phillips wrote that the programme failed to 
realise the goal of reorienting public sector expenditure on infrastructure towards labour-
intensive techniques as a result of a number of extraneous factors, including ‘a context 
of major political restructuring, multiple demands on a new government, and an 
uncertain legal framework for labour intensive construction’ He was specifically alluding 
to the absence of an underlying legal framework to regulate working conditions under 
labour-intensive schemes, where such a framework was subsequently developed (see 
chapter 8). A similar kind of framework was not clearly observable in the description of 
the ‘special job creation programmes’ initiative, which included remunerating 
beneficiaries in the form of a ‘contribution’ or ‘allowance’, part of which was allocated in 
the form of food and transport costs (See Department of Manpower 1987: 171; Barker 
1986: 171) 
 
Although the White Paper did not explicitly propose that the NPWP be replaced by a 
new instrument that could presumably obviate such challenges, the structure of the 
NPWP as a seemingly looser programmatic collection of initiatives designed to 
experiment with greater labour intensive methods in public sector infrastructure provision 
may have limited its ability to effectively corral and focus these various interventions 
towards a more common set of outcomes. Section 3.3 of the White Paper further 
suggested that policy and ‘practical orientation’ on public works programmes, again 
taking aim at the NPWP, needed to be better co-ordinated. Reference to co-ordination 
and practical orientation reflected how the DPW defined its own role in the NPWP, 
where in section 1.2.3 of the Green Paper on Public Works (1996b), the department 
commented that ‘[a]lthough the PWD [public works department] has been given 
responsibility for implementing the NPWP, it is a programme of the entire government. 50 
The role of the NPWP is primarily co-ordinating, monitoring and evaluating.’ Moreover, 
the NPWP was reported to have engaged in bilateral discussions with various other 
                                                 
50This described an arrangement where other infrastructure delivery departments in the 
government were encouraged to employ greater labour-intensive methods of implementation, 
where the DPW, under the ‘Reorientation’ initiative, was tasked with researching techniques and 
methods, and providing assistance to departments. 
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government departments involved in the delivery of sector-specific infrastructure. 51 
Some of these would later become participants in the EPWP: the Departments of 
Agriculture and Water Affairs and Forestry (Environment and Culture sector), and the 
Department of Constitutional Development, now the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government (Infrastructure sector). 
 
Recognising a need to improve the co-ordination of labour-intensive infrastructure 
delivery across government also began to take on a greater socio-economic character, 
which had the additional effect of extending the notion of public works beyond the 
delivery of physical infrastructure. Phillips (2004: 6) recalled for instance that the policy 
momentum behind an ‘expanded’ public works programme could be traced to the 51st 
National Conference of the governing African National Congress (ANC) in 2002, which 
resolved that there should be a large-scale expansion of the use of labour-intensive 
construction methods to ‘alleviate unemployment and to address the backlogs of 
infrastructure in previously disadvantaged areas’. The ANC further argued, under the 
heading: ‘infrastructure development’, that: 
The apartheid era left a legacy of social and economic infrastructure that is 
unintegrated, environmentally unsustainable, of poor quality and unequally 
distributed. The interests of white communities, business and security 
considerations influenced infrastructure programmes. There was little or no 
reference to the needs of the poor and rural areas. 
The Party added that: 
 
The Expanded Public Works Programme must be a major priority and be 
designed to make a significant contribution to reducing unemployment and 
providing livelihoods for the poor, women, youth and people with disabilities … it 
should adopt a differentiated approach to social and economic infrastructure that 
ensures the design of social infrastructure, including all urban and rural social 
facilities, infrastructure for basic household services, amenities in residential 
areas focusing on: 
• Creation of jobs through labour intensive construction and maintenance  
• Creating sustainable assets for the poor  
• Creating income generating opportunities for communities, and  
• Providing opportunities for skills development and training  
                                                 
51This included the Departments of Transport; Water Affairs and Forestry; Agriculture; Housing; 
and Constitutional Development (now Department of Provincial and Local Government). See 
DPW (1996a: 4; 1997: 8; 1999: 13). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
157 
Source: Resolutions adopted by the 51st National Conference of the African National 
Congress, Stellenbosch, 2002 
 
A greater social and economic orientation had in fact appeared under the NPWP as 
early as 1997, when the CBPWP was allocated a sum of R85 million to implement a ‘fast 
track poverty alleviation’ programme aimed at especially poor provinces (DPW 1998a: 
10).  The projects being supported were however similar to those found in the earlier 
special job creation programmes, including physical infrastructure (e.g., community halls 
and sport and recreation facilities); transport infrastructure (e.g., access roads and 
village bridges for access); and agricultural infrastructure (e.g., livestock dipping and 
handling facilities, micro-irrigation schemes) (DPW 1999: 9). Moreover by 2001 it was 
being reported that the CBPWP was implementing projects cutting across a range of 
sectors beyond physical infrastructure. 52 
 
The adoption of a more poverty-oriented focus by the CBPWP was also accompanied by 
a concern for the ability of these activities to generate longer-term social and economic 
benefits to beneficiaries. This was evident in a Parliamentary Media Briefing (South 
Africa Government Online 2000) by Public Works Minister Stella Sigcau as early as 
February 2000, where the Minister reported the following: 
 
We have now placed a stronger focus on sustainability of jobs and development, 
community facilitation and the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure to serve 
larger pockets of communities … Our immediate implementation and delivery will 
focus on: balancing temporary poverty alleviation efforts with long term 
sustainability of rural economies, infrastructure creation and service provision 
 
The Minister was essentially arguing that the link between short-term strategies and 
longer-term outcomes associated with government works initiatives, which it was 
claimed the NPWP had not effectively bridged, also depended on instruments that could 
effectively contribute to the longer-term sustainability of rural economies. A more 
pronounced emphasis on the poverty-alleviating outcomes of CBPWP activities was, in 
an effort to facilitate sustainability, expected to be linked more ‘directly to Local 
                                                 
52See DPW 2001: 27. Projects included improving road access and facilitating community 
markets; providing employment in small-scale agriculture, e.g., food lots; small-scale irrigation; 
the operation of crèches to facilitate childcare of working parents; and projects on waste 
collection and recycling. 
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Economic Development and Integrated Development Planning initiatives’53, which 
constituted existing medium to longer-term planning instruments employed by local 
governments in South Africa (Department of Public Works 1999: 8). 
 
Interestingly, in her briefing to Parliament and in what could be viewed as a reflection of 
the co-ordination challenges that were earlier associated with the NPWP, the Minister 
also remarked that the true impact of the CBPWP on rural development would only be 
secured through an ‘integrated’ strategy working with other national departments, 
provincial and local governments (South Africa Government Online 2000). The challenge 
of facilitating sustainable longer-term socio-economic benefits from labour-intensive 
works initiatives effectively brought together a call to integrate these activities more 
closely with existing spatial planning mechanisms, as well as an appeal to state 
institutions carrying out relevant physical, social and economic infrastructure activities to 
co-ordinate their efforts more effectively. The stage was then complete for the 
introduction of an Expanded Public Works Programme, which three years later was 
described by the DPW (2003: 34) as building on the experience of the CBPWP by being 
charged with ‘facilitate[ing] and create[ing] employment opportunities for the poor, 
vulnerable and alienated groups through an integrated and coordinated labour-based 
approach to government infrastructure delivery and service provision’ (DPW 2003: 34). 
 
7.2 Conclusion 
 
This historical background to the introduction of the EPWP was intended to present a 
limited but pertinent set of facts about the evolution of government-sponsored labour-
intensive measures designed to create employment opportunities in South Africa. 
Chapter 8 will engage in a more extensive discussion and analysis of the findings from 
interviews together with a reading of secondary materials, which together will be used to 
identify factors found to have influenced the capacity of EPWP implementing 
organisations to carry out the programme.
                                                 
53Local Economic Development (LED) as a strategic instrument was introduced in the 1998 White 
Paper on Local Government. Integrated Development Plans (IDP) was stipulated in the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000). See Government Gazette 2000. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME: CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will present an analysis of the findings from interviews conducted mainly 
with a cross-section of government officials directly charged with implementing the 
EPWP. These included officials in the department mandated to co-ordinate and monitor 
the programme’s implementation: the national Department of Public Works (DPW), and 
officials from various national departments contributing to each of the programme’s four 
sectors. In total, twenty-one qualitative interviews were conducted for the EPWP case 
study. Findings from the interviews were analysed together with a range of secondary 
documents sourced on the programme, which covered official programme and 
government reports, speeches, presentations, and statistical data. These primary and 
secondary sources were analysed together in order to locate and explain factors found 
to have influenced the capacity of implementing organisations to carry out the EPWP. 
This analysis will be structured according to the three variables of ‘strategy’, 
‘environment’, and ‘structure’, as adapted from Paul’s work on the functioning of 
development programmes, and will be assessed against the assumptions contained in 
Paul’s description of these variables as outlined in chapter 3. 
 
8.2 The ‘strategy’ variable 
 
A development programme’s strategy as adapted from Paul’s framework encompasses 
the following three elements: the objectives specified by the government for the 
programme, how these objectives are translated into operating goals and action plans, 
and the circumstances under which resources are allocated to a programme. As with 
CASP, the analysis and discussion of factors influencing the capacity of EPWP 
implementing organizations, associated with the strategic make-up of the programme, 
will be presented in accordance with each of the three sub-variable elements described 
above. This will begin with the objectives specified by the South African government. 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
160 
8.2.1 Factors associated with EPWP programme objectives 
 
 
The substance of the objectives specified by a government for a development 
programme could constitute a factor(s) affecting the capacity of its implementing bodies 
to carry it out. This may yield direct and possibly adverse effects, according to Paul, 
depending on a number of conditions: the congruence between political objectives and 
how these are translated into on-the-ground implementation goals and plans; and the 
level of specificity attached to a programme’s objectives, which may affect the flexibility 
with which implementing organisations are able to determine the best operational means 
of achieving these (Paul 1983: 58). Depending on the makeup of these conditions, the 
objectives of a development programme could highlight factors that are influential to 
understanding the capacity of its implementing bodies to act. 
 
As noted earlier, the idea of an ‘expanded’ public works initiative was first introduced by 
the governing African National Congress party in 2002. The policy impetus behind this 
initiative was elaborated a year later by two landmark events. The first was the 
convening of a Growth and Development Summit by the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) (Department of Labour 2003). Section two 
of the final Summit agreement made specific mention of ‘expanded public works 
programmes’, which specifically referred to initiatives that could be introduced by any of 
NEDLAC’s constituent groups (government, labour, private sector and civil society). Of 
particular interest was how closely the notion of expanded public works programmes 
resembled the circumstances under which the apartheid government introduced its 
special job creation programmes initiative, where the idea was to provide ‘poverty and 
income relief through temporary work for the unemployed’ (ibid) Moreover, the range of 
activities that could be introduced via such programmes covered physical as well as 
other types of infrastructure, including the maintenance of various public buildings; 
transport infrastructure (fencing of national roads, access roads in rural areas); 
environmental conservation (tree planting, erosion control and land rehabilitation); and 
agricultural activities (community gardens, dipping and irrigation schemes). 
 
The second event gave official policy sanction to a government-sponsored ‘expanded 
public works programme’, which South African President Thabo Mbeki announced in a 
State of the Nation address (South Africa Government Online 2003). The President’s 
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remarks on the government’s new public works initiative stressed the notion of ‘social 
and economic infrastructure investment’, which had earlier motivated the CBPWP’s 
adoption of a more poverty-oriented stance. The President’s announcement would, as 
with the creation of the NPWP ten years earlier, have a direct effect on the functions of 
the DPW (2005a: 29), as it was to be given the task of ‘co-ordinating’ the implementation 
of the programme. Final policy endorsement of the EPWP was granted by Cabinet in 
November of 2003 (DPW 200?: 2). 
 
Launching the EPWP in a rural village in the province of Limpopo54, South African 
President Thabo Mbeki stated that its aim would be to draw significant numbers of low-
skilled unemployed into productive employment, and to provide these individuals with 
opportunities to undergo skills development whilst employed. The expectation was that 
workers would ‘increase their capacity to continue working elsewhere’ upon leaving the 
programme, given that it would only provide temporary employment. The President 
added that the EPWP would pursue its aim by promoting labour-intensive, in other words 
labour absorbing, employment methods (The Presidency 2004). 
 
In relation to the EPWP’s two-pronged objective, that is 1) to create temporary work 
opportunities for the unemployed; 2) and to include training as part of this package, the 
government went a step further by stating that the programme would be expected to 
create work opportunities for at least one million people over an initial five-year period 
(2004-2009), via the contributions of various participating government departments 
clustered under four sectors (DPW Not dated b: 1-2). Similar features were also evident 
in the apartheid government’s special job creation programmes nearly twenty years 
earlier, although this initiative did not appear to have organised departmental 
contributions according to sectoral groupings. 
 
Each of the EPWP’s sectoral groupings, and the departments which comprised these, 
would be expected to decide how each would contribute to the programme’s overall 
target for work and training opportunities. These were to be spelled out in individual 
                                                 
54The DPW’s 2004/2005 Annual Report stated that the Programme officially commenced on the 
1st of April, 2004, and would be launched in all provinces during the course of that financial year 
(Department of Public Works 2005a: 29). 
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sector plans. A summary of the sectors, their constituent departments, and their 
employment and training targets is presented in tables 8.1-8.3  
 
Table 8.1: EPWP sectors and participating departments 
 
EPWP Sector Participating departments 
1. Infrastructure • National Department of Public Works (also overall co-ordinator of EPWP) 
• National Department of Transport 
• National Department of Housing 
• National Department of Provincial and Local Government 
• Provincial departments 
• Local government (municipalities) via their capital budgets 
• State-owned enterprises (public entities) 
2. Economic 
 
• National Department of Trade and Industry 
• Provincial departments 
3. Social 
 
• National Department of Social Development 
• National Department of Health 
• National Department of Education 
• Provincial departments in these sectors 
4. Environment and 
culture 
 
• National Department of Agriculture 
• National Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
• National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
• Department of Arts and Culture 
• Provincial departments in some of these sectors 
  
Cross-cutting 
sectors  
 
• National Department of Labour  
• Sector Education Training Authorities (SETA), statutory bodies involved in 
organising industry-specific training and apprenticeships 
 
Source: EPWP. Not dated c. Roles and responsibilities of institutions involved in the 
EPWP. Available from: http://www.epwp.gov.za/downloads/downloads.htm (Accessed 9 
November 2006). Participating departments also mentioned in individual sector plans, 
see reference list.  
 
 
Table 8.2: EPWP employment targets by sector (2004/5-2008/9) 
 
Sector Work opportunities Person-years of 
work 
Infrastructure 750 000 (4-month average duration) 250 000 
Environmental 200 000 (1-year average duration) 200 000 
Social 150 000 (12-18 month average 
duration) 
200 000+ 
Economic 12 000 (18-month average duration)  18 000 
TOTAL 1 million plus 650 000 plus 
 
Source: Department of Public Works 2004b: 17 
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Table 8.3: EPWP training targets per sector (2004/5-2008/9) 
 
Sector Training days Learnerships/ 
Skills 
programmes 
Infrastructure 55 9 million days (average of 12 days per 
participant) 
- 
Environmental 2 million days (average of 10 days per 
participant) 
5 000 
Social 4.5 million days (average of 30 days 
per participant) 
35 000 
Economic 36 000 (average of 12 days per 
participant) 
3 000 
TOTAL 15.5 million plus 43 000 
 
Source: ibid  
 
The EPWP was therefore at its core a highly multi-sectoral programme, where it has 
also been said that the initiative, ‘[a]s an overall government programme … is highly 
decentralised’ (DPW 2004c: 1). Key to the programme’s capacity to respond to its 
objectives was the efforts of government departments, grouped under four sectors, to 
realise the job creation and training potential of their existing functional activities. In the 
Infrastructure sector for instance, the idea was to promote labour-intensive means of 
implementing capital works projects being financed through conditional infrastructure 
grants that were allocated to provincial and municipal governments. In the Environment 
and Culture sector additional job creation would be expected to be generated from 
existing activities being carried out by departments receiving support from a special 
poverty relief allocation. In the Social sector, programmes in Early Childhood 
Development and Home/Community-Based Care were chosen for their potential to 
increase work opportunities and training in particular. Finally, the situation was slightly 
different in the Economic sector where a new activity, in the form of a ‘Venture 
Learnership’ programme, was to be created and tasked with providing entrepreneurial 
and management training along with on-the-job experience to beneficiaries (DPW 
2005e). 
 
                                                 
55The Infrastructure sector was set the additional objective of providing more specialised training 
to 15 000 emerging private sector contractors in the management of labour-intensive contracts. 
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The EPWP generally retained the activity area foci of previous public works/job creation 
efforts, going as far back as the special job creation programmes in the mid 1980s, by 
incorporating physical infrastructure activities (building and transport); environmental-
related activities (conservation, agriculture, water affairs); economic activities (small 
business development); and social activities (childcare). The Department of Labour, 
post-apartheid successor to the Department of Manpower, was also expected to assist 
sector departments with the provision of training under the Programme. The 
incorporation of a social sector was however a relative newcomer to government-
sponsored job creation efforts, having begun under the CBPWP. The inclusion of a 
social sector was otherwise prominent in President Mbeki’s contextualisation of poverty 
in South Africa, including the contribution that government’s spending in social services, 
which at the time comprised 58 per cent (see National Treasury 2003b: 16) of total 
government expenditure, was expected to make to job creation via the EPWP (South 
Africa Government Online 2003): 
 
It is in these areas [where concentrated poverty was observed] that we find the 
largest concentration of the marginalised sections of our population, which 
require dedicated interventions to extricate them from conditions of 
underdevelopment and entrenched poverty. This dictates that we focus on them 
with regard to our social spending as well as social and economic infrastructure 
investment. 
 
Perhaps the most notable feature of the EPWP’s objective design was the DPW being 
designated as the programme’s overall co-ordinator, which, reflecting on the background 
presented in chapter 7, app ared to have arisen as a direct result of the administrative 
restructuring that accompanied South Africa’s political transition. This saw a shifting of 
responsibility for government-sponsored special job creation schemes to the 
Department. It should also be remembered that a considerable portion of the activities 
implemented under the apartheid government’s special job creation programmes 
initiative, despite being overseen by the Department of Manpower and being largely 
channelled to departments servicing racially segregated areas and needs, were of an 
infrastructural nature, which generally aligned with the functional activities of the DPW. 
 
Findings from interviews revealed a curious cross-section of concerns being expressed 
by diverse sectoral departments, which conveyed a general reluctance and some 
uncertainty in adapting their erstwhile functional activities to the ‘labour-maximising’ and 
related ‘job creation’ objectives being introduced by the EPWP. The distinction between 
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these two features of the programme is noteworthy, where job creation referred to its 
primary objective output, whilst labour-maximisation/intensity defined the means through 
this was supposed to be achieved. It will be remembered from chapter 7 that the EPWP 
was expected to make a more concrete contribution to job creation than was able to be 
achieved by the NPWP, where the NPWP’s focus lay more in experimenting with labour-
intensive/maximising methods of delivering public infrastructure. The objective 
significance of the EPWP was that it was expected to respond to both the means and 
ends of labour-intensity and job creation. 
 
Turning to the objective concerns expressed by a wide cross-section of participating 
departments, it is acknowledged that commentary was elicited from a number of DPW 
officials, officials from participating sector departments, and stakeholders from outside 
the government who were otherwise directly involved in the programme’s 
implementation. One DPW official offered the following observation in relation to the 
Infrastructure sector: 
 
But the point I want to make here with regard to reporting would be, do national 
departments in the Infrastructure sector, provincial departments in the 
Infrastructure sector, and municipalities where they deliver on MIG56 projects, do 
they actually have the full grasp around that, to know that yes I can clearly up 
front state that at the beginning of my financial year these will be my labour 
intensive projects I will be undertaking … And so I think a lot of the under-
reporting could have a lot to do with an understanding of what needs to be done 
 
The respondent also remarked that they believed a lot of under-reporting could be 
attributed to whether implementing bodies clearly understood the difference between a 
labour-intensive or employment intensive project, and a ‘machine-based project’, adding 
that the creation of frameworks to support implementation of the EPWP in the 
Infrastructure sector did not necessarily facilitate understanding. They specifically 
remarked that ‘[i] think the fact that they have put out documents … frameworks, 
logframe … but the fact that it’s there, doesn’t mean that it is actually clearly 
understood’. 
 
Another DPW official conveyed similar sentiments: 
                                                 
56MIG stands for Municipal Infrastructure Grant, which municipalities receive from the national 
fiscus to spend on local infrastructure. 
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Well I think the biggest one is institutional … we have a mandate to deliver a 
million jobs … what makes up that million we assume that provinces would take 
their share, and municipalities would take their share … and then, you have the 
dilemma in provinces where people say alright now what do we do, do we do 
things the way we’ve been doing it all along, or do we shift, do we focus on 
EPWP, is EPWP different from what we’ve been doing, so there’s this continuous 
role clarity that you’re trying to clarify 
 
There were other concerns about how clearly municipalities in particular were adapting 
their implementation activities to suit the new expectations (labour intensive-job creating) 
introduced by the EPWP, where a Parliamentary observer of the programme recalled 
that ‘when we went around, what did we then discover, we discovered that in each and 
every local municipality very few had an understanding of what the Expanded Public 
Works Programme is all about, save to come up and then say, but you have your MIG, 
right, but what are you doing with it?’ Finally, another interviewee corroborated 
difficulties with the programme’s objective penetration at the municipal level, by querying 
what exactly it was seeking to ‘expand’ (budgets, outputs?), adding that ‘[i]n my view this 
policy is not fully understood at the municipal level’. 
 
Other findings revealed that infrastructure-delivery departments, especially at a 
municipal level, were not, necessarily, only unclear about the labour-maximising 
emphasis of the EPWP, but also seemed to be demonstrating some reluctance to adapt 
existing operational approaches for ideological and circumstantial reasons. More than 
one interviewee for example noted that there was some resistance to moving from 
mechanised (namely the use of physical equipment) modes of creating infrastructure 
such as roads, to employing more labour-intensive methods. One particular interviewee 
observed that some resistance was encountered from the ‘engineering fraternity’ who 
were ‘probably the most reluctant to go labour based approaches’. This was partly 
attributed to an observation that engineers had insufficient formal training in delivering 
infrastructure through labour-intensive means, as well as an opinion held amongst some 
that this ‘compromised quality’. Another interviewee noted that some municipalities were 
themselves reluctant to adopt greater labour-intensive means of creating infrastructure, 
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where this risked slowing down the delivery of infrastructure in situations where these 
bodies were being pressured to attend to service ‘backlogs’57: 
 
Then of course you have implementing departments, whether it’s water or 
electricity, whatever within these municipalities that in themselves are reluctant 
… to change their design to accommodate labour-intensive means, and the 
principle reason for this is that they are faced with huge service delivery 
challenges and backlogs, and to superimpose the EPWP on the challenges that 
they face they just … a challenge to take on, and as a result reluctance, given 
from them to do it 
 
 
Finally, another observer alluded to potential problems with municipalities being able and 
willing to absorb additional demands being introduced by the EPWP, where the 
interviewee recalled that there were about seven programmes that municipalities were 
expected to respond to, ‘which in their view might or might not constitute their key 
objective which is the disbursement of money and the recovery of money through their 
billing system, that’s their key objective’. Although the interviewee did not specify what 
these other programming priorities were, he directed the researcher’s attention to a 
document which reported that ‘[i]t is clear that municipalities are hard-pressed to 
respond to the number and complexity of support programmes, which have to be 
aligned, integrated and coordinated. This requires “buy-in” by municipalities’ The 
initiatives in question included the EPWP; various IDPs (Integrated Development Plans, 
which are a national legislative requirement for municipalities in South Africa); Urban 
Renewal Programmes and the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme; 
the National Spatial Development Perspective (planning instrument); local economic 
development initiatives, which is also a national policy priority, Municipal Infrastructure 
Grant and equitable share expenditure (DBSA 2006: 16). 
 
In addition to the interview data, inadequate incorporation of guidelines promoting 
labour-intensive methods by Infrastructure sector departments was also being cited in 
EPWP progress reports. The following passage is from a DPW (2006) report dated two 
years after the programme began its implementation: 
 
                                                 
57A Department of Provincial and Local Government (2006: 6) workshop on Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant performance similarly recorded that: ‘There is a perception with municipalities 
that EPWP projects delays spending of funds and is more expensive.’ 
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In order to ensure that provinces and municipalities contribute to the EPWP, the 
PIG and MIG58 have specific EPWP conditions attached to them.  These 
conditions require that the implementing agents using these grants implement 
their projects in accordance with the EPWP tender and design guidelines. 59  
Although the Department does not have numerical data on the extent to which 
public bodies have adopted the EPWP tender and design guidelines for their 
tender documentation, the general impression of the EPWP unit is that many 
government bodies have not yet adopted them, and have not yet changed their 
tender documentation to specify the use of labour-intensive methods. 
 
Problems encountered with incorporating the EPWP’s objective emphasis on ‘labour-
intensive’ job creation into the functional mandates of its participating departments were 
also experienced in the programme’s Social sector. This sector was held to a 
considerably smaller job creation target and, unlike the Infrastructure sector, had little 
prior history contributing to labour-intensive job creating activities. Having said this, 
departments in this sector appeared to be facing a more basic difficulty adapting existing 
functional activities to the programme’s job creation imperative. One official in a Social 
sector department remarked that: 
 
The EPWP is, has really been used as a vehicle within the social sector, primarily 
to drive up service delivery, and so, the way that we’ve described our contribution 
to the EPWP is that the primary objective is to increase access to services, and 
it’s within that increase to access to services that we’re saying let us look at job 
opportunities, you know so the secondary component is job opportunities 
 
The interviewee’s comments firstly drew a distinction between what they held as the 
Social sector’s primary objective, which was to increase access to social services, and a 
secondary objective of job creation, a relationship which they later described as an 
objective ‘tension’. This differed from the objective difficulties experienced by 
Infrastructure sector departments, which concerned adjusting to the labour-maximising 
means of contributing to the EPWP’s job creation objective, where it essentially 
distinguished between competing objectives: the erstwhile orientation of social sector 
departments on improving access to services in education, health and welfare, versus 
an emphasis on creating jobs in the process of delivering these services. The Social 
                                                 
58A more recent EPWP progress report (DPW 2007: 12) added that no ‘comprehensive report on 
the MIG [Municipal Infrastructure Grant] contribution to the EPWP is currently available as the 
MIG reports submitted through the MIG MIS [Management Information System] contain 
insufficient detail for reporting on the EPWP’ (DPW 2007: 12).  
59This refers to the following document: Guidelines for the implementation of labour-intensive 
infrastructure projects under the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). 
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sector’s plan for the EPWP interestingly recognised that activities in Early Childhood 
Development (ECD) and Home/Community Based Care (HCBC) were significantly 
under-developed in terms of their prior job creating performance, where ‘[m]uch of the 
work of these three Departments relies on the input of volunteers and civil society 
organisations and is suitable for the development of the EPWP.’ The Plan added that 
‘[w]hile there is recognition that a number of programmes present a range of 
opportunities for work creation, two have been selected [ECD and HCBC] as the lead 
pilot programmes for the Social sector EPWP for 2004/5.’ (DSD, DEd, DoH 2004: 8). 
 
A DPW official elsewhere confirmed the difficulties experienced by Social sector 
departments in trying to incorporate a job creation emphasis within their existing delivery 
of social services: 
 
Many people don’t see the bigger picture … especially in the social sector, they 
see their role in terms of poverty alleviation, but they haven’t really pictured that 
in terms of the economy, in terms of employment creation 
 
 
The same interviewee recounted what transpired when the DPW was invited to present 
an overview of the EPWP to a provincial department in the social sector: 
 
[M]ost of them were thinking EPWP is about building [physical infrastructure] 
hospitals and clinics … so, and these people are managers, officials report to 
them, so how do you expect EPWP to take off if managers are still having that 
kind of mindset … So it took time, now I want to be convinced that everybody 
understands the concept, and how they fit into it, but for us, for me I think the 
challenge was changing the mindset 
 
Although the observations of the DPW official generally aligned with that of an earlier-
referenced department official, exposing an initial objective tension in translating the 
sector’s emphasis on social service delivery to job creation, the experience of Social 
sector departments broadly intersected with that of Infrastructure sector departments. In 
this regard, the means-end philosophy being advanced by the EPWP, which focussed 
on increasing the potential for job creation, did not easily penetrate the existing activities 
of these organisations. This was remarkable given the different histories of Infrastructure 
and Social sector departments in special job creation/public works schemes. 
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Another example from a department in the EPWP’s Environment and Culture sector 
exposed a similar difficulty reported by departments in the Social sector, which entailed 
translating the EPWP’s objective emphasis on job creation and training into existing 
functional activities. At the heart of the concern expressed by one sector department 
interviewed was that the usual operating approach being employed by a programme 
through which this Department was contributing to the EPWP, conflicted with the latter’s 
job creation objective and training criteria: 
 
For EPWP it’s a requirement that projects should have a job element, should 
have a training element, while for [Department X] we are saying, it’s a mindset 
thing, it’s a mindset thing that people have to understand the contribution of the 
resource, natural resource, to them. They have to understand how much they 
can get out of the resource, for them … and if they understand, it’s then that jobs 
will be created. 
 
Due to the difficulties experienced by this Department, the interviewee noted that at the 
time less than 50 per cent of the projects contributed by the Department were reported 
as complying with EPWP requirements. A less sympathetic perspective on the lack of 
operational compliance by the department-in-question was given by an official of the 
DPW, who observed that ‘[n]ow three years into EPWP [Department X] has been giving 
us their … projects the way they were, but without really like making a conscious effort to 
design them and making sure that the  like comply’. The official added however that ‘the 
other challenge for me is the varied nature of the programmes that are implemented … 
they are so varied’; where it was additionally noted that no ‘uniform’ implementation 
guidelines were in place in the Environment and Culture sector. 
 
Concerns about adjusting existing functional activities to the objectives mandated to the 
EPWP were also expressed by officials in the programme’s Economic sector, which 
despite being handed a considerably smaller job creation and training target (tables 8.2-
8.3), this sector, similar to its Social counterpart, was essentially being tasked with 
implementing as yet untested job creating activities. One official in the DPW recounted 
that ‘[i] think that debate still continues’ concerning the inclusion of the Economic sector 
in the EPWP, where it was much easier to identify work opportunities over and above 
what was already being created in, e.g., the Infrastructure sector. The official further 
noted that: 
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The way the way I would describe it is that, obviously the way we approached 
this was that like I said there was a lot of debate initially about whether you need 
an economic sector … the approach we’ve taken is to be able to lead by 
example, okay, and then based on what happens to hopefully develop it as best 
practice and get it accepted. 
 
The interviewee continued by noting that the focus would be on aligning strategies in the 
Sector’s lead department60 with those developed by the DPW, i.e., in the Economic 
sector’s Plan, although they conceded that this ‘hasn’t been finalized’ by the lead 
Department. The interviewee also mentioned that the vehicle through which the sector 
would make its contribution to the EPWP (New Venture Learnership) had also not yet 
been ‘embedded’ in the sector’s lead department. 
 
References to factors emanating directly from the objective makeup of the EPWP were 
communicated by and involved departments in all four of the EPWP’s sector groupings, 
where these varied (Infrastructure versus Social sectors) in terms of their historical 
experience contributing to government job creation programmes. Of those interviewees 
that did offer relatively pointed comments about the application of the EPWP’s objective 
framework, it was evident that core features of the programme’s objective makeup: job 
creation through maximising the use of labour in sector service delivery, faced a visible 
degree of reluctance from contributing departments in all sectors to buy into. 
 
In the Infrastructure sector, there was a mixture of uncertainty and reluctance to adjust 
existing functional activities to these new demands due to circumstantial and ideological 
factors. This was despite a history of participation by relevant departments in special job 
creation/public works schemes, along with the specification of implementation guidelines 
explaining how ‘labour-intensive’ infrastructure provision was intended to be carried out 
(through tender and design guidelines). The situation was different in the Economic, 
Social and Environment and Culture sectors, where the former two sectors did not 
possess the kind of experience in mass job-creating activities as the Infrastructure sector 
did, where contributing departments appear to have sustained difficulties re-orienting 
existing and largely untested functional activities towards the more basic job creation 
imperative. Finally, a department in the Environment and Culture sector also indicated 
that the modus operandi employed by a programme through which it was contributing to 
                                                 
60
‘Lead’ department should be read in conjunction with table 8.1, where one department in each 
of the EPWP’s four sectors was designated as the lead or coordinating department for the sector. 
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the EPWP conflicted with the job creation expectations being demanded by the 
programme. 
 
From the perspective of Paul’s research, these findings suggest that departments in all 
of the EPWP’s contributing sectors exhibited some reluctance to adjust their existing 
functional activities to the labour intensive-job creation philosophy underpinning a key 
objective of the programme. This was due to circumstantial (adapting existing modalities 
of delivery, Economic sector); prevailing needs and commitments (Infrastructure sector); 
and in other cases ideological factors (Infrastructure, Social and Environment and 
Culture sectors) observed in participating sector departments. This appears to have 
most acutely affected the ability of the EPWP’s co-ordinating department, the DPW, to, 
as Paul (1982: 110) indicated, ‘have room to initiate and influence the formulation of 
strategy.’ Although, as Paul (ibid) argued, programme managers may be able to exploit 
such room if objectives are vaguely specified, and even when they are not (i.e., if 
measurable targets are given as in this case), where goal-means relationships are 
seldom specified, in the EPWP case the means through which sector departments were 
expected to contribute to the objective targets set by the programme were largely left to 
them to determine, via sector plans. This seems to speak directly to Paul’s (1982: 110) 
claim that ‘[t]he degree of freedom a program manager has in formulating strategy is 
influenced by the manner in which the government initiates his program.’ In this instance 
the manner in which the EPWP was arranged by the government saw sector 
departments retain the responsibility for determining how they would contribute to the 
Programme’s job creation objectives, through sector plans. 
 
This aspect of the programme’s design likely contributed to the DPW’s limited capacity 
to influence the objective compliance of participating departments, a difficulty it 
continued to refer to up to three years into the EPWP’s implementation by reporting that: 
 
There is an ongoing need for aggressive advocacy and communication to 
position the EPWP as a programme of the whole of government and to 
encourage the widespread use of more labour-intensive methods in the creation 
of infrastructure, through the use of the EPWP tender and design guidelines 
(DPW 2007b: 21). 
 
The next section will look at factors associated with the translation of the EPWP’s 
objectives into operating goals and plans. 
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8.2.2 Factors associated with the EPWP’s operating goals and planning 
 
The operational planning of a development programme refers to the translation of its 
objectives into operating goals and actions plans, where it is assumed that how these 
activities occur and the outcomes thereof may adversely affect the capacity of 
implementing organisations to carry out the programme. In the context of Paul’s 
framework, the policy objectives attached to a development programme are intimately 
entwined with the specification of its operating goals and plans. Following on from the 
previous discussion of the EPWP’s objectives, this section will need to enquire more 
directly into the conditions relating to the interpretation, selection and sequencing of 
EPWP activities by the programme’s various implementing bodies, and identify the 
implications for and effects on their capacity. This corresponds with Paul’s (1982: 110) 
suggestion that ‘some situations yield greater flexibility to the program manager [or in 
this case implementing organisation] to choose, interpret and sequence operating goals’. 
 
In the EPWP case, an extensive legislative and non-legislative framework of operating 
conditions and planning guidelines were created to operationalise its objectives. These 
are listed in table 8.4. 
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Table 8.4: Conditions and guidelines informing the EPWP’s operational planning 
Instrument Description of instrument 
Code of Good Practice for Employment and 
Conditions of Work for Special Public Works 
Programmes (Government Gazette 2002b) 
 
Statutory notice put out by the national Department of 
Labour in 2002, as part of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (1997). Makes reference to ‘Special 
Public Works Programmes’. Intended to be read in 
conjunction with Ministerial Determination. 
 
Provides good practice guidelines for the protection of 
workers on special public works programmes, including 
the selection and profile of beneficiaries (prioritisation 
of vulnerable groups such as women, youth and the 
disabled), duration of participation, and guidelines for 
contracting of workers.  
Ministerial Determination: Special Public Works 
Programmes (Government Gazette 2002a) 
 
Statutory notice put out by the national Department of 
Labour in 2002, as part of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (1997). Makes reference to ‘Special 
Public Works Programmes’. Stipulates conditions of 
employment for work on special public works 
programmes. 
EPWP-related job creation conditions attached to 
existing statutory grants provided to provincial and 
municipal governments in South Africa to support 
infrastructure delivery. This includes a document 
entitled: Roles and Responsibilities of 
Municipalities and PMUs in the Management, 
Administration and Implementation of the MIG 
(municipal infrastructure grant) Programme. 
 
Other existing grant mechanisms to which EPWP-
related job creation targets were attached 
included an HIV/AIDS grant to provincial 
governments, to support Home/Community-Based 
Care activities in the EPWP’s Social sector. 
Confirmed in 2005/2006 provincial government 
allocations as ‘Comprehensive HIV and AIDS 
grant’ (Government Gazette 2005b) 
These refer to adding conditions to existing statutory 
grant funding instruments distributed to provincial and 
local governments in South Africa for sector-specific 
spending, where receiving departments would be 
expected to expend the grants in accordance with the 
labour-intensive/job creation expectations and related 
guidelines of the EPWP. 
Guidelines for the Implementation of Labour-
Intensive Infrastructure Projects under the 
Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) 
Specifically relevant to the infrastructure sector, these 
guidelines aim to assist provincial and municipal 
governments to assess activities based on their 
suitability for employing labour-intensive methods. Also 
contains guidelines on contracting procedures. 
Framework for Monitoring and Evaluation of the 
Expanded Public Works Programme 
The framework provides methodologies for and criteria 
against which EPWP activities could be measured. 
Management Plan for Labour-Intensive Emerging 
Contractor Learnerships 
Guidelines on the management of labour-intensive 
contractor learnerships (training) 
Consolidated Programme Overview and Logical 
Framework 
Provides a comprehensive overview of operational 
information, which in particular includes a logical 
framework breakdown of the EPWP: goals, purpose, 
approach, outputs, assumptions and risks; funding; 
institutional arrangements 
The Coordinating role of the Department of Public 
Works in the Expanded Public Works Programme 
Document detailing what the overall ‘co-ordinating’ role 
of the DPW on the EPWP consists of. 
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It was evident from the content of the instruments listed in table 8.4 that a substantive 
effort was made to overcome previous weaknesses in the post-apartheid implementation 
of large-scale public works programmes, bearing in mind Phillips’ earlier reference to an 
‘uncertain legal framework for labour intensive construction’. This was addressed with 
the publication in 2002 of a Code of Good Practice and a Ministerial Determination 
governing the implementation of ‘special public works programmes’. It was also evident 
that an effort was made to address ‘co-ordination’ and ‘integration’ deficiencies which 
had restrained the full potential of previous labour-intensive public works activities (see 
chapter 7). This could be seen in the publication of an implementation framework and 
guidelines, a monitoring and evaluation framework, and a document specifying the 
DPW’s co-ordinating role on the EPWP. 
 
Other documentation reviewed by the researcher revealed a further layer of operational 
planning, where each of the four sectors that comprised the EPWP along with their 
participating departments (see table 8.1) were expected to draft sector-specific plans on 
how each would contribute to the objectives of the programme. These plans were 
specifically intended to outline how sector departments would generate work and training 
opportunities in accordance with the objectives of the EPWP. This included specifying 
the individual programmes and activities through which departments would seek to 
create jobs and training opportunities, as well as outlining the organisational 
arrangements (roles and responsibilities of each sectoral department) through which 
each sector’s contribution to the EPWP would be made. At the time of writing an 
individual plan was in place for each sector (economic, social, infrastructure, 
environment and culture). 
 
Interview findings at an operational level, and analysed according to Paul’s framework, 
interestingly revealed a further layer of capacity constraints that were not evident when 
the programme’s labour intensive/job creation objective imperative was examined 
earlier. It was found that some implementing departments (particularly in the 
Environment and Culture sector) experienced capacity constraints in the process of 
translating the EPWP’s objectives into operating goals, where the conditions and 
guidelines (see table 8.4) specified for the programme did not create the kind flexibility 
that enabled some departments to interpret and sequence operating goals. Even more 
interesting was the more widely experienced (across departments in more than one 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
176 
sector) operational constraints experienced by implementing departments in responding 
to the conditions attached to the EPWP’s training objective. 
 
In the Environment and Culture sector, one department expressed frustration at 
restrictions associated with having to adapt its existing functional activities to EPWP 
operational criteria being applied by the DPW. The department described their 
experience thusly: 
 
[T]he biggest constraint that this programme [EPWP] has is that this programme 
is viewed as an infrastructure programme and the fundamental reason why it’s 
viewed as an infrastructure programme is twofold, the one is that it’s being 
managed or being co-ordinated by a public works department, which most 
function [sic] is government infrastructure; and the other reason is that because 
your EPWP co-ordinating unit is a public works department, your methodology, 
your systems, your way of thinking is all infrastructure-related. So the definition of 
a job opportunity would be a job opportunity based on an infrastructure project. 
Definition of labour-intensity would be based on a labour-intensity project … Now 
because infrastructure projects are that much shorter in terms of duration, they 
believe it can happen that way and they therefore impose that on everybody else 
and if we do not comply to those sets of rules you are not EPWP compliant. 
 
 
The constraint being referred to by this interviewee stemmed from having to narrowly 
adjust and adhere to a set of operating rules for creating jobs to the exclusion of 
operating procedures that their Department had already been engaging in. The 
interviewee added greater weight to this point by suggesting that ‘If you look at all of the 
sectors…and you then get define [sic] parameters for the whole of the EPWP by taking 
cognisance of the varying projects within the EPWP and not just the infrastructure 
sector, you will then be able to come to a situation where you have more EPWP 
compliant jobs and you can actually show more jobs’ They further mentioned that ‘[t]he 
EPWP does not necessarily have an implementation framework or mechanisms that tells 
departments how to implement…But I do not think that sufficient work is being done by 
the EPWP unit to support departments in EPWP implementation.’ 
 
Reflecting on the interviewee’s comment about the apparent absence of an 
implementation framework, it must be worth noting that this thesis was only able to 
locate a set of implementation guidelines for Infrastructure sector projects under the 
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EPWP61, where guidelines oriented to the functional circumstances of other sectors were 
not visible amongst the programme’s documentation. It could be reasoned then that the 
visible lack of a comprehensive set of guidelines covering more than just the 
Infrastructure sector, to inform the operationalisation of the EPWP’s objectives, would 
have contributed directly to a situation where an Environment and Culture sector 
department was citing constraints in how the programme’s operating rules were being 
applied to its contributing activities. Conversely, it would also appear logical that the non-
existence of guidelines to, for instance, facilitate the implementation of Environment and 
Culture sector contributions to the EPWP, created a situation where existing guidelines, 
that is, for the infrastructure sector, were being applied essentially as a default 
operational framework. 
 
Another example which this time exhibited a paradoxical feature of how EPWP operating 
rules were specified, also involved an Environment and Culture sector department which 
earlier reported being constrained by rules governing job creation. This time the 
department expressed difficulties associated with having to adhere to the working 
condition requirements applied by the EPWP. The department in question reported that 
the lack of specificity attached to the setting of wage rates under the Code of Good 
Practice, which governed the employment of beneficiaries on special public works 
programmes, had resulted in adverse implementation consequences for implementing 
departments: 
 
[Y]ou have three implementing bodies implementing in one jurisdiction, right. 
What the Code of Good practice says is that you need to refer to the minimum 
wage in terms of the Department of Labour or the municipality within that 
jurisdiction … you are then not allowed to pay the workers below the minimum 
wage, but you not allowed to exceed the minimum to such an extent that you 
draw people away from permanent jobs … now what happens is that Working for 
Wetlands pays one rate, Working for Water pays one rate, we pay another rate 
… workers talk to one and other … we all talk to one and other, so you now have 
a situation on your hands where your workers are dissatisfied because I want to 
know why you earn more than me … There’s no consistently adhered to in terms 
of the Code … so it’s therefore not possible according to law to have a standard 
wage rate for every single project 
 
                                                 
61This again refers to the document: Guidelines for the Implementation of Labour-Intensive 
Infrastructure Projects under the Expanded Public Works Programme. 
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This contrasts with observations made in an interview with a DPW official who 
essentially reported that in other respects (namely training) the Code was too specific 
about the sequencing of training required to be provided to beneficiaries, where training 
days were accumulated based on a specified number of days beneficiaries worked, and 
where in the official’s opinion this was having adverse planning and implementation 
consequences for contributing departments: 
 
[T]he one area of conflict is … the Code of Good Practice, which is the two days 
[training] for twenty-two days [worked] …which is extremely difficult to implement 
… Now we’ve taken some decisions that are going to solve this. One we are 
emphasizing a lot more prior training … that where training is done up front, 
before the project even starts, it’s much more successful, you don’t have that 
planning crisis62, and it fits more into the Department of Labour systems 
 
 
Ironically, the DPW official’s reference to the programme moving towards the provision 
of training up front, in other words, prior to the commencement of working days, 
corresponded with the experience of another department in the Environment and Culture 
sector, where an official indicated that the programme through which it was contributing 
to the EPWP had a different training regime to that of the EPWP. Interestingly, the 
source of the incompatibility related to how this Department sequenced training was 
based on its allocation of training days at the beginning of a project, which differed with 
EPWP rules, where training days accrued based on the number of days worked, as 
stipulated in the Code of Good Practice. 
 
The collective experiences of Environment and Culture sector departments, coupled with 
at least a partial concession by a DPW official on a similar score, indicated that a lack of 
operational flexibility in some instances adversely affected the capacity of implementing 
departments to interpret and sequence operating goals in the course of making job 
creation and training contributions to the EPWP. Extending this point, it was curiously 
reported in an interview with a former official of the DPW that the Department did not 
initially intend to regulate (via the Code of Good Practice) the operational contributions of 
non-infrastructure departments participating in the EPWP: 
                                                 
62This planning crisis was evident in other findings, including the following passage that describes 
one of the current challenges with training: ‘[job] Contractors want to finish contract, training 
happens at end of project [after training days have been accumulated], learner leaves-negative 
impact on our funding commitment and training provider.’ (DOA, DPW, DOL 2006) 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
179 
But we never had much of an emphasis on changing the existing public works 
programmes, … the EPWP never never itself never specified for example things 
about wages and things like that, that was done prior to the EPWP, [the code of 
good practice], and it was particularly related to construction, labour-intensive 
construction … it was negotiated in the construction industry, but then when it 
was issued by the Department of Labour they had its applicability to programmes 
like Working for Water in mind, so Working for Water used it, but there was never 
an intention of the EPWP to get all the different public works type programmes in 
government to use that code of good practice, it was never really an objective of 
the EPWP, or a strategic focus, so those kind of compliance issues, I would 
argue, are not really strategic issues 
 
The interviewee claimed that the Code of Good Practice and presumably the Ministerial 
Determination, which together outlined employment and training conditions to be applied 
under the EPWP, were not intended to be uniformly applied to the various sectoral 
departments contributing to the programme, outside of the Infrastructure sector, for 
which these conditions were originally designed. Evidence from non-infrastructure 
departments (Environment and Culture sector) and the DPW official quoted earlier 
revealed however that this had in reality become the case. Having said this, it does 
seem incongruous to accept that the statutory Code of Good Practice was ‘never 
intended’ to be applied to all the different public works type programmes in government, 
when in chapter 7 it was noted that one of the reasons the NPWP failed to effectively 
promote labour-intensive approaches was because of an ‘uncertain legal framework’. 
 
Another factor that more widely affected the capacity of EPWP sector departments also 
emerged from the Programme’s framework of conditions, and specifically its logical 
framework, which noted that ‘[a]s far as possible, all [EPWP-related] training must result 
in NQF-accredited certification’ (Department of Public Works 2004b: 17). The acronym 
NQF stood for National Qualifications Framework (NQF), which referred to an integrated 
and more structured post-apartheid framework for assessing learning achievements in 
South Africa. 63 This was introduced as part of the South African Qualifications Authority 
Act, Number 58 of 1995. The problem which emerged under the EPWP was that the 
pace at which the Department of Labour had formally been able to accredit vocational 
training providers and re-align courses to the requirements introduced by the NQF, 
limited the ability of EPWP implementing departments to, ‘as far as possible’, make 
                                                 
63This was more structured in terms of the progression and related credit earned through 
undergoing training, including unit standards, and leading to certification. (DPW 2004b: 17; 
DOA/DPW/DOL 2006) 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
180 
provision for training that met NQF qualifications. This situation was described in more 
detail by a Department of Labour official: 
 
The EPWP training needs to be accredited, and we not there yet, all our courses 
have all these years been on the old training of unemployed persons system, 
unaccredited training, and we moving over now to the accreditation of training 
providers, and that is a very very challenging process because you have to re-
cost all the courses to include now assessment, you have to come up with a new 
costing formula, you have to align all the courses that’s on our system to unit 
standards, you have to, you know … train our own people to know and sort of 
monitor a little bit deeper than they did in the past and … also the SETAs, we 
have to form alliances with them now because we can’t, we haven’t got the 
capacity really to do the proper quality assurance 
 
The Department of Labour explained that the EPWP requirement that training provided 
by sector departments be accredited outstripped the more modest medium-term targets 
that it had set for broader non programme specific skills development, in other words 
separate from the needs of just the EPWP. The DPW itself conceded with reference to 
accredited service providers that ‘[i]t’s not many in South Africa that has achieved that 
status’.  Participating departments interviewed also cited problems with accessing a 
sufficient supply of accredited training providers. A department in the Social sector64 
reported that: 
 
[O]ne of the challenges is that getting accredited service provides [sic] so that 
people can be trained to be … NQF level … But the Department of Health, 
through the HR [human resources] … has hired somebody to see how they can 
help us … relying on the external it takes too long … Yes, because now the 
standard is that they must be accredited so that people can get credit and they 
can … so that has been a big challenge. 
 
 
A Department in the Environment and Culture sector also mentioned that the 
accreditation requirement had had a material effect on its capacity to ensure that training 
was provided: 
 
There is a challenge with regards to Department of Labour … Department of 
Labour made in fact R28 million available for training … and the release of that 
money … in order to get that training done and get it accredited, it must be a 
                                                 
64The impact of the accreditation rule on the Social sector was also mentioned in an EPWP 
progress report (DPW 2007: 16) covering the period April to June 2007. The report recorded the 
following amongst challenges facing the sector: ‘The limited numbers of accredited training 
service providers, especially in rural areas, constrain the roll-out of training’.  
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Department of Labour approved service provider, and there is a massive 
shortage of vocational training service providers … that is a major challenge … 
So we end up having to fund the training through our operational costs, so that is 
our cost that taken away from invasive alien plant clearing, we fund that through 
operational costs and we use trainers that’s not necessarily accredited … 
ultimately our people get training that’s not accredited with SAQA. 
 
Overall, findings showed that limited operating flexibility seems to have adversely 
affected the capacity of some departments (Environment and Culture sector) to interpret 
and sequence operating goals in the process of responding to the EPWP’s job creation 
and training objectives. In addition, the operating emphasis on ‘accredited’ training more 
widely affected the ability of contributing departments to source available service 
providers, which effectively exposed a disjuncture between the operating demands being 
introduced by the programme and the overall ability of the government’s training 
accreditation system to service these needs. From the standpoint of Paul’s (1983: 58) 
research, it was evident that despite the existence of an elaborate operational framework 
of guidelines and conditions, which was in part a response to an absence of such 
instruments to promote inter-departmental labour-intensive job creation under the 
NPWP, the manner in which these were applied did not enable the kind of ‘considerable 
[and in some cases coherent] scope in [some departments] choosing between 
alternative ways to achieve an objective’, and which moreover affected departmental 
capacity. 
 
The next section will focus on the EPWP’s resource allocation. 
 
8.2.3 Factors associated with the EPWP’s resource allocation 
 
The resources allocated to a development programme, with reference to Paul, relate to 
the conditions underpinning its financial as well as human resourcing makeup, which 
includes the mobilisation of these and other forms of administrative and political 
cooperation and support. The assumption is that the extent of and circumstances 
relating to the mobilisation and allocation of a programme’s resources may adversely 
affect the capacity of implementing bodies to carry out the initiative. This section will first 
cover the financial resources allocated to the EPWP. 
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The financing of the EPWP was described as running ‘through the normal budgeting 
process’ (DPW Not dated b: 2, DPW 2004b: 20). In practice this meant that there was no 
separate or distinct fund for the EPWP as such, where monies to support the 
programme were channelled through budgeting instruments that were already 
resourcing existing departmental programmes contributing to the EPWP. These 
appropriations were made via an annual statutory process of dividing nationally raised 
revenue across national, provincial and local government bodies. A brief overview of this 
inter-governmental fiscal process is explained below. 
 
In 2004, the year in which the EPWP was introduced, South Africa’s National Treasury 
(National Department of Finance) published a document entitled Trends in 
Intergovernmental Finances: 2000/1 – 2006/7, which provided a useful background for 
understanding the normal budgeting process in the country. Understanding South 
Africa’s system of public financing should of course take note of the way its system of 
government is set up, which comprises national, provincial and local spheres of 
government, and which also recognises that whilst some functions are performed 
exclusively by one sphere of government (namely the national sphere), ‘most functions 
are shared (concurrent) between spheres’ (National Treasury 2004: 1). South Africa’s 
Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) stipulates these shared functional areas in Schedule 4, 
where at the level of revenue distribution the provincial governments, and to a much 
lesser extent, municipalities, are largely dependent on transfers from the national fiscus 
(National Treasury 2004: 4). 
 
The reference to EPWP financing flowing through the normal budgeting process 
effectively meant that a variety of existing transferring instruments would be used to 
finance the activities of departments contributing to the programme, depending on how 
these public bodies normally received allocations of national revenue. For example, in 
the Infrastructure sector, funding was channelled via conditional infrastructure grants to 
provincial and municipal governments (DPW Not dated b: 5, DPW Not dated a: 3; DPW 
2005c: 12). The allocation of a Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) to local governments 
began in the 2003/2004 financial year, with the aim of removing backlogs in the delivery 
of a range of basic services such as electricity, storm water management, water supply, 
refuse removal and sanitation, roads, public transport, fire fighting, municipal health 
services, and local sports facilities (Municipal Infrastructure Task Team 2004). At a 
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provincial level, documentation from the National Treasury indicated that conditional 
infrastructure grants to provinces had been in existence since at least the 1998/1999 
financial year, preceding the introduction in 2000/2001 of a R300 million ‘provincial 
infrastructure grant’ (PIG) (National Treasury 2000: 67). 
 
In the Environment and Culture sector, financing was channelled primarily through a 
specialised fund designed to support poverty alleviation programmes which were already 
being implemented by national departments (February 2004 Environment Sector Plan: 
19). 65 In the Social sector, funding flowed through a mixture of departmental equitable 
share transfers (unconditional transfer of core monies to provinces and municipalities 
from the national fiscus) and conditional grants (supplementary monies) to provincial 
counterparts of national departments (DSD, DEd, DoH 2004: 16). Finally, in the 
Economic sector, funding instruments were less certain and depended on the number of 
public bodies participating in this sector, which was not specified in the sector plan. 
Moreover, entrepreneurial ‘learnerships’66 under the Economic sector were also 
expected to receive funding from existing statutory training bodies (Sector Education 
Training Authorities), set up under a Skills Development Act (Number 97 of 1998), and 
which according to the Act were partially financed by a ‘skills development levy’ on 
employers (Government Gazette 1998). Additional financing would also be expected 
from public bodies contributing to the Economic sector (DPW 2005e: 5, 6, 17; DPW 
2004b: 16). 
 
An illustration of the EPWP’s funding targets by sector is presented in table 8.5 
 
Table 8.5: Distribution of funding for the EPWP (2004/5-2008/9) 
Sector EPWP Public Sector Budget Allocations  
Infrastructure R15 billion 
Environmental  R 4 billion 
Social R0.6 billion (planned to increase to R2 billion) 
Economic Subject to level of public sector participation 
 
Source: Department of Public Works 2004b: 20 
                                                 
65This refers to the Special Poverty Relief Programme Allocation, overseen by the National 
Treasury. 
66A ‘learnership’ comprises practical work experience of a specified nature and duration, 
according to the Skills Development Act (Number 97 of 1998).  
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Similar to CASP, the EPWP was not hindered by a lack of financial investment, having 
enjoyed an initial and substantial four-year resource commitment (2004/5-2008/9). The 
reinvigoration yet modest earlier efforts at rolling out government-sponsored job creating 
schemes after 1994 provides helpful context to the significant budgetary commitment 
attached to the programme. 
 
Finally, in accordance with the DPW’s co-ordinating responsibility, documentation also 
confirmed that the Department ‘does not have a fund for funding EPWP projects’ (DPW 
Not dated b: 2). In other words, the Department did not oversee the disbursement of a 
separate fund to participating sector departments to finance their implementation of 
EPWP projects, which was consistent with funding having flowed directly to departments 
via existing instruments to finance their functional activities. This arrangement resembled 
the funding scheme employed under the apartheid government’s special job creation 
programmes initiative, co-ordinated by the Department of Manpower. 
 
Figure 8.1 illustrates a calculation of expenditure in the EPWP’s four sectors, covering 
the period 2004/2005 – 2006/2007 and based on data compiled by the DPW. The 
figures firstly show varying levels of expenditure, with Social sector departments 
consistently recording the highest spend of funds allocated for the programme, followed 
closely by departments in the Environment and Culture sector. For the Social sector, this 
level of consistency was remarkable given that there was a 279 per cent increase in the 
Sector’s budget between 2005/2006 and 2006/2007, from 166 to 464 million Rands. 67 
Data published in EPWP progress reports (DPW 2007a: 9) on work opportunities 
created by the Social sector also showed that the sector was nearly meeting its annual 
target, where by June 2007 a total of 78,310 work opportunities had been created, 
where if its total portion of 150,000 was subdivided into 30,000 per annum, it should 
have created 90,000 work opportunities. Findings elsewhere in the documentation and 
interviews however gave a somewhat different perspective on this performance, whilst 
exposing factors that were adversely affecting the Social sector’s capacity to make what 
could be argued was its more significant training contribution to the EPWP. 
 
 
                                                 
67A significant increase of funds, totalling R4,2 billion over a three-year period, was allocated to 
provincial Social sector departments beginning in 2006/2007. 
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Figure 8.1 Sector expenditure of funds allocated for EPWP, 2004/5-2006/7 
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*2004/2005 figures for the Infrastructure and Environment and Culture sectors did not 
include local government contributions, and was therefore excluded from a comparative 
calculation. 2004/2005 figures for the Social sector also only comprised Mpumalanga 
province, and so was also excluded. 
**Figures for the Social sector for 2005/2006 included both provincial and local 
government departments, but only included provincial departments for 2006/2007, 
 
Source: Department of Public Works 2005b: Annexure A; Department of Public Works 
2006: Annexure A; Department of Public Works 2007b: Annexure A 
 
Although the Social sector’s plan acknowledged that programmes such as ECD and 
HCBC presented opportunities for work creation, the Plan also recognised that much of 
the erstwhile work of Sector departments in these areas relied on the input of existing 
volunteers and civil society intermediary organisations. A 2003 national survey of HCBC 
services for instance recorded a total of 19, 616 volunteers, of which 15, 326 received no 
stipend (DSD, DEd, DoH 2004: 8). Although no comparative figures were given for ECD, 
the Plan did otherwise note that a national audit of ECD identified a total of 23, 482 sites, 
where caregivers stationed at these sites either had insufficient or no training and a 
limited source of income (DSD, DEd, DoH 2004: 11-12). An imperative for Social sector 
departments was therefore formalising the working conditions of a large base of existing 
beneficiaries, by supplying remunerative compensation in particular. 
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An EPWP progress report for the 2005/2006 period recorded for instance that the Social 
sector had contributed 18, 300 work opportunities whilst paying out over R85 million in 
wages. The same report noted elsewhere though that ‘[t]raining forms the backbone of 
the sector. Currently there is insufficient capacity within provinces for both HCBC and 
ECD teams to provide and manage NQF level accredited training’. The situation was 
also described as ‘urgent’ (DPW 2006: 6; 18).  For the 2006/2007 period, the sector 
created over 37,000 work opportunities and paid out over R191 million in wages. 
Elsewhere, the sector’s capacity to supplement its compensatory support with training 
was constrained by a number of factors which spoke to the resourcing circumstances 
underpinning the supply of training, including ‘limited capacity’ to fast-track accreditation 
by relevant SETAs; limited supply of accredited training service providers ‘constraining’ 
the roll-out of training; and the ‘programme design’ being constrained by human 
resource limitations in provincial and local government departments (DPW 2007b: 
Annexure A; 20). These references suggest that whilst overall expenditure (inc. wage 
payouts) and work opportunity creation was high in the programme’s second and third 
years, resourcing conditions affecting the supply of training according to EPWP 
conditions (NQF accreditation) severely constrained Social sector department capacity. 
 
These conditions must be read in combination with observations pointing to inadequate 
human resource mobilisation in provincial and national departments to service the 
administrative demands which followed their participation in the EPWP. This was acutely 
felt from the 2006/2007 year, which saw a massive medium-term (3 year) budget 
allocation of R4,2 billion allocated for ECD and HCBC. A former DPW official 
commented for instance that: 
 
In the Social sector the main challenge is to put in place the, to operationalise 
that massive increase in Early Childhood Development and Home Community 
Based Care, and to put in place the necessary operational capacity to make it 
happen, and I think that’s where they’re struggling in the Social sector. 
 
Another DWP official described a situation where the administrative and reporting 
demands being placed on provincial departments by the EPWP, which in this case 
involved the ECD component, were ‘normally’ being shouldered by a limited number of 
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assigned personnel68, who assumed responsibility for the programme in addition to 
performing other activities. The official stated that: 
 
You see this person now has, EPWP is putting pressure on this person to get 
additional information to do audits, to make sure that there is a database, to 
make sure they report to us on a quarterly basis, people cannot cope … So we 
are interfacing with officials who still have to convince the Chief Director or 
whoever that we need to align these things, because if it’s aligned, you will see 
that you need two or three more people to manage this process, there is no way 
that with the current capacity that is in the provinces you will be able to deal with 
this thing, because with us it is very intensive, intensive in the sense that you 
need updated information in terms of what is happening, and remember the 
challenge is, a lot of this information that we need is sitting everywhere, not 
consolidated, so now because we are requesting this people have to get 
information and put it together 
 
The same official elsewhere confirmed what had been reported in EPWP progress 
reports, where department officials in the Social sector were struggling to comply with 
the operational requirements attached to the training component: 
 
[B]ut you don’t have also people with the right skills, if you look at the training that 
is required for EPWP, it’s like a higher quality training, because we emphasise 
accredited training, and then it means that you have to have programmes that 
are NQF aligned, and officials most of these officials in the Social sector, some of 
them are social workers, of them are teachers, and most of them do not have a 
very good understanding of NQF, because it’s specialised thing 
 
Inadequate human resourcing arrangements in the Social sector was also evident at the 
national level of government, where one department recounted that when a considerable 
increase in monies to support ECD and HCBC activities was signed off from the 
2006/2007 financial year (R4,2 billion) no portion was allocated to national departments 
to manage and oversee implementation in provincial departments. This department 
explained that the increased funding allocated to the programmes would impact directly 
on its capacity to perform monitoring, noting that ‘the monitoring must really be, and we 
need to develop systems that enable us not just to listen to people and assume that 
what they’re telling us is what’s actually happening … which requires then a different 
kind of size of personnel’. The department added that ‘[w]e don’t have systems to check 
                                                 
68Another official in a national Social sector department also noted that ‘[y]ou have the same kind 
of thing in the provincial level, it’s an add-on job, for which you do not really have that amount of 
time, because there are no staff.’ 
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on this evidence on the reporting, so you in KwaZulu Natal [province] says that you are 
training 600 people in your EPWP programme … given them R2000 stipend or 
whatever, so, why do we get all these letters from people saying, “I never got paid”‘ 
 
Another department in the Social sector described a similar and more detailed set of 
circumstances, indicating that for a considerable period only one official was assigned to 
oversee the department’s ECD-related activities under the EPWP, which they were 
carrying out in addition to performing their normal line function activities. The official 
confirmed that of the sizeable increase in funding allocated for ECD and HCBC from 
2006/2007, the national department did not receive a portion to support monitoring, 
where ‘at the end national Department of Social Development and national Department 
of Education didn’t get one cent, it was all for the provincial level’. The official further 
mentioned that other policy priorities facing the national department also impacted on 
the availability of internal funds to support its ECD activities under the EPWP: 
 
[Y]ou must now understand where I am located now, [respondent refers to their 
line function structure] … at that point, one our main functions that we have at the 
national level is legislation, policy, norms and standards … My Chief Director is 
responsible for the new Children’s Bill, this Children’s Bill is now dragging on for 
past eight years … so for my Chief Director this is a priority … so the bulk of the 
money that is being allocated to the Chief Directorate must go to the completion 
of the Bill and the Act … so that was the scenario in which I am functioning 
 
Finally, a potentially more serious resourcing constraint that would have adversely 
affected the financial and human resource capacity of provincial Social sector 
departments concerned a re-direction of funds intended for ECD and HCBC as part of 
the R4,2 billion package, to support other activities in some provincial governments. An 
EPWP progress report covering the 2006/2007 financial year noted that ‘[s]ome of the 
funds allocated for expansion of ECD and HCBC (R4.2 billion over MTEF) have in some 
provinces been allocated to other programmes and, as a result, the overall targets to 
accelerate service delivery and create employment will not be achieved.’ (DPW 2007b: 
20). This does not seem to have been significant in expenditure terms however, where 
as noted in figure 8.1, 86 per cent of allocated funds for the 2006/2007 financial year 
were reported as spent. This incident did however elicit a number of insightful 
observations from interviewees, including a consultant to the EPWP who explained that: 
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I think Treasury makes the assumption at national level that by the time it gets 
motivations for budgets, etc., that the provinces have sorted out their priorities at 
a provincial level, and that may indeed be the case, but once the money flows … 
as equitable share [unconditional allocation to provinces], it gives the province 
discretion on how to apply and allocate that money … In this particular case, 
R4.2 billion was motivated for the Social sector, agreed to and allocated by 
National Treasury to provincial treasuries, and in the case of many of the 
provinces, that money has not flown to the departments … that it was intended to 
flow to. And…based on our framework, inter-governmental framework … there’s 
nothing that National Treasury can do about it, so the departments at provincial 
level must motivate hard with their respective treasuries at provincial level to 
make sure that their allocations are actually given to them, it’s a challenge 
  
An official with a Social sector department contributed the following: 
 
So sometimes this works well, in that the amount of money that has been 
allocated at national level manages to get into the department and manages to 
get into the programme, and it’s the same amount of money, but in many 
instances it slips through, and they can do that … because this provincial 
process is determined by provincial priorities, the national process is determined 
by national priorities, one assumes that the national priorities, which are not our 
priorities, it is priorities that we have got from provinces, that those priorities are 
the same as the priorities that are going to be dealt with at provincial level, and it 
magically doesn’t happen. 
 
Despite references by one DPW official to their being ‘consensus at a provincial 
[departmental] cluster level69, there is consensus and there is buy-in’, the official also 
conceded that they were ‘not sure … if, at that level, there is communication with 
[political] leadership in the provinces, and that is my biggest challenge’ They added that 
it was their ‘understanding’ that there was ‘buy-in’ on this Programme, referring to the 
EPWP social sector activities in ECD and HCBC, amongst department heads, political 
leaders such as provincial ministers (MECs) and the heads of provincial governments 
(Premiers). 
 
The interviews did not contain any noticeable findings concerning the resourcing of 
Environment and Culture sector departments, therefore little can be reported on this 
sector. EPWP progress reports were however showing that the Sector as a whole had 
exceeded its original work opportunity target of 200,000, generating 271,896 by June 
2007 (DPW 2007a: 9). It should be remembered that the operational constraints 
                                                 
69
‘Cluster’ level means a clustering of the heads of Social sector departments (i.e., Education, 
Social Development, Health) 
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reported earlier by at least one Environment and Culture sector department, which also 
incidentally obtained by far the largest financial allocation in this sector, did not concern 
its ability to generate work opportunities per se, but dealt with the operational limitations 
experienced in having to comply with EPWP guidelines and conditions. In addition, 
although no comparable reference to this sector’s contribution to its overall training day 
target was available, it was otherwise evident that all70 EPWP sectors were struggling to 
keep pace with their overall training target of 15.5 million days, where by September 
2007 just 23 per cent of this target was reached, compared to 77 per cent of the target 
for work opportunities (DPW Not dated d: 4). 
 
A basic picture of the Economic sector’s resourcing circumstances showed some 
expenditure volatility in the first three years, with a low of just 49 per cent of allocated 
funds spent in 2006/2007, as compared to the previous year’s 79 per cent. It was also 
observed that the total allocation for the Economic sector increased seven-fold, from 
about R33 million in 2005/2006 to R235 million the following year, which is generally 
consistent with the demand-driven nature of public body participation in the sector. 
Having said this, the EPWP was reporting that by June 2007 the sector had nearly 
achieved its work-opportunity target, where this stood at 11, 512 out of the 12,000 
planned (DPW 2007a: 9). With this said, work opportunity creation appeared ancillary to 
the Economic sector’s core focus on identifying and training potential entrepreneurs via 
a learnership programme, where a target of 3000 had been set by the sector (DPW 
2005e:4). Findings showed that by the end of the 2005/2006 financial year, only 120 
learners were participating in the venture learnership initiative, where no comparable 
figures were available in the 2006/2007 consolidated report (DPW 2006). By late 2007, 
another programme report indicated that the venture learnership programme had 
created 310 companies in five provinces (DPW Not dated d: 17). 
 
Interview data revealed that a number of resourcing constraints had been experienced 
by the EPWP’s Economic sector, which likely impacted on its capacity to effectively 
respond to its learnership objective. One factor appeared to reflect difficulties 
experienced by the DPW in encouraging participating public bodies, particularly in the 
provinces, to become more involved in the learnership scheme. One DPW official 
                                                 
70Another EPWP progress report concluded that ‘[t]raining is an area that needs serious attention 
from all implementing bodies’ (DPW 2007b: 21) 
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observed for instance that strategic attention was being directed at the provinces on 
whether there was willingness to undertake learnerships. The official also mentioned that 
the DPW had received approval to create new staffing posts in five provinces in 
particular, ‘where persons are based in the provinces from our unit’. Other resourcing 
constraints appeared to arise from circumstances outside the direct control of the DPW. 
This included non-performing mentors responsible for supporting learners, a SETA in the 
Construction industry running out of money to fund learnerships, SETAs not being 
present in some provinces, problems with learner attendance (see later discussion on 
environmental uncertainty), and problems booking training venues. 
 
The Infrastructure sector’s ability to expend resources indicated that considerable 
difficulties were being experienced, with around 50 per cent of allocated funds being 
spent. The figures presented in figure 8.1 were reported to comprise funding transferred 
via MIG and PIG grants, as well as funds allocated through a province’s unconditional 
equitable share of nationally raised revenue, where provincial departments comprised 
the majority portion by far. Interestingly, the National Treasury (2007: 87) had noticed 
that provincial departments of Roads and Transport, which were allocated relatively 
large portions of EPWP infrastructure sector grants, were sustaining ‘severe shortages 
[understaffed] of technical skills’, commenting that ‘[t]he few remaining senior engineers 
available play a more managerial role, so departments do not really benefit from their 
technical skills’. These observations were generated from a Treasury survey in five 
provincial departments in 2006, and describe an existing set of circumstances within 
which the EPWP was introduced. 
 
By the end of March 2007 the DPW was reporting that the Infrastructure sector had 
accumulated 342, 873 of its five-year target of 750,000, which on a year-by-year basis 
meant that the sector was reaching about 76 per cent of its per annum target, with an 
average of 114, 291 (DPW 2007b: 9). The sector dramatically improved work opportunity 
creation, as reported on in the 2006/2007 year, although its performance against the 
training objective seemed less impressive. Although DPW data for 2004-2006 combined 
training and person-years of work, making it impossible to disaggregate out training 
generated per sector, the 2006/2007 report did indicate that the total person-years of 
training generated by the Infrastructure sector was 1, 959 (DPW 2007b: Annexure A). If 
it is assumed that the total number of person-years of training allocated to the 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
192 
Infrastructure sector is 39, 130, based on its target of nine million divided by 230 
days/annum (figure used in EPWP reports), the sector should be generating an average 
of over 7,800 person years of training every year. Again due to inconsistent and 
incomplete data, this thesis could elsewhere verify that by the end of the second quarter 
of 2007, the Infrastructure sector had only generated 12 per cent of its annual training 
day target for the year, lower than all other sectors (DPW Not dated d: 8). 
 
Overall, the reported expenditure and output performance of the Infrastructure sector 
must take into account an earlier discussion on the EPWP’s objectives, which included 
references to confusion and reluctance on the part of Infrastructure sector departments 
to adjust to the programme’s labour-maximisation imperative. For example, despite the 
generally favourable pace of work opportunity creation being reported, DPW 
documentation two years into the EPWP was observing that the department could not 
objectively verify the operational use by Infrastructure sector departments of the EPWP’s 
tender and design guidelines. The department did however concede a general 
impression that many departments were not adhering to these conditions (DPW 2006: 
14). This coupled with the observation at the end of the programme’s third year that 
‘[u]nfortunately no comprehensive report on the MIG contribution is currently available’, 
where existing reports ‘contain insufficient detail for reporting on the EPWP’, raises 
questions about the objective legitimacy of this sector’s work opportunity creation, as 
well as the potentially adverse affect of the programme’s underlying compliance 
arrangements. (DPW 2007b: 14) 71 
 
Staying on the MIG-related data, and recognising that this information was being 
described as insufficient, interview findings were also revealing municipal-level 
circumstances which appeared to have affected the capacity of these bodies to comply 
with the programme’s operational guidelines. A consultant to the EPWP remarked that: 
 
We would look at what the blockages are, and many times we found that 
blockages are procurement processes which are friendly to the MFMA [Municipal 
                                                 
71An official at the national Department of Provincial and Local Government, which is responsible 
for disbursing MIG funding to municipalities and receiving reports on expenditure, also noted in 
an interview that ‘[w]e do not monitor compliance with EPWP’, where the Department provided 
‘basic’ output information to the DPW, including number of projects and jobs created. 
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Finance Management Act]72 but unfriendly to labour-intensive methods of 
construction, and the procurement department is reluctant to change any of 
these policies because it took them a lot of time, money, effort to make them 
friendly to the MFMA, and now they have to change them yet again to make 
them friendly to the EPWP. 
 
This observation should ideally be discussed in the section on operational planning, but 
because it concerns rules governing the procurement and allocation of resources, it is 
dealt with here. The issue acknowledged by this observer suggests a conflict between 
EPWP operating rules, which in this case concerned its tender and design guidelines 
and specifically the conditions applying to the contracting of tenderers to supply labour-
intensive works, and existing tender-related guidelines prescribed in broader municipal 
finance legislation. This conflict may have contributed to reluctance or, alternatively, 
could have affected the pace at which municipal officials were able to adapt the latter to 
accommodate the former, which was required in order to demonstrate operational 
compliance with the EPWP. This would also have affected the capacity of the DPW to 
effectively encourage compliance. Another way of describing this, in the context of 
Paul’s framework, would acknowledge that the operating demands introduced by the 
EPWP yielded little flexibility for implementing departments to interpret, in this instance, 
procurement goals, let alone choose between these, given that compliance with EPWP 
conditions was embedded in division of revenue legislation. 73 
 
Another resourcing-related issue found to have adversely affected the capacity of 
municipalities to procure goods and services in response to the EPWP this time 
ironically included adjusting to the new supply chain management (which dealt with 
purchasing goods and services) regulations introduced by the MFMA. An official at the 
national Department of Provincial and Local Government reported that complying with 
the prescribed tendering rules required under the Act was proving ‘difficult at this stage 
to get that off the ground within the municipalities’. The interviewee added that it was 
‘delaying [overall] project implementation considerably’, and not just EPWP projects. 
 
                                                 
72The Act (2003) regulates the conduct of financial management, controls and reporting in South 
African municipalities. This includes a section on ‘supply chain management’, or procurement of 
goods and services. 
73Division of Revenue legislation incorporates conditions attached to the infrastructure grants 
allocated to provinces and municipalities in South Africa. See DPW 2005d: 1. 
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A final observation on the resourcing circumstances of the EPWP recalled a previous 
debate about the resourcing design of a programme of this nature, which asked whether 
funding should be centralised and presumably disbursed by a single entity, or 
decentralised and disbursed separately to participating public bodies. The EPWP opted 
for the latter arrangement, where two interviewees remarked explicitly on this 
arrangement. The first described the fact that the DPW did not disburse money for the 
EPWP as a ‘potential constraint’ on its ‘leverage’ over the contributions of implementing 
departments. Another interviewee argued that ‘there must be a budget … for the 
Department to begin to do the coordination and driving’. A similar concern has also been 
expressed by McCord (2008: 559) in her analysis of the EPWP, where she suggested 
that: 
 
[S]ince the EPWP itself does not have an operational budget, it is only able to 
create employment in as much as it can encourage shifts in the factor intensity of 
government spending to promote labour intensification. 
 
The most interesting feature of McCord’s observation together with the comments 
conveyed by interviewees was that these appeared to exhibit less of a concern about the 
institutional arrangement of EPWP budgeting per se. This was compared to a stronger 
emphasis on the potentially adverse implications of a decentralised organisational 
arrangement for the ability of the programme, and its co-ordinating department in this 
case, to encourage objective and operational compliance with labour-intensity and 
associated conditions. Having observed this, an interview with a former DPW official 
revealed that an evaluation of a centrally disbursed special poverty relief fund which 
preceded the EPWP had influenced the National Treasury’s decision not to allow the 
EPWP to replicate such an arrangement: 
 
So for those kind of reasons Treasury recommended to Cabinet that there must a 
single budgeting process, so you don’t have these kind of problems, and you 
shouldn’t have a separate poverty relief, separate fund for poverty relief 
programmes, that poverty relief programmes should be mainstreamed through 
the normal budgeting process … Now, that decision took place before we 
finalised the planning of the EPWP, now in our discussions with Treasury on the 
design of the EPWP they made it very clear that there was no way that they were 
going to bring back this idea of a separate fund for EPWP, and that there was 
also no way they were going to give national public works a whole lot of money 
for funding stuff which was not within their mandate. 
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The interviewee noted that one of problems experienced by the centralisation of poverty 
relief funding, which it appeared to have inherited from a centralised Reconstruction and 
Development Fund, was that it resulted in problematic resource planning alignment 
between spheres of government. They gave the example of a special clinic building 
programme financed through the RDP Fund and undertaken by the national Department 
of Health, which experienced problems at the provincial level. The reason was that 
departments at this sphere, which assumed functional responsibility for staffing and 
medicines supply to clinics, had not adequately budgeted for supplying these resources 
to the clinics being built by the national department. In an early evaluation of the RDP 
Fund, Cameron (1996: 239-240) reflected other concerns about the potentially adverse 
consequences that its centralised arrangement created for intra- and inter-sphere 
budgeting: 
 
One of the major concerns was that the RDP undermines sound budgeting. At 
one level, it created red tape in that departments were forced to apply to the RDP                                                        
funds [sic] for funding which they previously received. This was time-consuming 
and led to delays … A similar point is made by Nattras (1995). She argues that if 
the entire cabinet supports the RDP, why shouldn’t the allocation of funds be left 
to the Minister of Finance and various departmental ministers? 
 
 
The centralised imperatives of the RDP are understandable in that the GNU 
[Government of National Unity] wants public-sector bodies to redirect its priorities 
and policies. However, if the major function of provinces and local authorities is 
to implement RDP policies [through applying to a central office for funds], this 
could affect the autonomy of subnational government substantially. 
 
 
The South African government was evidently then unwilling to risk a repeat of the 
adverse operational consequences (which included implementation delays and limited 
policy discretion) that centralising special programme funding had historically generated, 
when designing the EPWP. Having said this, the experience of the EPWP case has 
seen that decentralising the funding and primary level of planning that went with this did 
not absolve the programme, and the DPW as the designated ‘co-ordinating’ department, 
from a responsibility to encourage the objective and operational compliance of 
contributing departments. This echoes earlier references to the Department’s ‘leverage’ 
vis à vis other departments, and it needing to ‘drive’ and ‘encourage’ other departments 
contributing to the initiative. Under these circumstances the only tools that the DPW 
seems to have had at its disposal were human and political resources. Although these 
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have been forthcoming, these have not necessarily been sufficient to obviate the kind of 
objective, operational and resource-related capacity constraints that were directly 
experienced by the programme’s various implementing bodies, as discussed elsewhere 
in this chapter. 74 
 
Overall, the resourcing circumstances which affected the capacity of EPWP contributing 
bodies to carry out the programme varied across its four sectors. In the context of Paul’s 
description of a development programme’s resourcing, a key factor shared by 
departments in at least three of the four sectors (Social, Infrastructure, Economic) 
however concerned instances where implementing bodies, primarily at the national level, 
experienced difficulties mobilising resources, in the form of inter-governmental support 
and co-operation (provincial and local government) to respond to the programme’s 
objectives. Although in some instances the unconditional allocation of financial 
resources for the EPWP (namely the equitable share allocation of Social sector funding 
to provinces) may have abetted this problem, in other cases this was found not be the 
case (the stipulation in PIG and MIG conditional grants that recipient bodies employ 
EPWP tender and design guidelines). Finally, the decentralised financial resourcing of 
the EPWP, although it sought to depart from centralised and administratively 
cumbersome multi-sectoral programming arrangements of old, exposed the limited 
instrumental capacity of the DPW, as the programme’s designated co-ordinating 
department, to encourage the objective and operational compliance of contributing 
departments. 
 
Instances where the existing resourcing circumstances of sector departments were 
found to have adversely affected their capacity to respond to the objective demands 
introduced by the EPWP included the availability of accredited training providers 
(Department of Labour), where this was also discussed as an operational constraint. 
Other examples displayed a need to augment and adapt existing line function personnel 
in national and provincial Social sector departments to respond to the operating 
demands introduced by EPWP-related activities; existing human resource capacity 
constraints in Infrastructure sector departments (provincial) impeding their 
                                                 
74A number of DPW officials (at least 3, plus a fourth which mentioned a request for additional 
resources) interviewed by this thesis commented on having secured additional human resources 
to support their co-ordination roles. 
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implementation of EPWP activities; and finally conflicting as well as constraining 
statutory requirements governing the procurement of goods and services by 
Infrastructure sector departments (municipalities), which impacted on their capacity to 
comply with conditions stipulated by the EPWP. 
 
  8.2.4 Overall impressions on the strategy of the EPWP 
 
An overall impression of the EPWP’s strategy firstly indicated that the programme’s 
means-end philosophy of increasing the potential (through labour-intensity) for job 
creation created uncertainty and reluctance from departments in all four of its 
participating sectors to adjust, due to a combination of prevailing circumstantial and 
ideological factors. This ultimately affected the capacity of its designated co-ordinating 
department (DPW) to encourage objective compliance. These capacity constraints were 
extended at an operational level, where departments in the Environment and Culture 
sector in particular expressed concerns about the effect of the programme’s restrictive 
operating rules in respect of job creation and training provision, on their ability to 
respond to its objectives. These constraints were most widely experienced in relation to 
the EPWP’s training objective, where various sector department capacities were being 
constrained by the circumstances attending the programme’s ‘accreditation’ 
requirement. 
 
Finally, the affect of the EPWP’s resourcing on the ability of its implementing 
departments, similar to other sub-variable categories, again saw variation due to the 
prevailing functional circumstances in participating sectors, where this revealed 
problematic financial, regulatory and human resourcing arrangements to absorb the 
demands introduced by the EPWP. In addition, factors also spoke directly to Paul’s 
concerns about development programme implementing bodies needing to mobilise 
financial and other (administrative and political) types of resource-related co-operation 
and support, including instances where national implementing bodies experienced 
difficulties mobilising co-operation at sub-national levels of government. 
 
The next section will discuss findings on the ‘environment’ variable. 
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8.3 The ‘environment’ variable 
 
Factors associated with the ‘environment’ of the EPWP were, unlike in the CASP case, 
and relative to the strategy and structure variables, not strongly evidenced in the 
interview findings and documentation. Consequently, little can be added about factors 
associated with this variable having affected the capacity of EPWP implementing bodies. 
With this said however, it was interesting to note that of those references to 
environmental factors that did appear, these almost exclusively concerned instances of 
‘uncertainty’ experienced by implementing departments in the delivery of training, 
mentorship and learnership activities, and in the roll out of Social sector programmes. 
 
The notable aspect of this finding was, similar to CASP that the delivery of these 
services required implementing departments to engage more formally and didactically 
with relatively impoverished beneficiaries who possessed little formal education, which 
generally corresponds with the lower-skilled unemployed beneficiary audience targeted 
by the EPWP. The difference of course was that these uncertainties were not 
experienced in the large-scale and more rapid generation of work opportunities, but 
appeared in the training element. Examples of uncertainties experienced in the delivery 
of EPWP programmes included problems with beneficiary attendance on learnerships; 
literacy levels amongst beneficiaries undergoing training, raising concerns about their 
‘ability for competence’; resistance to or lack of interest in training from some 
beneficiaries who, according to one official, expressed greater interest in opportunities to 
earn money to meet ‘bread and butter issues’. Attempts to formalise and standardise 
training and employment conditions of ECD and HCBC volunteers in the Social sector 
has also had to confront unpredictability in the constant movement of beneficiaries to 
where they could access the best stipends. 
 
In general terms, these findings reflected Paul’s (1982: 108; 1983: 50) description of the 
uncertainty variable, which encompassed circumstances occasioned in this instance by 
the socio-economic conditions of beneficiaries (i.e., driven by an income-generating job 
imperative), where in addition ‘changes in the perception of clients or their dissatisfaction 
with a service’, i.e., their reactions to training, could affect their responses to a 
programme. 
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The next section will discuss findings on the ‘structure’ variable. 
 
8.4 The ‘structure’ variable  
 
The structure variable refers to the functional and organisational arrangements 
underpinning a public organisation’s capacity to carry out a development programme. In 
functional terms this refers to how organisational tasks are broken up, or structured, 
according to what is relevant for the services rendered by a programme. In 
organisational terms this refers to the configuration of decision-making authority within 
and between public organizations, through which a development programme’s functional 
activities are carried out. Paul’s description of the structure variable includes explicit 
reference to ‘bureaucratic’ constraints arising from the relationship between a public 
body’s existing functional and organisational structures, and the new demands 
introduced by a development programme. The findings so for, which have concentrated 
on the strategic influences on implementing department capacity, have already hinted at 
potential structural constraints, which related primarily to the DPW’s capacity to 
encourage sector department compliance with the EPWP’s labour-intensive, job creation 
objective. 
 
An examination of the interview findings begins with one respondent who remarked that 
‘[i]n terms of the functions within the departments, it was difficult to find the glue to keep 
these things all together’, when referring to the EPWP’s multi-sectoral departmental 
makeup. The interviewee added that ‘In this particular case it’s the EPWP and its, in my 
view, it’s so called intrusion into the social, and economic and environmental spheres, 
which were actually outside of the departmental structure of the public works 
department’. Although the respondent later recalled that the glue that bound the various 
sector departments together was primarily the programme’s job creation objective, they 
included the proviso that ‘they [departments] all have different ways of doing it obviously, 
within their functions’. 
 
These passages firstly point to functional and methodological differences distinguishing 
the various departments that came together to contribute to the EPWP’s job creation 
objective. This was earlier cited by a department in the Environment and Culture sector 
with reference to the limited operational flexibility that it experienced interpreting its 
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contribution to the programme’s job creation objective. The second observation recalls 
another potential structural constraint on the DPW’s capacity which this time can be 
linked to the notion of the EPWP, and by association the DPW, ‘intruding’ into other 
sectoral spheres, which suggests a kind of conflict arising from the configuration of line 
function decision-making authority introduced by the programme. Both of these 
references speak to the kind of bureaucratic constraints on capacity encapsulated by 
Paul in the assumption that ‘[n]ew programs with a different definition of the problem and 
a set of tasks which cut across different ministries … may not perform well when 
structured along the same [in other words existing] functional lines.’ 
 
The effect on capacity created by the introduction of the EPWP into an existing 
arrangement of line function decision-making authority was in fact mentioned across a 
number of interviews spanning at least three of its four sectors. To begin with, problems 
were raised in relation to the DPW’s role as overall co-ordinator of the programme. 
Before dealing with these, it is necessary to provide some background on the structure 
of the DPW’s co-ordinating role.  
 
It will be recalled that the central role played by the DPW in special public works 
initiatives could be traced back to 1994/1995, when the Department began to host a 
National Public Works Programme, whose activities included experimentation with 
labour-intensive infrastructure delivery across government departments. It should be 
remembered that the DPW had a more loosely defined co-ordinating role under the 
NPWP, where it was tasked with encouraging other government departments to employ 
greater labour-intensive approaches in the delivery of infrastructure, which it supported 
by research and experimentation into appropriate methodologies. The NPWP though 
lacked the concrete output targets and more formal monitoring, evaluation and reporting 
role vis à vis participating sector departments introduced by the EPWP, which was to 
alter the character of the DPW’s erstwhile co-ordinating function. For example, it was 
reported that ‘[d]ifferent public bodies implementing EPWP projects all report directly or 
indirectly to DPW … Furthermore DPW is also responsible for evaluating the overall 
EPWP and the projects that are implemented as part of the EPWP.’ This also comprised 
‘evaluat[ing] how well the EPWP is being implemented, whether or not all public bodies 
are participating and identifying the reasons why they are not participating’ (DPW 2004c: 
2) 
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The structural arrangements to host the EPWP in the DPW mirrored how the NPWP had 
been taken on board. These arrangements began by first incorporating the EPWP within 
the National Public Works Programme branch (NPWP) of the DPW. The Department’s 
2004-2007 Strategic Plan, which coincided with the launch of the EPWP in 2004, 
confirmed that it then comprised a sub-programme falling under the NPWP (NDPW 
2004: 13). This was largely an unremarkable occurrence however when considering that 
the EPWP was simply the next in a line of various programmes which had been housed 
under the NPWP since its inception (see chapter 7).  The EPWP would soon however 
take on a more independent structural identity within the Department, as commented on 
in the same Strategic Plan, which noted that the DPW was in the process of a 
restructuring that would result in the creation of four new branches: Policy and the 
National Public Works Programme, Asset Management, Operations (Regions), and 
Expanded Public Works Programmes (ibid). 
 
The Department’s 2003/4 Annual Report presaged the structural upgrade of the EPWP 
by indicating that the programme was to be overseen under a new Deputy Director-
Generalship (then vacant), which, in organisational terms, was to function alongside a 
restructured NPWP and Policy branch, also headed by a Deputy Director-General (DPW 
2004a: 4). It added that all posts comprising this branch were to be advertised and 
expected to be filled during the course of the 2004/5 financial year (DPW 2004a: 33). In 
the following year’s Annual Report (2004/5) the Department stated that a DDG had been 
appointed to oversee the EPWP branch (DPW 2005a: 4-5). 
 
Although the EPWP would assume a distinct structural identity within the DPW, it would 
continue to function under the strategic umbrella of the NPWP. This was confirmed in 
both the 2003/4 and 2004/5 Annual Reports. The NPWP would continue to function as a 
strategic intervention of the Department focussed on continuing the work of ‘[p]romot[ing] 
transformation in the construction and property sectors and contribut[ing] to poverty 
alleviation, job creation and skills development through labour based projects’ (DPW 
2005a: 13). The EPWP did not therefore replace the NPWP, but functioned on a parallel 
track which was however assigned sole responsibility for co-ordinating the single largest 
programmatic attempt to merge labour intensive infrastructure delivery with socio-
economic asset creation in South Africa. 
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Although the distinct structural identity given to the EPWP was not unprecedented in 
form, given the experience of the NPWP, it did introduce a new set of ‘co-ordination’ 
conditions for the DPW given the output targets, operational design and sectoral 
configuration that the EPWP had to function by. The interview findings revealed that 
these conditions did generate concerns about the ability of the DPW in particular to 
effectively exercise its designated co-ordinating role. A former official of the Department 
recalled a debate prior to the roll out of the EPWP in which the Department’s co-
ordinating role was seriously questioned on the basis of the relative functional authority it 
possessed in government: 
 
And in fact, as officials in public works … we were saying to people in the 
Presidency that it’s going to be very difficult to make this programme work if 
coordination responsibility is given to the Department of Public Works, because 
the Department of Public Works doesn’t have that much influence over other 
departments in government … it’s a relatively junior portfolio in Cabinet, and that 
we suggested that it should be co-ordinated by a central, by a more central body 
with more influence over the rest of government. 
 
 
The same interviewee stated that in their view what has made the EPWP not achieve as 
much job creation as it could have generated, ‘is this institutional problem of how does, 
is the fact that public works is responsible and is held accountable for delivery on the 
programme but it has no authority over other departments nor other spheres of 
government’. Another DPW official commented that the department’s role as co-
ordinator elicited a more mixed reaction, where ‘there are departments that feel that we 
have no right to give guidance on the programmes, or even to tell them what to do with 
the programmes, or even to tell them, you know, what training they should be doing’, 
whereas ‘[t]here are some departments which agree that you know there is a gap and 
we might be playing a role’. The same official conceded however that the DPW lacked a 
source of influence to enforce its co-ordinating function, where ‘[a]t some stage I was 
saying to myself, maybe this unit should have been placed in the Presidency, so that it is 
not identified with a specific line function department.’ 
 
A different perspective on essentially the same problem was offered by a Public Service 
Commission official interviewed for this thesis, who remarked that ‘it’s one of the 
challenges that they [the DPW] face that because they get seen as a responsibility of 
usually the coordinating department, the kind of guidance that is needed at the level of 
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implementation faces challenges’. He likened this to implementing departments 
declaring that ‘[w]e have our own responsibilities, the Expanded Public Works 
Programme is yours’. Employing both perspectives as described above reveals firstly 
that structural constraints on the DPW’s capacity functioned along both horizontal and 
vertical lines, and secondly that these constraints, stemming from the nature of the co-
ordinating role that it assumed under the programme, held potentially wider 
consequences in the shape of implementing department commitment. 
 
Another interviewee painted an even more difficult scenario in which the DPW found 
itself, where ‘constitutionally we [DPW] have to respect the authorities … the line 
functions, because you cannot simply find yourself encroaching into another department 
and begin to tell another, one department cannot tell another department what to do, 
then how do we then do the coordination?’ The interviewee then recalled that despite 
President Thabo Mbeki having instructed the DPW to not only co-ordinate but that it 
‘must be the driver’ of the programme (see Benton 2006), they wondered ‘what 
ammunition are you going to have if you’re supposed to be the driver thereof?’ The 
respondent then conveyed the possibility of ‘internalised fears’ or perceptions amongst 
ministers and department heads about having to report to a ‘super minister’. The thrust 
of the issue then appeared to go beyond just the structural configuration of authority 
being introduced by the EPWP, b  noting the DPW’s resourcing position in the 
programme, or its possession of ‘ammunition’ to influence the actions of contributing 
departments. Earlier it was mentioned that aside from human resources and political 
support, the DPW did not centrally disburse and control the financial resources available 
for the EPWP.  Another official from an EPWP sector department talked about the 
difficulties they believed the DPW experienced as a result of this lack of financial 
ammunition, however, this was again explained in a wider context marked by how line 
functional authority was structured in the government: 
 
I think EPWP has found it much more difficult than Treasury did, because 
Treasury, because it holds the purse strings, is the first among the equal partners 
in government, so they are more powerful ... And more so than we do now with 
EPWP, because it’s more difficult for Treasury to, I mean for [the Department of] 
Public Works to really impose on us in the same way that Treasury could.75 
                                                 
75The interviewee was referring to a programme that his department was implementing under a 
poverty relief allocation overseen by the National Treasury, prior to this programme contributing 
to the EPWP. 
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Capacity constraints arising from the structure of inter-departmental functional authority 
were not limited to the co-ordinating role assigned to the DPW, where this extended to 
the relationships between departments in other EPWP sectors. Again some background 
is necessary. Figure 8.2 illustrates the organisational structure of the EPWP. Although it 
resembles a hierarchical configuration of relations seen for instance in intra-
departmental organograms, what it is supposed to represent is a set of inter-
departmental co-ordinating relationships within the programme, with the DPW assuming 
the status of overall co-ordinator, and with each of the four departmental groupings 
having a designated sector co-ordinating department. At the apex sits an overseeing co-
ordinating structure in the form of a steering committee, constituted by the Heads of the 
DPW, the four sector co-ordinating departments, and the Office of the Presidency. 
 
Figure 8.2: Organisational structure of the EPWP 
Source: Department of Public Works 2004b: 20 
 
Some attempt was made to rationalise the structural relationship of contributing 
departments under the EPWP’s four sectors. This can be seen in how these groupings 
were constituted by public bodies regarded as possessing relevant and related functions 
or portfolio mandates. For instance, the Social sector comprised the Departments of 
Social Development, Education and Health; the Environment and Culture sector 
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consisted of the Departments of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Water Affairs and 
Forestry, and Arts and Culture; the Infrastructure sector involved the DPW along with the 
Department of Transport; whilst the Economic Sector was largely driven by the 
Department of Trade and Industry. Provincial counterparts of national departments and 
municipalities are also taken into account. This structure was generally consistent with 
the evolution of sectoral co-ordinating mechanisms in the wider South African 
government. For example, the introduction of a new Cabinet Committee system in 
2000/2001 saw the clustering of ministries (and corresponding departments) along 
related functional lines. This re-organisation resulted in the creation of six clusters at 
ministerial level: social; economic; investment and employment; international relations, 
peace and security; justice, crime prevention and security; governance and 
administration. Ministerial clusters were also replicated at a senior administrative level, 
consisting of five76 clusters presided over by heads of government departments 
(Directors-General). 
 
With this background in mind, findings from Environment and Culture sector 
departments mirrored the kind of concerns expressed about the capacity of the DPW to 
exercise its co-ordination role. One DPW official, who suggested that many of the 
projects being reported in this sector were being generated by only one department, 
which in this case was the sector’s designated co-ordinating department77, observed 
that: 
 
As you can see DEAT is a department, it would be difficult for DEAT to even 
enforce EPWP implementation in Department of Agriculture … or to go to 
Department of Agriculture to enforce implementation of EPWP as DEAT 
department, because as you can see here from the line of authority these 
departments are on the same line, so DEAT does not have that upper power to 
make sure that Agriculture or Water Affairs has done what it’s supposed to be 
done. 
 
 
                                                 
76The economic, investment and employment clusters were combined as part of the Director-
General (DG) Clusters (The Presidency 2001: 16). 
77
 Figures for the 2006/2007 financial year showed that work opportunities generated by projects 
were in fact dominated by two departments in the Sector: DEAT and the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry. These two departments, and particularly DEAT, were also given the largest 
financial resource allocation by far amongst all departments in the Sector (DPW 2007b: Annexure 
C1). The respondent’s point about the capacity of the DEAT to ‘enforce’ EPWP implementation 
on other departments in the sector is otherwise taken. 
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The constraints emerging from the structuring of line functional authority between 
departments in the Environment and Culture sector were more acutely expressed in 
another interview, which responded to an expectation that the lead department in this 
sector would need to ‘validate’ the contributions being made by other departments 
before reporting these to the DPW. An official in the sector’s co-ordinating department 
commented that ‘[i] do not have the capacity or the locus standi to be able to go and 
institute those kind of things and then in addition ask my staff to conduct site 
inspections’. The same official explained that they did not think it was possible ‘to be 
able to conduct site inspections on behalf of another department, even as a sector lead 
department’. Although not directly relevant to the Environment and Culture sector, 
further insight into the kind of difficulty that a co-ordinating department like DEAT or for 
that matter the DPW faced, arose in an interview with an official at the Public Service 
Commission. This individual indicated that it came down to a question of accountability, 
where officials usually accounted directly to their own departmental managers and not 
necessarily to officials in departments co-ordinating a joint programme initiative like the 
EPWP. This then presented difficulties for co-ordinating departments to ensure that if 
reports were not forthcoming they could directly enforce the compliance of officials over 
whom they did not exercise direct accountability, without going through their line 
managers first. 
 
Capacity-related constraints arising from the configuration of line functional authority 
under the EPWP also appeared in the Social sector, where this time the source of the 
constraints appears to have arisen from hierarchical rank designations at both a national 
and provincial level. This gives a more nuanced picture of the cross-departmental 
accountability constraints referred to by the PSC official. An official based in the sector’s 
national co-ordinating department recalled that: 
 
[O]ne of the big problems that we had as coordinating the sector was that we 
didn’t have the power actually to talk to a Chief Director in another department on 
something on A, B and C, you know it just couldn’t be done … One of the other 
challenges also is to get people to understand on the provincial level that they 
really have to work together in an integrated manner, and that ranks are a little bit 
beside the point … I’ve been to one of the provinces and I was asking the lady 
specifically, listen, how are you working now together, she said no there have 
been challenges because she’s on a, say, assistant director level, the person 
who is running, a director say in Education, and she feels her rank is too low to 
work with her, so she’s not properly informed 
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The interviewee noted that one of the problems that their department initially78 
confronted was that the level at which it had designated functional responsibility for the 
EPWP did not equate to the level designated by other departments in the Sector. A 
similar scenario was described at the provincial level, where unequal rank designations 
appeared to have hampered the ability of departmental officials to consult across 
departments. 
 
A more interesting set of circumstances conveyed elsewhere by this interviewee might 
help to explain earlier resourcing constraints affecting the capacity of national Social 
sector departments, and the DPW, to mobilise resources in the form of inter-
governmental support and co-operation (provincial governments) to facilitate the sector’s 
response to the EPWP. Although these circumstances do not explicitly point to the 
structure of line functional authority relations, the suggestion is that structural factors, 
which potentially included rank designation hierarchy conflict as noted above, may have 
contributed to the outcome of Social sector departments in some provinces not having 
received equitable share revenues as part of a R4,2 billion package appropriated in 
2006/2007. It should be conceded that this thesis was unable to uncover evidence 
indicating precisely why monies distributed as part of this appropriation was re-
redirected to other programmes, and consequently did not flow to all provincial 
departments concerned. Having said this, an official of a national Social sector 
department did report that there had been a failure to finalise provincial business plans 
for ECD activities. This was linked back to earlier sector plan between national and 
provincial departments being hurriedly compiled at the request of the DPW in 2003 for 
Cabinet consideration, and at the expense of national departments fully consulting with 
provincial counterparts. The official reported that ‘[n]ow up till now, we also do not have 
the final business plans yet, for implementation … on the Expanded Public Works 
Programme’, where ‘the HoDs [Heads of Department] have signed it off, we have drafts, 
but not the final document’. 
 
If it can be conjectured that non-finalised planning could have influenced political 
decision-makers in some provinces to withhold and transfer funds intended for Social 
sector EPWP activities, and ECD programmes in particular, to other provincial 
                                                 
78The same official elsewhere reported that the Department had since designated an official at 
the rank of Chief Director to oversee its role on the EPWP. 
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programmes, then the interviewee’s description of the incomplete (referring to inter-
departmental) process of trying to finalise provincial planning across various 
departmental structures may have contributed to this result. This, when read in the 
context of Paul’s assumption that new programmes with a different definition of a 
problem and tasks that cut across different ministries might not perform well when 
structured along existing functional lines. The interviewee continued that: 
 
[B]ut now you must remember the situation requires that the different 
departments on the provincial level must now come also in and work together, 
because that’s what’s now required, they had to put business plans together …   
there’s a unrealistic expectation on how fast processes can move, even if you 
have the money. 
 
Another manifestation of how the configuration of line functional authority introduced by 
the EPWP may have affected the capacity of the DPW to encourage operational 
compliance was observed in the Infrastructure sector. A former official of the DPW 
explained that one of the authority ‘tools’ that the DPW had at its disposal in this sector 
was the Division of Revenue Act, where EPWP-related conditions were attached to the 
release of provincial and municipal infrastructure grants which were sanctioned under 
this statute. They added however that ‘the Division of Revenue Act specifies clearly that 
provinces and municipalities must use the tender and design guidelines for infrastructure 
projects … but very few as far as I know still relatively few municipalities and provinces 
are literally using those guidelines, they’re ignoring the Division of Revenue Act, and no 
one does anything about it’ Another DPW official relayed a similar observation: 
 
I mean if you look at the Infrastructure sector, there are some people who do not 
follow guidelines and they get away with it, and those guidelines are based on 
the DORA, and they get away with it, so we need to be able to enforce certain 
regulations of government to say this will be done. 
 
Although these observations recall earlier strategic conditions (influenced by prevailing 
needs and commitments, and ideological factors) that likely influenced the lack of tender 
and design guideline use by Infrastructure sector departments, in the context of the 
present variable it revealed the structural incapacity of the DPW, as the co-ordinating 
department for the sector and the programme as a whole, to encourage or otherwise 
enforce EPWP compliance on provincial and local authorities. This again reflected Paul’s 
reference to ‘programs with a different definition of the problem and a set of tasks which 
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cut across different ministries [and in this case, levels of government]’. It should 
moreover be remembered that these sub-national governments were expected to adapt 
their existing line function infrastructure delivery activities to operating guidelines being 
imposed by the EPWP via the DPW. 
 
Other structural constraints which affected the co-ordinating capacity of the DPW in the 
Infrastructure sector appeared to have arisen more directly from the process of 
embedding responsibility for the EPWP within existing line functional activities. A DPW 
official remarked on a problem observed in provincial departments of Transport, where 
there were ‘huge inconsistencies’ cited in the outputs being reported, where this was 
ultimately connected to how reporting responsibilities for the programme were implanted 
in existing line functions. In this instance the official described a scenario where 
reporting was essentially being split, where one official in a department’s finance section 
wrote the ‘Treasury report’, or in other words a more general report required from 
provincial departments on how they spent their overall PIG allocation; whilst another 
official prepared the ‘EPWP report’, which was more specifically focussed on reporting 
outputs for this particular programme. The inconsistencies emerged as a consequence 
of how functional reporting on EPWP outputs was arranged, the structuring of which also 
seems to reflect Paul’s description of a development programme’s monitoring 
processes, and in particular the extent of the shift from a bureaucratic observance of 
procedures to programme performance. In wider terms, the reporting inconsistencies 
could ultimately be linked to the fact that, on the one hand, the EPWP constituted a 
stand-alone programme with expected targets and outputs, whilst on the other hand 
these outputs and targets were expected to be generated and met via an existing 
resourcing instrument (PIG), which possessed its own functional reporting protocols. 
 
A final observation from the interview findings appeared to again speak to Paul’s 
concern about the extent to which programmes structured along existing line functions 
were, through their implementing bodies, able to respond to the particular demands and 
in some cases uncertainties generated by these initiatives. This time the findings 
revealed the structural incapacity of the DPW to respond to tasks which were judged as 
falling outside its designated functional remit in the EPWP, but which arose 
unexpectedly in the course of the programme’s implementation. The issue at hand arose 
in an interview with the National Treasury, in the context of a discussion on the financing 
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of the DPW’s EPWP Unit. A Treasury official recalled that the Unit had previously 
motivated for increases to its budget allocation which in Treasury’s opinion appeared to 
overstep what it believed to be the Unit’s primary responsibility to monitor and co-
ordinate EPWP activities. The example given by the Treasury official concerned 
mentorship and entrepreneurial learnership programmes in the construction industry, 
where according to the Treasury the Unit appeared to be motivating that it should 
become more directly involved in the planning, execution and funding of these activities, 
which was denied on the grounds of functional responsibility resting with a construction 
industry SETA. The official remarked: ‘we, I think, took the stance that we thought this is 
not really Public Works’ function, because you’ve got a construction education and 
training authority, that specific SETA for the construction industry, and we were of the 
opinion those guys should rather drive those processes rather than public works’ They 
further explained that: 
 
You see it doesn’t serve purpose for a national department to take over the 
functions of other institutions or entities, so it won’t serve any purpose to, even 
for a short term intervention, for a national department to take over let’s say the 
tasks of a tertiary institution, or a SETA, of whatever the case might be, I mean it 
might help you in the short term but it’s not a long term solution. 
 
 
Although the Treasury’s opinion on where the EPWP Unit’s functional role should stop 
was clear enough, this passage also revealed that the learnership example seemed to 
have arisen from unforeseen operational difficulties experienced by the SETA in 
question in carrying out these learnership obligations, which motivated ‘taking over’ in 
the short-term the functions of another organisation. This was confirmed elsewhere by 
the Treasury official where the construction industry SETA had apparently run out of 
money. 79 The DPW’s attempt, as overall co-ordinator of the EPWP, to motivate for 
additional government funds which it could allocate to address the shortfall, obtained the 
following response from the Treasury: ‘no, that’s not the intention of your [DPW] 
functions, and ultimately those were then denied those requests’. 
 
Further examination of this particular incident raises pertinent questions about the 
functional rigidity that was in this case applied by the National Treasury, where although 
                                                 
79The financial problems of the Construction SETA was also mentioned in an interview with a 
DPW official 
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the DPW did not possess the primary functional mandate to implement learnership 
activities, it did otherwise possess considerable functional experience in the construction 
industry where these learnerships were expected to take place. This would tend to lend 
further credence to Paul’s concern about structuring development programmes, which 
introduce new service delivery demands that cut across different organisations, within 
existing functional mandates, where the latter in this case was rigidly adhered to and 
hindered the capacity of the DPW to respond to unexpected needs. 
 
8.4.1 Overall impressions on the structure of the EPWP 
 
This section on the structure of the EPWP began by suggesting that the findings so far 
had detected potential structural constraints on the capacity of its implementing 
organisations. This mainly recalled strategic factors undermining the DPW’s capacity to 
encourage departmental compliance with the programme’s job creation and training 
objectives, and accompanying operating conditions. 
 
Findings on the EPWP’s structure were remarkably consistent with and expanded on 
this earlier observation, where the programme’s configuration of structural relations 
confirmed Paul’s assumption about bureaucratic constraints accompanying the 
introduction of a programme with a different definition of a problem and tasks that cut 
across different organisations being structured along existing functional lines. 
Departments in at least three of the EPWP’s four sectors expressed concerns about the 
capacity constraints experienced whilst implementing the programme, where this mainly 
exposed conflicts of hierarchy (similar to the CASP case) generated by line functional 
authority designations introduced by the initiative. This emerged most strongly where the 
relationship between implementing organisations was structured according to ‘co-
ordinator’ and ‘co-ordinated’ roles. In other instances capacity constraints were 
experienced in relation to how EPWP demands were accommodated within existing line 
functional structures. In one case this produced inconsistencies in provincial 
Infrastructure sector monitoring due to the procedural arrangements by which EPWP 
outputs were being recorded and reported inside departments, which adversely affected 
the capacity of the DPW to ensure consistency of reported outputs. In another case the 
DPW’s overall co-ordinating capacity was constrained by its inability to intervene in a 
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programming area that was designated as falling outside of its line functional mandate 
(namely construction sector learnership activities). 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented an analysis of factors associated with the strategy, 
environment and structure of the EPWP, which were found to have influenced the 
capacity of its implementing organizations to carry out the programme. The impressions 
documented in this chapter will contribute to a consolidated identification of factors in the 
next chapter, which will conclude this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will summarise the main findings and wider research contributions that this 
thesis has tried to make by examining the administrative ‘capacity’ to implement 
development programmes. It will begin by summarising the premise, and the motivation 
behind the premise that influenced the study’s interpretation of administrative capacity, 
and which eventually informed the research question and conceptual and theoretical 
outline. This chapter will then identify and discuss the overarching factors found to have 
influenced the capacity of public administrations to implement the CASP and EPWP 
development programmes. The thesis will then outline the contribution that this thesis 
has sought to make to wider research on administrative capacity in developing countries, 
and end by outlining a further research agenda to examine this subject in the South 
African context. 
 
 9.2 Administrative capacity: outlining the premise 
 
The premise that this study came to associate with administrative capacity – which 
generally refers to the ability of public administrations to function – emerged almost 
entirely from observing how frequently and in what form the term capacity had been 
employed in discussions and debates about the performance of South Africa’s public 
administrations (outlined in chapters 1 and 2). A more detailed examination of the local 
academic literature on administrative capacity revealed that a concern for the capacity of 
the country’s public administration had in fact been present at the very outset of its 
political transition to a non-racial democracy in the mid 1990s. Moreover, its usage was 
closely associated with the significant increase in the socio-economic development 
demands that political transformation handed to a new government and a restructured 
public administration. In this context, the predominate view of capacity that emerged 
came to be defined by whether South Africa’s public administrations possessed the 
requisite or sufficient capacity to respond to an expanded agenda of development 
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demands, and where this was deemed not to be the case, that this capacity should be 
acquired, or in other words built or strengthened.  
 
This thesis then submitted that such a twofold interpretation of the term capacity had 
tended to be translated into some measure of sufficient human (mostly), material or 
financial resources (suggested by the phrase ‘lack of’), where it was treated as an item 
that was judged to be either adequately present in an administrative setting or not, and if 
not, required remedy. This study then indicated that while it generally accepted the 
argument that a lack of human, material and financial resources could affect the ability of 
public administrations to function, where such deficiencies ought to be rectified, relying 
solely on such a twofold interpretation of capacity limited the contextual scope for 
understanding the underlying factors that potentially affected these conditions. In other 
words, the prevailing twofold interpretation of the term did not adequately explain how 
the organisational and operational circumstances under which public administrations 
functioned might influence or affect their capacity to d liver services and implement 
programmes. 
 
With this in mind, this thesis proposed the following research question: 
 
What are the factors that influence the capacity of public administrations in South 
Africa to carry out development programmes? 
 
The primary aim of this study was to systematically isolate, define and examine the 
effects of factors that could be observed as influencing the capacity of South African 
public sector organisations to carry out development programmes. It was then 
suggested that isolating and examining the characteristics of such factors would enable 
additional  explanatory and theoretical insights to be drawn about the administrative 
circumstances (the organisational and operational conditions) that underlie more 
common applications of the term capacity, that is, ‘lack of’ in South Africa. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on identifying and discussing the four 
overarching factors that this study, based on findings from two case development 
programmes, found to have influenced administrative capacity. These are: 
 
1. Adaptability of programme objectives 
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2. Flexibility of programme operating rules 
3. Functional accommodation of demands introduced by a programme 
4. Inter-organisational authority relations. 
 
9.3 Discussion of overarching factors found to have influenced 
administrative capacity 
 
 
An outline of the four key factors mentioned above is presented in accordance with the 
three variables and sub-variable categories used in this study to examine public sector-
administered development programmes. These variables, adapted from research by 
Paul (1983; 1982), in this study’s estimation best approximated its primary task of 
investigating the organisational and operational circumstances under which public 
administrations carried out development programmes, in order to isolate factors affecting 
their capacity. This section begins with the ‘strategy’ variable. 
 
9.3.1 Strategic factors influencing capacity 
 
 
A development programme’s strategy, in relation to Paul’s framework, encompassed the 
circumstances under which objectives were set for it by the government, how these 
objectives were translated into operating goals and action plans, and finally the 
conditions underpinning its resourcing. Circumstances associated with the strategic 
makeup of the two development programmes were widely reported in this study. 
Beginning with the objective makeup of CASP and the EPWP, it was evident that a key 
factor common to both programmes, which affected the capacity of their implementing 
organisations, was the adaptability of programme objectives. Adaptability in this 
instance refers to the extent to which the makeup of the objectives introduced by the 
programmes could be accommodated within the prevailing operational circumstances of 
participating departments. However, the conditions under which this occurred differed for 
the two programmes. 
 
For CASP, a notable concern expressed by just over half of the provincial departments 
interviewed stemmed from the objective requirement that 70 per cent of monies received 
under the programme had to be directed at government land reform programmes and 
their corresponding beneficiaries, where in observing a distinction between servicing 
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land reform and non land reform beneficiaries on the basis of farming potential and 
attitudinal attributes, departments were citing an increased risk to their ability to service 
the latter clientele. The portrayal of this risk also seemed to correspond with comments 
made by other interviewees who were expressing doubts about the commercial focus 
and corresponding viability of CASP. The prevailing operational circumstances within 
which this key objective of CASP was introduced was defined by a situation where 
limited and ad hoc administrative attention had been given, prior to CASP coming on the 
scene, to the agricultural support element linked to initiatives designed to improve 
access to land. Concerns expressed about provincial department capacity to respond to 
the beneficiary circumstances introduced by this objective requirement of CASP also 
revealed insights about the limited flexibility that provinces appeared to possess in 
defining the land reform beneficiary audience being prioritised by the programme. It also 
created the possibility of an objective tension between, on the one hand, providing post-
settlement support to land reform beneficiaries, and a key output attached to the 
programme’s objective of strengthening existing agricultural support services, where this 
was intended to enhance the ‘productive capacity and economic success’ of its 
beneficiaries. 
 
A similar but potentially more serious situation was evident in the EPWP case, where 
departments in all four of the programme’s sector groupings were exhibiting a broader 
reluctance to take on board the labour-intensive job creation philosophy being 
introduced by the programme. Unlike in the CASP Programme, sector departments were 
afforded greater discretion to determine how best to allocate available resources under 
their existing activities to respond to the EPWP’s job creation objective, through 
intensifying the use of labour. However, prevailing operational circumstances in 
participating departments, encompassing existing modalities of delivery80 (i.e., Economic 
sector), prevailing needs and commitments (i.e., Infrastructure sector), and in other 
cases ideological factors (i.e., Infrastructure, Social and Environment and Culture 
sectors), contributed to this reluctance. Ultimately, this affected the capacity of these 
departments to respond to this core objective of the EPWP, and more acutely affected 
the ability of the Department of Public Works, as the programme’s designated co-
                                                 
80The resourcing circumstances of public sector bodies could also be included under ‘existing 
modalities of delivery’. This study found for instance that conflicting as well as constraining 
statutory requirements governing the procurement of goods and services affected the capacity of 
municipalities in particular to comply with EPWP requirements. 
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ordinator, to ‘have room to initiate and influence the formulation of strategy’, as Paul 
(1982: 110) has described. 
 
A second major factor that was common to both programmes studied, and which was 
found to have produced more tangible effects on implementing department capacity, 
concerned the flexibility of programme operating rules. In both cases, implementing 
departments were limited in the extent to which they could determine and plan the 
specific activities through which they would be expected to contribute to programme 
objectives. This factor spoke directly to Paul’s (1982: 110) statement that ‘some 
situations yield greater flexibility to the program manager [or in this case implementing 
departments] to choose, interpret, and sequence operating goals’. 
 
In the CASP case, despite the specification of six agricultural support service pillars 
being promoted by the programme, and direct references claiming otherwise, provincial 
departments of agriculture enjoyed little de facto control over the interpretation, selection 
and sequencing of all available services, which prioritised the delivery of on/off farm 
infrastructure, and which effectively constrained their capacity to cater to other 
potentially more pressing service needs identified in their regions. This thesis suggested, 
moreover, that the maintenance of this situation seems to have been objectively 
influenced by provincial departments having to prioritise the needs of land reform 
beneficiaries, where infrastructure was cited as having been a neglected service area 
directed at this clientele. The capacity constraints experienced by provincial departments 
of agriculture resulting from the limited extent to which these organisations could 
determine and plan their interventions, were most markedly evident in human (i.e., 
engineers and extension officers) and physical resource (i.e., procurement rules) 
deficiencies and impediments, which exposed the inability of provincial departments to 
adequately respond to these demands. Finally, the capacity of the national and 
provincial departments of agriculture to deliver their support interventions to land reform 
beneficiaries was further constrained by the operating rules linking CASP with land 
reform programmes being carried out by the national Department of Land Affairs. This 
issue will be discussed further in a later section on structural factors. 
 
A generally similar scenario was observed in the EPWP case, where inflexible, and in 
some instances inconsistent and conflicting operating rules governing the job creation 
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and training expectations of the programme inhibited the capacity of departments in 
some sectors to fashion their interventions in response to these objectives. Furthermore, 
departmental operating inflexibility was perhaps most widely felt across sector 
departments in adjusting to the ‘accreditation’ rules attached to the delivery of training, 
which essentially exposed a disjuncture between the operating demands being 
introduced by the EPWP and the ability of the government’s overall training accreditation 
scheme to service (especially through resource mobilisation) the accreditation 
requirements of contributing departments. 
 
 
9.3.2 Environmental factors influencing capacity 
 
 
Environmental factors affecting capacity overwhelmingly concerned instances of 
‘uncertainty’ which, according to Paul, arose from unforeseen, or sudden or 
unpredictable changes precipitated by the socio-economic, political and physical 
conditions of a development programme’s beneficiaries. The findings showed that 
instances of uncertainty, which were evident in both CASP and the EPWP, involved, in 
the first case, difficulties faced by some provincial departments of agriculture in being 
able to negotiate intra-group socio-economic and political dynamics generated by land 
reform beneficiaries. Having said this, the observation that these ‘group’ dynamics were 
generated by how land reform beneficiaries organised themselves to acquire access to 
land via government-prescribed programming rules, spoke directly to the objective 
make-up of CASP (i.e., 70 per cent of funding directed at land reform programmes and 
their corresponding beneficiaries), and to the adaptability of its objectives as discussed 
earlier. In the EPWP case, the socio-economic circumstances of beneficiaries did affect 
their response to the delivery of training and the formalisation of Social sector services 
under the programme. 
 
 9.3.3 Structural factors influencing capacity 
 
 
Structural factors affecting capacity referred to the functional and organisational 
arrangements in place to support a development programme’s implementation. Findings 
from both case studies were mostly consistent with a key assumption that Paul 
associated with a programme’s structural makeup, which suggested that features linked 
to what he termed the ‘bureaucratic mode’ could pose severe constraints for a 
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development programme’s structure. The constraints that he associated with the 
bureaucratic mode arose from development programmes being embedded within the 
existing line functions of their implementing bodies, where these bodies were inclined to 
impose a centralised decision-making structure on a programme. This description also 
reflected characteristics associated with development bureaucracies mentioned in 
chapter 2: hierarchical structures and adherence to general rules. The first major 
structural factor found to have influenced departmental capacity across both 
programmes highlighted what could be described as the functional accommodation of 
demands introduced by a programme. 
 
 
In the case of CASP, a factor found to have stubbornly constrained the capacity of both 
the national and provincial departments of agriculture to respond to the important land 
reform clientele concerned the temporal disjuncture experienced in releasing agricultural 
support services under CASP, to beneficiaries who had accessed land via separate 
government programmes such as LRAD. This disjuncture could essentially be traced to 
a misalignment in the rules governing when CASP could release agricultural support 
services, and rules applying to the provision of land to beneficiaries. Having observed 
this, the structural nature of this problem stemmed from these rules having been 
functionally embedded in the practice of separate departmental bodies, i.e., national and 
provincial departments of agriculture, and a national Department of Land Affairs, both of 
which astonishingly reported to the same political head (Minister of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs). Other instances where provincial department capacity was affected by the 
functional accommodation of new demands introduced by CASP saw some departments 
being either functionally ill-prepared or unclear about how to absorb the supplementary 
contribution that the programme made to their existing delivery of farmer support 
services. In other cases, this was displayed in the cumbersome arrangements resulting 
from how CASP was embedded in existing provincial department functional structures. 
 
The effects on capacity produced by the functional accommodation of CASP were also 
evident in the EPWP case. To a large extent this could be traced to the inherent makeup 
of the programme, which required sectorally diverse departmental structures to 
contribute to the objective of labour-intensive job creation and training via their existing 
functional activities. Having said this, an analysis of the actual workings of the EPWP 
tended to confirm that the capacity of some departments, especially the Department of 
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Public Works (DPW), designated as the overall co-ordinator of the programme, was 
affected by the extent to which contributing departments demonstrated an ability to 
operationally absorb the objective demands being introduced by the programme. 
Although strategic factors such as the adaptability of the EPWP’s labour-intensive job 
creation objective, and the flexibility of its operating rules, had already exposed potential 
difficulties for departments to functionally accommodate the programme’s demands, in 
other instances these took on a more distinct structural profile. 
 
Examples included the complicated monitoring procedures exercised by provincial 
infrastructure-delivery departments in functionally reporting on the EPWP, which 
ultimately affected the ability of the sector’s co-ordinating department (DPW) to ensure 
consistency in outputs being reported. Another example which demonstrated the extent 
to which the DPW, as the programme’s overall co-ordinator, was functionally constrained 
from responding to uncertainties arising from the implementation of the EPWP, related to 
its inability to assume emergency responsibility for learnership programmes in the 
construction industry, which were judged as falling outside its functional mandate. 
 
The second major structural factor found to have influenced the capacity of CASP and 
EPWP implementing departments was attributed to inter-organisational authority 
relations. The findings interestingly showed that although the nature of the authority 
relations in both cases exposed structural conflicts of hierarchy, this did not conform to 
what Paul described as the imposition of centralised structures, where this was rather 
attributed to decentralised, and in other cases horizontally configured, structural 
arrangements. In the CASP case, this was most visibly expressed in the monitoring and 
oversight role performed by the national Department of Agriculture (DOA), compared to 
the responsibilities for on-the-ground implementation assumed by provincial 
departments of agriculture. This exposed concerns about ‘turf’ issues and inter-
organisational ‘impositions’, demonstrating conflicts of hierarchy which affected the 
capacity of the DOA to effectively exercise its monitoring and oversight role under the 
programme. It should be remembered that the public agricultural sector in South Africa 
was constitutionally decentralised, where functional responsibilities were shared 
between a national and provincial departments. 
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A similar but more complex scenario was evident in the EPWP, where cases of 
hierarchical conflict sprang from the co-ordinator and co-ordinated roles and associated 
responsibilities assumed by departments under the Programme. This functioned on 
vertical and horizontal axes, was observed at both national and provincial levels of 
government, and was evident at the level of rank designations of officials. The capacity 
constraints on departments assigned a co-ordinator role was especially acute for the 
DPW, whose responsibility as overall Programme co-ordinator of the EPWP had 
become more formalised and output sensitive vis à vis sector departments participating 
in labour-intensive public works schemes. At the same time, the department’s relative 
standing among peer group departments to exercise this role, which did not include the 
authority to allocate funds to other departments, was considered by some to have limited 
its ability to exercise strategic influence. 
 
Findings from both programmes suggest that inter-organisational authority relations, 
which exposed bureaucratic conflicts of hierarchy and which functioned in a 
decentralised environment, do not, ipso facto, undermine the validity of Paul’s emphasis 
on the bureaucratic effects of centralised decision-making structures. Rather, it would be 
more appropriate to say that the evidence extends Paul’s observation, because issues at 
the core of his concern with the effects of centralised structures, including the 
configuration of decision-making and the exercise of discretion, were also evident in how 
the decentralised relationship between public organisations contributing to both 
programmes was structured. 
 
9.4 Significance of the findings to existing research on administrative 
      capacity 
 
 
The factors found to have influenced administrative capacity, which again emphasised 
the organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations 
implement development programmes, were generally consistent with the effects on 
capacity of inter-organisational relationships, intra-organisational settings, and 
institutional rules as observed by previous scholars such as Grindle and Hilderbrand 
(1995), Umeh and Adranovich (2005), and Wallis (2000). The findings also generally 
corresponded with and were given more local expression in the observations of South 
African public administration academics interviewed for this study. This included a 
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reference to bureaucratic constraints adversely affecting inter-organisational cooperation 
(at vertical and horizontal levels); as well as the effects on capacity of how shared 
functional mandates were negotiated across levels of government (i.e. national and 
provincial), which one academic referred to as ‘… joining things up …’ It will be 
remembered that another academic referred to the potential problem faced by 
organisations tasked with a coordinating role, in influencing the contributions of 
partnering organisations. The EPWP case spoke specifically to this scenario. 
 
Both the CASP and EPWP case examples clearly demonstrated that the capacity which 
public administrations possess, or seek to possess, and which is typically reflected in 
human resourcing capability, can often be adversely affected by or subject to specific 
organisational and operational conditions and imperatives that are potentially 
changeable and not necessarily then fixed. This observation would tend to advise 
against overly static and simplistic assessments of public administration’s ‘lack of 
capacity’, which would logically accept that throwing more capacity at a public policy 
problem will, in and of itself, advance a solution. 
 
The findings of this thesis also interestingly corresponded with observations made in 
research contemporary to Samuel Paul’s work that so influenced this study’s analytical 
framework. This research was contained in Grindle’s (1980) edited volume, Politics and 
Policy Implementation in the Third World. The case research published in this volume 
found, similar to this thesis, that administrative capacity to implement development 
programmes is sometimes adversely affected by broader organisational and operational 
factors. These most notably included policy objective/goal setting, choices about a 
programme’s implementing organisations, and the effects on programme implementation 
of decentralised structural arrangements. 
 
Focussing back on the findings of this thesis, a closer look at the specific organisational 
and operational conditions that influenced capacity revealed that the bureaucratic 
characteristics associated with public administrations featured strongly, and it is hoped, 
has added usefully to the employment of middle range theoretical approaches. This was 
again consonant with existing literature such as Bryant and White’s (1982) reference to 
‘administrative incapacity’ and Brinkerhoff’s (1991a: 16) description of development 
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programmes being ‘located in organizations’, where these are ‘subject to the 
bureaucratic context in which its implementing organization(s) are situated’. 
 
These bureaucratic characteristics were given sharper definition through Paul’s 
framework in the following ways: In the first instance this took the form of inflexible, 
inconsistent and conflicting operating as well as objective rules to which implementing 
departments were bound under the two programmes. The consequences that this 
generated for administrative capacity were reflected in limited departmental flexibility and 
discretion to respond to the objective and operational demands introduced by the 
development programmes, where this also created tensions between participating 
departments depending on the roles they assumed under the programmes (i.e. 
monitoring versus implementation, co-ordinator versus co-ordinated). A notable example 
from CASP ironically seemed to show that rule compliance may have even contributed 
to increasing environmental uncertainty, which adversely affected the capacity of 
provincial departments of agriculture. This seemed to sp ak to Rondinelli’s reference to 
public administrations adopting control-oriented planning where this was perceived as a 
means of reducing uncertainty. The example relates to agriculturally servicing groups of 
land reform beneficiaries who had accessed land via rules governing land reform 
programmes being administered by a second government department (i.e. Land Affairs). 
 
In the second instance, the fact that centralised hierarchical structures were not a 
feature of either programme did not remove the saliency of hierarchy itself, where the 
circumstances attending decentralised and horizontally configured81 structural 
arrangements did expose capacity constraints arising from conflicts of hierarchy 
expressed through inter-organisational authority relations. 
 
9.5 Scope for further research on administrative capacity 
  
 
The aim of this study was to try to demonstrate that the prevailing interpretation of 
administrative capacity in the South African literature did not adequately capture how the 
organisational and operational circumstances under which public administrations 
                                                 
81In discussing bureaucracy as an impediment to development administration, Milne (1973: 415) 
interestingly commented that ‘it has been said that horizontal relations, as opposed to vertical 
relations, were neglected by Weber’. 
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functioned might also influence their ability to deliver services and implement 
programmes. This premise was adopted in response to a situation where administrative 
capacity, in terms of the developmental response of public administrations, had become 
fixated on the possession and acquisition of sufficient human (mostly), as well as 
financial and material resources. It is firstly hoped that the four overarching factors found 
to have influenced the capacity of public administrations to carry out CASP and the 
EPWP have contributed to the overall aim, by demonstrating that administrative capacity 
should also be interpreted as a mixture of disabling constraints that affect or act upon a 
public body’s resources. Secondly, it is also hoped that the insights drawn about the 
implications of these factors, in terms of the study of public bureaucracies, have 
contributed to Van Ufford’s call (in chapter 2) for further research into the organisational 
problems arising ‘in between’ the intentions of development policy and its effects. 
 
As a final note, it is instructive to illustrate why there remains real potential to employ the 
same interpretative approach to analysing administrative capacity in the South African 
case. This was evident in a document made available to the researcher by government 
officials during the course of this study. The document, outlining a framework for the 
management of joint programmes, presented a set of guidelines to be used by 
government departments when jointly implementing individual programmes, especially 
those with a development focus. These were defined as interventions requiring cross-
departmental involvement in planning, budgeting and service delivery, and where a 
number of departments were often responsible for specific aspects of the programme, 
but where none was responsible for it in its entirety (Governance and Administration 
Cluster 2005: 5) This definition encapsulated the two programmes examined by this 
thesis. The problem emerged in the document’s explicit reference to capacity, which, 
following the conventional approach where the term was limited to problems arising from 
‘lack of capacity and capability deficiencies in government departments’, was later 
defined and distinguished as follows: 
 
There is therefore a clear distinction between what can be referred to as capacity 
and what is referred to as capability. Capacity is more related to issues of human 
resources (personnel, budget and infrastructure) whilst capability relates to 
competency, that is, the ability to apply knowledge and skills to achieve goals. 
(Governance and Administration Cluster 2005: 6). 
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Again, with an obvious focus on the possession of human capacity and what it 
distinguished as capability, or the application of this capacity, a wider reading of the 
document indicated that nowhere was an explicit connection being drawn between these 
interpretations of administrative capacity and potentially influential factors in the wider 
organisational and operational environments in which programmes were jointly 
delivered. Indeed, the following statement seemed to partially illustrate this gap: 
 
This framework is aimed at addressing the weaknesses in the current procedures 
and processes of planning, budgeting and implementation that are hampered by 
weak capability to deliver. (Governance and Administration Cluster 2005: 3). 
 
A relevant question arising from the statement, in terms of the working definition of 
capacity used in this thesis, would be: to what extent can current procedures and 
processes of planning, budgeting and implementation also have an effect on the 
capability to deliver? This effectively turns the aim as described in the above quotation 
on its head, by recognising that the capacity to deliver could be as much a function of 
organisational and operational processes as it could be an enabler of these. Having said 
this, there is, in the considered opinion of this researcher, extensive scope for examining 
administrative capacity from the former perspective, not only in view of the widespread 
use in South Africa of development programmes as a service delivery vehicle, but also 
as a reflection of the increasing organisational complexity by which these programmes 
are being implemented, exemplified by the government’s need to establish guidelines for 
joint departmental implementation. 
 
From a research perspective, the continued use of case studies would, in the short-term, 
further enrich an understanding of the complexities of inter-departmental development 
programme implementation, and the effects on administrative capacity. Given the large 
number of programmes being implemented throughout the South African bureaucracy 
however, it would be equally advisable to work towards refining relevant analytical 
frameworks for gathering data on larger numbers of programmes in pursuit of 
generalisability. The use of semi-structured questionnaires could usefully aid this pursuit. 
Finally, there is also scope and indeed an expectation within the comparative public 
administration literature to examine multiple country cases, which could include cross-
country analysis of factors that influence administrative capacity to implement 
development programmes. One example that could support this purpose from the 
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developing world could include an analysis of South African, Indian and Brazilian 
bureaucracies in view of the increasingly close trilateral relationship forming under the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum, which includes sharing experiences in public administration 
(Tshwane IBSA Summit Declaration 2007). It would be fascinating to examine the 
relatedness of factors affecting administrative capacity, given the different administrative 
histories of these countries coupled with their shared development challenges. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Questionnaire on administrative capacity 
 
 
As an introduction to the contents of appendix one, which is presented overleaf, it is 
necessary to refer to the brief questionnaire distributed to South African public 
administration academics as it contains an important conceptual proviso. Chapter four 
indicated that ‘capacity’ was described to the respondents as the ‘inherent’ ability of 
public bureaucracies to carry out development programmes, where they were asked to 
identify, from their experience, key inherent constraints affecting the ability of South 
African public administrations to carry out these programmes. These inherent constraints 
were meant to signify the in-built structures, mechanisms and modes of administrative 
decision-making and actions that formed part of the process of implementing 
development programmes. 
 
Having said this, in the course of one interview an academic respondent signaled a 
potential interpretive problem with the notion of ‘inherent’ constraints. The researcher re-
examined this wording in relation to the perspective of capacity being advanced by this 
thesis. Although the idea of inherent constraints was originally intended to capture the 
organisational and operational circumstances within which programmes were carried 
out, it was decided that its use could be problematic if it implied, unintentionally, that 
these circumstances were somehow fixed and unchangeable. The researcher therefore 
decided to abandon the notion of ‘inherent’ in favour of simply stating that the 
perspective adopted by this thesis concentrated on capacity as being influenced by the 
organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations functioned, 
which retained the thrust of the perspective of capacity being employed. 
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Expert Assessment of Administrative Capacity for Development in South Africa 
 
 
Question 1: 
 
In this thesis, a ‘development’ programme 1 has been defined according to the following 
criteria, where such an initiative must exhibit the following features: 
 
1. Carry out a nation’s development goals, 
2. Introduce change in a society or community to increase its productive or 
organizational capacity, 
3. Improve the quality of peoples’ lives, including improvements in the well-being of 
the poor. 
 
In your view, what impact have development programmes had on public bureaucracies 
in South Africa, in terms of the latter’s ability to organize and carry these out? You may 
make your response in the form of key impact points: 
 
1.                                                                                                                                                
  
 
 
2.                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
3.                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
4.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
Question 2: 
 
In this thesis, ‘capacity’, in the context of public and development 
administration/management is being defined from the perspective of: 
 
• The inherent ability of public administration to respond to public (development) 
policy objectives. 2 
 
This perspective acknowledges that bureaucracies by definition have in-built structures, 
mechanisms and modes of decision-making and actions that come into play when 
development policy objectives are defined and pursued, through programmes for 
example. 
                                                 
1Following Louise White (1987) Creating Opportunities for Change: Approaches to Managing 
Development Programs. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
2Derick Brinkerhoff (1991a: 22) spoke to this perspective of capacity when he defined the term as 
the latent ability of a development programme organisation to generate outputs, where this was in 
turn linked to an ability to effectively combine existing physical, human and administrative 
resources. 
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In your view, what would you say are the key ‘inherent’ constraints that South Africa’s 
public bureaucracy has sustained in being able to carry out development programmes 
(as defined in question 1). You may make your response in the form of key points: 
 
1.                                                                                                                                                
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                         
2.                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3.                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4.                                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Question 3:  
 
This thesis submits that researching the capacity (inherent ability) of public 
bureaucracies to carry out development programmes can proceed with reference to 
three variables in particular: 1) environment, 2) strategy, 3) structure. 3 (See overleaf for 
definition of these variables) 
 
In your view, what would you say is the key issue affecting the capacity of South African 
public bureaucracies to carry out development programmes, associated with each of the 
three variables? 
 
1. Environment      Key issue:                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                                          
2. Strategy            Key issue:                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                         
3. Structure          Key issue:                                                                                                                            
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                 
3Following Samuel Paul (1982) Managing Development Programs: The Lessons of Success. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
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END OF ASSESSMENT 
 
MY SINCEREST THANKS FOR TAKING THE TIME TO PROVIDE YOUR VIEWS 
 
Vinothan Naidoo  
Ph.D. Candidate, University of Cape Town 
(vinothann@yahoo.com) 
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Appendix 
 
In researching the public management of development programmes, Samuel Paul 
(1982) attributed the following features to the three variables identified on page 2 above: 
 
 
1. Environment 
 
• The scope of a development programme, encompassing its geographical and 
sectoral spread; 
• The diversity of a development programme, comprising physical-geographical, 
cultural, socio-economic and political features in a programme’s setting. For 
example this could refer to the make-up of a programme’s beneficiary audience 
• The uncertainty accompanying a development programme, referring to how a 
programme responds to unpredictable or unforeseen changes 
 
 
2. Strategy: 
 
• The objectives specified by a government for a programme and how these 
objectives are to be arrived at. This would include: 
o Policy goals set for the programme 
o The allocation of financial resources  
o The specification of a programme’s operational framework  
 
• The relationship between a programme’s strategic objectives and its environment 
 
 
3. Structure: 
 
• Functional relationship between programmes and their sponsoring administrative 
bodies (i.e. departments)  
 
• Organisational relationship between programmes and their sponsoring 
administrative bodies (i.e. departments) 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Farmer testimonials: CASP Programme 
 
CASP Review Workshop 
14 March, 2007 
Midrand, Johannesburg 
 
 
 
Farming beneficiaries from South Africa’s provinces attended a CASP Programme 
review workshop that took place on the 14th and 15th of March 2007. The farmers were 
given an opportunity to address the gathering to report on their experiences, concerns 
and observations about participating on the CASP Programme. Comments from farmers 
representing eight of South Africa’s nine provinces (excluding Limpopo province) were 
recorded by the researcher as well as officially recorded by a representative of the 
consultants appointed to carry out the CASP review. Unfortunately, the researcher was 
not in possession of a tape recorder and so was unable to tape record the beneficiary 
testimonials, nor was the official transcription a verbatim recording, where it comprised a 
list of main points captured. 
 
The researcher attempted to record specific comments made by the farmer beneficiaries 
about their experiences with CASP. The researcher then sought to check/verify as well 
as elaborate these recordings by comparing them against the written transcript of the 
testimonials recorded by the rapporteur, and provided to the researcher. A final list of 
main points captured by the researcher is provided below.
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• More of social development in the Department of Agriculture than commercial 
development – referring to the approach of CASP, appears to exhibit less of a 
commercial imperative. 
 
• CASP needs to be appropriately planned for ‘farms’, not just ‘farmer’, towards 
making the farm a profitable enterprise. 
 
• Distinction drawn between ‘what do you need’, reference to what the farmer is 
asked (by Extension Officer) and ‘what is your strategic plan for your growth’. 
Mentioned that the first question that I got was wrong, or as the farmer seemed 
to feel, the wrong way of going about providing support. 
 
• Need for continuous training and mentoring until we are self-reliant.  
 
• ‘CASP must work with us’. Another farmer received grant. ‘when we do these 
things, we would really would like to work with you’. Quote referred to by 
representative from the Northern Cape: ‘Don’t plan for me without me’ 
 
• Reference to ‘wanting to become businesses and not projects of the Department 
of Agriculture’  
 
• Issue over how the grant is provided to farmers, where one farmer compared the 
Department of Social Welfare, which gives people grants directly, with the 
Department of Agriculture, which says ‘we’ll buy for you’. Beneficiary questioned 
whether this was appropriate. 
 
• Gives us sufficient funds, we will get the rest from others, we don’t want a hand 
out. 
 
• You have to be a group to get government funding, bias in the practice of the 
Department, unless a group of ‘blacks’ you won’t get money. 
 
• Farmer quotes section 38 of Public Finance Management Act, there is no reason 
not to give farmers funds directly to spend, why not give it directly to farmers. Is it 
the duty of the official to buy on behalf of farmers?  Section 38 of the PFMA 
allows for transfers to legal entities who show sufficient controls. 
 
• Farmer was told that funds weren’t available when this was supposed to be 
committed. He was then told to re-apply. 
 
• After approval the service provider refused to deliver because there were no prior 
arrangements on advance payments and payments after delivery of the service.  
This was reported to the department, who informed him (farmer) that the money 
that was approved for these projects was not available anymore.  He is still 
waiting.  The department told him that the money was used, and that the next 
budget does not include his approvals. 
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• In another testimonial, they applied for assistance and after a long wait they were 
informed that the application was wrong. 
 
• Pressure on farmers to spend monies committed late in financial year, where 
they were told the money would be taken back if it was not spent. This is a 
problem for farmers as they had already planned for their production. Farming 
organisation budgeted on R1, 2 million allocated to them but there were many 
delays, until a contractor was appointed last month (February?).  The group was 
not involved in the appointment of the contractor.  He has not been to the project 
yet.  They received a letter informing them that the money will be taken away if 
not spent by the end of this month (March). 
 
• Problems between contractors/service providers and administrators: farmer had 
to sell pigs (sows) at a loss because the piggery structure was not completed. 
The farmer has discovered that there are many ‘carcasses’ (incomplete 
erections) on other farms. In another incident, they received money for an 
irrigation system. A service provider was appointed.  The farmers were not 
involved.  The service providers left the work half done. In another instance, the 
service provider threatened to repossess the goods.  The department claimed 
that the paper work was wrong. Suggested to the department that they change 
the system to allow him to pay up front and provide the receipt later to the 
department.  This suggestion was rejected. 
 
• Procurement-it takes too long. 
 
• Procurement system was a ‘total mess’, length it took to get feedback on 
quotation was a problem as quotations have a lifespan. After submitting three 
quotations, approval was given but after a long time.  This happened after the 
lifetime of the quotation, with the result that the approved amount was 
inadequate. 
 
• A need to take fencing out of CASP, because it doesn’t support production or 
ability of farmer to enhance production and enterprises, towards reaching 
profitability. At the moment we have farmers with twenty cows applying for 
fencing.  Fencing is given, but there is no income generating activities so the 
farmer cannot salvage loans. 
 
• We need CASP to have a visibility. In Mpumalanga they were told that CASP 
only assisted with infrastructure, but was surprised to hear that there are actually 
six pillars.  This information needs to filter to the ground. First time we heard of 
CASP last week (Northern Cape) – De Aar. In a review meeting of the 
programme in Gauteng – the majority of the participants (farmers) did not know 
about CASP. 
 
• That information doesn’t go down to the farmers; they don’t understand it – this in 
relation to six pillar strategy and not just the infrastructure pillar. 
 
• Application forms: ‘most of the people don’t understand it’ 
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• Farmers mostly know how to farm (I think this refers to general practices), but 
they don’t necessary understand government policy/objectives. 
 
• Criticism of extension officers who may know technical aspects of agriculture but 
don’t have ‘business’ competence 
  
• We need business ‘support’ and ‘advice’ not assume we don’t know anything 
about farming/growing. 
 
• Time cycle is an issue: planting, soil preparation must wait for resources, can’t 
wait. 
 
• Disjuncture between farming season – and input requirements, and project 
planning, which sometimes leads to delays in production planning. The 
timeframes for considering applications are problematic. Sometimes resources 
are only approved after the planting opportunity has gone. 
 
• Problem of communication between service providers and farmers around 
‘technical’ issues, where service provider indicated to farmer that the erection of 
a structure had to be changed for ‘technical’ reasons/because of ‘technical’ 
issues, the farmer must know/understand what that means. Example: farmer 
applied for a dam but received water tanks. This was done without consulting 
her. 
 
• A lot of people are grouped together to farm, what happens when they have 
different interests (relates to needing to bring together a group of farmers to be 
able to purchase land, i.e. willing seller/willing buyer, on the reality that land could 
only be purchased on a collective basis where the grant per individual farmer 
was not sufficient to purchase land. 
 
• Groups are too big (farming groups), each group has its own group dynamics 
 
• Planning by group m mbers is sometimes a challenge 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
List of interviews conducted
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Number Departments interviewed as part of EPWP case study  
(For reasons of anonymity and confidentiality, the names and designations of officials and 
stakeholders have been withheld) 
Date and Place 
of interview 
1 National Department of Public Works 22 January 2007, 
Pretoria 
2 National Department of Trade and Industry 22 January 2007, 
Pretoria 
3 Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) (Public entity involved in the implementation of the 
EPWP) 
23 January 2007, 
Midrand 
4 National Department of Provincial and Local Government 23 January 2007, 
Pretoria 
5 National Department of Public Works 23 January 2007, 
Centurion 
6 National Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 24 January 2007, 
Pretoria 
7 National Department of Education 25 January 2007, 
Pretoria 
8 National Department of Labour 25 January 2007, 
Pretoria 
9 National Department of Public Works 25 January 2007, 
Pretoria 
10 National Department of Agriculture 25 January 2007, 
Pretoria 
11 National Department of Public Works 26 January 2007, 
Pretoria 
12 National Department of Public Works 26 January 2007, 
Pretoria 
13 National Department of Health 8 February 2007, 
Pretoria 
14 National Department of Social Development 8 February 2007, 
Pretoria 
15 National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 6 February 2007, 
Cape Town 
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16 National Treasury (Department of Finance)  8 February 2007, 
Pretoria 
17 National Department of Public Works 9 February 2007, 
Pretoria 
18 Member of Parliament, Republic of South Africa 12 February 
2007, Cape Town 
19 Shisaka Development Management Services  16 February 
2007, (via 
telephone) 
20 National Department of Public Works 9 February 2007, 
Pretoria 
21 National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 26 February 
2007, Cape Town 
Number Departments interviewed as part of CASP case study  
(For reasons of anonymity and confidentiality, the names and designations of officials and 
stakeholders have been withheld)  
Date and Place 
of interview 
22 National Department of Agriculture 3 April 2007, 
Pretoria 
23 National Department of Agriculture 3 April 2007, 
Pretoria 
24 National Department of Agriculture 3 April 2007, 
Pretoria 
25 National Treasury (Department of Finance) 3 April 2007, 
Pretoria; follow-
up phone 
interview on 2 
May, 2007 
26 Department of Agriculture, Western Cape province 18 April 2007, 
Elsenburg, 
Western Cape 
27 National Department of Land Affairs 26 April 2007, 
Pretoria  
28 Umhlaba Rural Services  23 April 2007, via 
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telephone 
29 National Department of Land Affairs  26 April 2007, 
Pretoria 
30 
 
 
Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal province 4 May 2007, Via 
telephone 
31 National Department of Land Affairs  16 May 2007, Via 
telephone 
32 Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Eastern Cape province 17 May 2007, Via 
telephone 
33  Department of Agriculture, Free State province 31 May 2007, Via 
telephone 
34  Department of Agriculture, Free State province 30 May 2007, Via 
telephone 
35  Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Gauteng province 29 May 2007, Via 
telephone 
36  Department of Agriculture, Land Reform, Environment and Conservation, Northern Cape province  6 June 2007, via 
telephone 
37 
 
 
Department of Agriculture, North West province 14 September 
2007, Via 
telephone 
Number Other interviews 
(names and designations of officials withheld for reasons of anonymity and confidentiality) 
Date and place 
of interview 
38 Office of the Public Service Commission 24 January 2007, 
Pretoria 
39 National Treasury (Department of Finance) 11 June 2007, 
Pretoria 
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Number Academics interviewed Date and place 
of interview 
40 F. Cloete, Professor, School of Public Management and Planning, University of Stellenbosch 22 March, 2007, 
Stellenbosch 
41 E. Schwella, Professor, School of Public Management and Planning, University of Stellenbosch 22 March, 2007, 
Stellenbosch 
42 F. Theron, Senior Lecturer, School of Public Management and Planning, University of Stellenbosch 12 April 2007, 
Stellenbosch 
43 
 
 
F.C. de Beer, Professor, Department of Development Studies, formerly Department of Development 
Administration, University of South Africa 
26 April 2007, 
Pretoria  
44 
 
 
M. Wallis, Executive Dean: Faculty of Commerce, Durban University of Technology 7 May 2007, via 
telephone 
45 
 
 
P. FitzGerald, Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Finance, University of the Witwatersrand 22 January 2008, 
Johannesburg 
 
